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ABSTRACT 
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Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2017 
The objective of this study was to understand pilots’ proclivity toward automation usage 
by identifying the relationship among pilot training, aircraft and systems understanding, 
safety culture, manual flight behavior, and aviation passion.  A survey instrument titled 
Manual Flight Inventory (MFI) was designed to gather and assess self-reported variables 
of manual flight behavior, aviation passion, safety culture perception, pilot training, and 
pilot understanding.  Demographic data and automation opinion-based questions were 
also asked to fully understand pilots’ thoughts on automation, safety culture, policies, 
procedures, training methodologies and assessment measures, levels of understanding, 
and study techniques.  Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was utilized to identify 
underlying factors from the data, followed by confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
confirm the factor structure.  Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was utilized to test the 
relationships between the variables.  All hypotheses were significant; however, four of 
the thirteen hypotheses were not supported due to a negative relationship.  The significant 
predictors of manual flight were identified to be pilot understanding, pilot training, 
aviation passion, and safety culture.  Pilots’ understanding of the aircraft operating 
systems was determined to have the greatest influence over a pilot’s decision to manually 
fly.  Aviation passion was identified as the second largest influencing factor.  Pilot 
v 
training had the greatest influence over pilot understanding, and safety culture presented 
the greatest influence over pilot training.  Results identified that safety culture was 
negatively impacting pilot training, and pilot training had a negative influence over 
pilots’ decision to manually fly.  The contributions of this research have identified the 
significance of safety culture as associated with Safety Management Systems (SMS) as 
an influencing factor over pilot training and resultant operational performance.  Pilot 
understanding is a direct result of pilot training, and current training practices are 
negatively influencing the decision for manual flight.  Therefore, a solution to the 
industry problem—operational confusion (understanding), as well as guidance versus 
control (Abbott, 2015), and the lack of hand flying skills and monitoring ability (OIG, 
2016)—can now be addressed by improving training practices.  Future research and 
recommendations were provided.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Air France Flight 447, Colgan Air Flight 3407, Asiana Flight 214, and UPS Flight 
1354 were a series of catastrophic accidents attributed to pilot error due to inadequate 
skill.  However, critical analysis of these accidents revealed problems beyond skill to 
include lack of systems and aircraft understanding, as well as incorrect operational 
procedures (BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010; NTSB, 2014a; NTSB, 2014b).  While automation 
was designed to improve safety, pilot training may not be keeping up with technological 
growth, leaving pilots without a thorough understanding of aircraft systems and 
operational procedures that may be resulting in pilots’ reluctance to manually fly their 
aircraft without the autopilot and autothrust (Young, Fanjoy & Suckow, 2006).  Whereas 
the option to disengage the autothrust and autopilot remains in the pilot’s control, 
component failure may cause unintended disengagement requiring manual flight 
proficiency.  Thus, pilots should be able to manage the aircraft in all modes of operation 
from Level 0 (no autopilot, autothrust, and flight director) to a fully automated and 
managed aircraft of Level 4.  Pilots should also have competency beyond rote 
memorization of aircraft limitations, to a level of knowledge where they possess a 
complete understanding of instrument displays, system operations, and operational 
procedures in order fully realize situation awareness (SA) (Endsley, 2001).  SA is defined 
as “the perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, 
the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” 
(Endsley, 2001, p. 5).  While research has identified that technology improves 
visualization in the glass cockpit aircraft, this technology could also be a contributory 
factor of reduced skills in the ability to scan.  There is concern that if the automation were 
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to fail and pilots were required to fly on standby instruments, they may have problems 
maintaining control within required speed, heading, and altitude control of ten knots, ten 
degrees, and 100 feet respectively (Young, Fanjoy & Suckow, 2006).   
The Next Generation Air Transport System (NextGen) is underway, where 
satellite-based systems will replace ground-based systems for air traffic management 
(Curtis, Jentsch, & Wise, 2010).  Continued technological advancement will necessitate 
that pilots taxi utilizing moving maps, execute satellite-based landing procedures, and 
assume responsibility for aircraft separation (FAA, 2016; Krois, Piccione, & McCloy, 
2010).  With increased complexity and additional responsibilities, reduced SA will create 
an environment susceptible to human error.  Krois, Piccione, and McCloy (2010) purport, 
“Major changes in NextGen flight decks provide new opportunities for error as well as a 
change in the nature and frequency of existing error patterns” (p. 705).  History has also 
shown that any time new technology is introduced, an area of instability develops 
associated with a learning curve, creating an environment ripe for catastrophe (Salas, 
Maurino, & Curtis, 2010).  If pilots do not have a solid understanding of their aircraft and 
procedures, possessing both cognitive and physical skills, the added complexity of 
NextGen may increase instability with additional technological distractions (Darr, Ricks, 
& Lemos, 2010).  NextGen pilots will also have fewer opportunities to manually fly, due 
to regulatory pilot-managed separation and automated arrivals (Darr, Ricks, & Lemos, 
2010; FAA, 2016).  A paradigm shift is underway where manual flight skills may become 
archaic due to NextGen yet will remain essential for safe operations when systems fail 
(FAA, 2016).  Thus, the necessity for pilots to understand and manage the automated 
aircraft, with or without the autopilot and autothrust, and perhaps without the flight 
director engaged, remains a key issue in merging automated aircraft into the NextGen 
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automated environment with human operators (Casner, Geven, & Williams, 2013; 
Franks, Hay, & Mavin, 2014; Geiselman, Johnson, & Buck, 2013; Haslbeck, Ekkerhart, 
Onnasch, Huttig, Bubb, & Bengler, 2012; Kole, Healy, & Fierman, 2010; Moll, 2012).   
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) chief scientific and technical 
advisor for the flight deck human factors group identified flight skill loss and mode 
awareness to be industry problems, but also included issues dealing with operational 
confusion (understanding), as well as guidance versus control (Abbott, 2015).  The Office 
of Inspector General (OIG) further identified pilots’ lack of hand flying skills and 
monitoring ability to be industry issues (OIG, 2016).  However, these industry concerns 
should be of no surprise, in that an FAA human factors task force reported similar issues 
in 1996, where pilots showed weaknesses in “understanding, automation/mode 
awareness, and insufficient knowledge and skills” (FAA, 1996, pp. 23-24).  The human 
factors task force also reported heightened concern with both “the quality and quantity of 
automation training” (FAA, 1996, p. 33).  Nineteen years after that 1996 report was 
presented to the human factors committee, the chair of that committee spoke of those 
exact industry concerns at the 2015 Flight Safety IASS conference (Abbott, 2015).  
Recommendations from that FAA (1996) safety report went unaddressed, and today 
flight skill loss, due to automation reliance and complacency, continues to grow as an 
industry concern (Abbott, 2015; Curtis et.al., 2010; FAA, 1996; Franks, Hay, & Mavin, 
2014; Geiselman, Johnson, & Buck, 2013; Haslbeck et al., 2012; Moll, 2012).   
Research has identified that unheeded concerns contained within that 1996 FAA 
report were contributing factors to numerous accidents, incidents, and thousands of 
events resulting from pilot error (FAA, 2013d).  An FAA sponsored working group (WG) 
examined 46 major incidents and accidents, 734 Aviation Safety Reporting System 
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(ASRS) reports, 9,155 Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA), and interviewed 
numerous pilots, and identified insufficient understanding of aircraft systems, overuse of 
automation, and flight skill loss, associated with training, to be contributing factors to 
pilot error (FAA, 2013d).  In response to the concern for flight skill loss, the FAA 
released a safety alert to encourage manual flight (FAA, 2013a).  Despite the FAA 
directive, it appears that pilots may be reluctant to manually fly their aircraft; therefore, 
flight skill loss has become an industry issue (OIG, 2016).  This reluctance to fly may be 
diminishing pilots’ skills as a result of and/or contributing to the lack of confidence.   
The nature of long-haul flying has created additional challenges for pilot 
competency and performance in that technology enables aircraft to stay aloft for many 
hours.  Long-haul flights therefore demand multiple pilots due to the length of flight 
time; yet, with only one flight segment every other day, only one of the three to four 
pilots have the opportunity for a takeoff or landing event to maintain currency (FAA, 
2008).  Reduced vertical separation minimums (RVSM) require autopilot usage enroute 
(FAA, 2015b), and the typical airline pilot is said to manually fly less than two-minutes 
per flight (Lowy, 2011).  As opposed to domestic flying, many long-haul pilots also visit 
a simulator every 90-days, per Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.439, in lieu of 
flying, yet only meet minimum requirements during this currency event to make them 
legal.  Many FAA approved training programs require pilots to train themselves at home, 
allow the classroom portion of training to be an instructor review of the electronic test, 
followed by a computer assessment of pilots’ systems knowledge versus a traditional oral 
exam to assess understanding, followed by simulator sessions that only allow the pilot to 
experience an event once (FAA, 2017a).  However, in order to learn, pilots must not only 
have aptitude, but they must also have the ability to practice through repetition, receive 
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feedback, and feel confident that the level of performance they achieve will ensure a safe 
operation (English & Visser, 2014; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Huddleson & Rolfe, 1971; 
Johnson, & Fowler, 2011).  A pilot must experience success to feel confident.  Without 
repetition to a continued set of successful attempts, doubt will prevail, leaving the pilot 
with diminished confidence (Johnson & Fowler, 2011).  General aviation flight activity 
may also impact a pilot’s decision to disengage automation during flight associated with 
work, in that the pilot’s passion may transfer to the job with greater interest resulting in 
self-directed learning.  Safety culture, policy, and training methodologies may impose 
additional factors that impact pilot behavior concerning manual flight. 
Within the advanced qualification program (AQP), a train to proficiency program 
introduced in 1990, pilot training has shifted from individual performance assessment to 
crew-based performance assessment (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 1999).  Under 
AQP guidelines, airlines have realized an economic benefit by reducing the training 
footprint.  However, training assessment effectiveness has been an ongoing concern and 
may still be in question (Nemeth, 2015).  This raises the question as to how AQP training 
has impacted pilots’ aircraft systems and operational understanding, confidence, 
monitoring skills, and willingness to manually fly.  The first step in finding a solution to 
these industry problems—flight skill loss, lack of mode awareness and confusion 
(Abbott, 2015); lack of hand flying and monitoring skills (OIG, 2016); and lack of 
aircraft understanding and overuse of automation (FAA, 2013d)—is to understand how 
current training practices, pilots’ understanding, safety culture, and passion, may impact 
performance and pilots’ reluctance to manually fly.  NextGen will increase pilots’ 
responsibility, adding more complexity and creating opportunities for error (Curtis, 
Jentsch, & Wise, 2010).  However, safety management systems (SMS) are designed to 
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evaluate the environment, assess hazards, mitigate risk, and capture errors (FAA, 2013b; 
Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  In the middle of these two spectrums of safety, NextGen and 
SMS, pilot performance becomes an integral part of the entire system.   
Significance of the Study 
This research identified that safety culture is influencing pilot training with a 
negative impact on operational performance.  The results identified that current training 
practices are negatively influencing the decision for manual flight, and further identified 
the importance of pilots’ understanding of their aircraft is essential to their decision to 
manually fly.  Therefore, a solution to the industry problems—operational confusion 
(understanding), as well as guidance versus control (Abbott, 2015), the lack of hand 
flying skills and monitoring ability (OIG, 2016)—can now be addressed by improving 
training practices.  
Statement of the Problem 
Industry reports supported by academic literature indicate that pilots may not 
understand aircraft systems, lack flight skills due to automation dependence, and have 
ineffective monitoring skills; all of which could be a direct result of safety culture, pilot 
training and associated levels of understanding, and aviation passion with resultant 
impact on the decision to manually fly.    
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this research was to examine the relationships among training 
methodologies, pilots’ aircraft understanding, safety culture, aviation passion, and 
manual flight, in order to address industry concerns of automation dependence, 
confusion, lack of mode awareness, and flight skill loss.  The strongest predictors of 
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automation, meaning the events impacting a pilot’s decision to manually fly, could 
therefore be utilized for empirical research at a later date.   
Current industry reports have identified performance issues in modern-day glass 
cockpit aircraft to include loss of manual flight skills, inability to read the flight mode 
annunciator, and lack of understanding, which have resulted in accidents, incidents, and 
safety reports.  Whereas current literature has identified automation challenges to include 
trust and reliability, complacency, display and integrated systems design, confidence, and 
situation awareness, a gap in the research appears to exist as to what factors impact 
pilots’ performance and proclivity toward automation usage, and if automation usage is 
impacting performance.  In addition, while much research has been conducted on safety 
culture, a gap in the research exists as to how safety culture may impact a pilot’s 
willingness to manually fly, pilot training, and aircraft understanding.  
Research Questions  
The overarching research question is—does pilot training, aircraft understanding, 
aviation passion, and safety culture, impact a pilot’s decision as to the level of automation 
usage?  Moreover, in what extent do these factors impact each other?  Likewise, could 
demographics such as age, gender, geographic location, flight hours, type of aircraft, or 
general aviation flight impact pilots’ performance associated with the level of automation 
utilized?    
Aviators’ performance has become an industry problem, but factors impacting 
this performance have yet to be determined.  In this research, the level of performance 
identifies how the aviator chooses to operate the aircraft indicated by the level of 
automation selected.  The FAA appears to have recognized the relationship between 
manual flight and pilot proficiency because the agency recommended that pilots should 
8 
 
manually fly their aircraft (FAA, 2013a).  Yet, despite this recommendation, the OIG 
reported pilots continue to lack hand-flying skills and lack monitoring ability—where 
manual flight is a skill that speaks directly to pilot understanding of the aircraft they are 
operating (OIG, 2016).  Pilots' unwillingness to manually fly has been identified as an 
industry problem, but the specific reasons for this unwillingness to manually fly have yet 
to be identified or acknowledged.  A survey instrument—Manual Flight Inventory 
(MFI)—was developed, tested, and validated to conduct this research.  MFI is a survey 
instrument designed to assess self-reported variables with a measurement tool that had 
not been previously validated or previously utilized, thus considered new scale 
development. 
In that this research was based upon new scale development, exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) was utilized to extract underlying factors among selected input variables 
in the analysis.  After EFA was run, hypotheses were formed.  A confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) measurement model was then built and tested.  Structural equation 
modeling (SEM) was utilized to test the relationships between factors in order to better 
understand the underlying correlations that could influence pilot behavior where manual 
flight and a variety of variables are concerned.  The MFI survey was developed to better 
understand these relationships to assist the industry to be better equipped to both 
comprehend and solve the problem, in addition to providing a theoretical contribution, 
adding to the body of knowledge. 
Delimitations 
Multiple factors could impact a pilot’s willingness to manually fly; however, this 
research focused only on pilot training, pilots’ systems understanding, safety culture, 
aviation passion, and the level of automation usage.  This study targeted airline, charter, 
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and corporate/fractional pilots, worldwide, in multiple aircraft types.  Pilot instructors and 
check airman were allowed to participate, despite that these training professionals should 
have higher levels of understanding than the average line pilot.  Pilots employed in single 
pilot operations were not utilized due to a single pilot operation may necessitate higher 
automation usage to reduce workload to a manageable level.  Pilots who have retired or 
were between jobs within the previous 12 calendar months were allowed to participate, in 
that many active pilots sit reserve and may not fly during the year and many receive 
recurrent training on an annual basis.  The pilots who were retired or between jobs within 
a year were perceived to still have enough recent experience and perception of past 
behavior.  Pilots who were in the middle of training with a new company, or on a new 
aircraft type, were requested to respond with answers based upon their most recent 
aircraft in which they had experience.  To ensure pilots’ opinions were based upon their 
experience and not a perception of what they thought may be the case, the questions were 
designed to be non-conditional.  For example, a domestic pilot was not requested to state 
their opinion on the perception of utilizing automation at the end of a long-haul flight that 
they never experienced.  Each automation opinion-based question was designed to allow 
the pilot the ability to answer based upon their experience and frame of reference.  This 
research was not intended to study pilots within an individual country or a specific 
operator but designed to be a broad view of the worldwide pilot population, therefore 
demographic data was collected based upon general geographic locations. 
Limitations and Assumptions 
A potential limitation of this study was the lack of a perfect sampling frame due 
to expansive worldwide operations, which necessitated relying upon nonprobability 
sampling.  Therefore, the sample was primarily located through social network systems 
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(SNS)—virtual platforms where pilots connect and communicate—with a hybrid of 
snowball sampling, respondent drive sampling, and purposive sampling. 
This sample could also express a higher passion for aviation, and therefore would 
be more apt to be motivated for self-directed learning than a pilot whose only interest was 
the perception of a large paycheck.  However, many pilots also connect to these sites for 
the sole purpose of shifting jobs and searching for better career opportunities, thus 
participation could be career-motivated versus passion driven.  Posting a survey link on 
the open Internet also has the risk of anyone who has access to potentially taking it.  
Informational messages were utilized to engage potential participants.  These potential 
participants were directed to another site that provided more information and articulated 
the purpose of the research.  Precautions were taken to never post the survey link to any 
SNS public forum, but to send potential participants to two sites to further explain the 
purpose of the research and the qualifications to participate.  Potential participants were 
directed to go to the researcher’s blog that would identify qualifications and request help 
for survey fulfillment from qualified participants.  Potential participants were then 
directed to a website that reiterated qualifications and further explained the purpose, 
history, declaration of anonymity, and provided the survey link.   
The researcher is a part of the target population, is an author with a public 
domain, and is active on SNS.  A perceived limitation of this research could be the 
inability to separate the researcher’s scholarly work with that of personal opinions, 
aviation activity, publications, and blogging activity due to the internet.  While there is no 
indication, research or otherwise, that would indicate this would be the case, protections 
were taken to design the survey questions in a manner that a public profile would not 
influence how the participants would respond.  To separate the industry related issues and 
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opinions from the survey, a survey link was never connected to an aviation industry 
statement.  
Pilot personality profiles have been identified with low Neuroticism 60% (13% 
high); Conscientious was at 58% high (7.5% low); Extrovert scale was 42% high (23% 
low); Openness was 29% high (37% low); and Agreeableness was 27% high (32% low) 
(Makarowski, Smolicz, & Plopa, 2016; Fitzgibbons, Davis, and Schutte, 2004).  This 
research indicates that pilots are emotionally stable extroverts who are highly 
conscientious and hold strong opinions.  While these statistics fall within the normal 
distribution, the data indicate that a greater percentage of pilots may not to be open to 
new ideas or agreeable.  Therefore, the assumption was made, due to the pilot 
personality, that pilots would not be swayed by opinions of another, but more than 
willing to stand up for their belief system.  Research further identified political opinions 
on Twitter noted as opinion leadership regarding influence of political participation and 
found that Twitter identified with significantly impacting a persons’ involvement in the 
political processes; however, utilizing Twitter did not necessarily support a person’s 
engagement (Park, 2013).  
Both online and paper surveys were utilized to avoid potential limitation of one 
methodology versus the other.  Query and Wright (2003) conducted a combination of 
online and paper surveys for older adults and reported no discernable differences between 
data collection formats.  Thus, there was no reason to expect that the pilot population 
would have different results between paper and online surveys.  The primary assumption 
was that the pilots would tell the truth when taking the survey.  There was also the 
assumption that those taking the online survey are in fact who they claim to be, and 
therefore part of the target population.  As with any survey, self-reported data could be 
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subject to accuracy bias in that the surveyed pilots may have an inflated self-perception.  
Research indicates that pilots may also remember successes more than failures, thus 
inaccurately overestimating their own abilities (Bénabou & Tirole, 2002; Compte & 
Postlewaite, 2004).  This inaccurate assessment is not dependent upon educational level.  
In a study of judges and college professors, there was no difference in overestimation, in 
that 94% of college professors surveyed believed they were better than their colleagues 
(Gilovich, 1991, as cited in Bénabou & Tirole, 2002); and 90% of federal judges viewed 
they were above average as compared to their peers (Guthrie et al., 2001, as cited in 
Compte & Postlewaite, 2004).  Therefore, the pilot may indicate a higher level of 
knowledge, ability, or performance than he or she may actually have.  However, 
reporting higher than actual ability could be equally, or more, prevalent during an 
interview due the respondent’s embarrassment in reporting low knowledge and 
performance ability to the interviewer versus a computer or paper survey.  In an attempt 
to eliminate accuracy bias, a number of efforts were taken to include emphasis upon 
anonymity, clearly defined goals, and survey question structure.  Pilots’ names, and the 
name of their employer, were not asked; therefore, performance was not linked to the 
pilot or company.  A detailed explanation as to the purpose of this research was provided 
to promote participation.  Survey questions were designed in a manner to assist the pilot 
respondent in answering the question without forcing the pilot to select one extreme or 
another.  Then tests were conducted to assure validity and reliability.  Despite the 
precautions to encourage participants to respond honestly, the limitation of assessing the 
level of pilots’ understanding, without an actual test to determine knowledge, could be 
reflective of pilots’ over confidence of their knowledge more so than their actual 
understanding.  Confidence was removed as a factor due to potential high cross-loading 
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with the factor labeled Understanding.  However, the factor Understanding responses 
could be reflective of confidence versus actual knowledge.  
The greatest overall limitations could be due to (a) demographics of a worldwide 
sample associated with misunderstood questions due to language barriers, (b) company 
and manufacturer mandates dictating automation usage, and (c) the vast number of 
potential situations that would impact a pilot’s decision to manually fly.  First, while 
English is the required language of pilots worldwide, there is a potential for a conceptual 
misunderstanding of the questions due to English being the second language for many 
participants.  Second, each company and aircraft manufacturer may also have a variety of 
automation mandates, beyond government regulations, that may leave the pilot without a 
choice for manual flight.  Third, the combination of potential reasons a pilot may choose 
automation over manual flight are far too many to capture in this survey instrument, as 
the increased length of adding these additional questions would have greatly increased 
the risk of survey fatigue.  Moreover, asking questions with multiple combinations of 
possibilities, that are type of flying dependent, would be asking pilots to guess and 
respond to something they may not have experienced.  Eliminating these types of 
questions that may not pertain to everyone enabled the pilots to answer based upon their 
actual experience.   
Definitions of Terms 
Adaptive expertise Adaptive expertise is where understanding and contextual-
based knowledge, combined with motivation for problem 
solving, creates adaptive and flexible strategies for 
unexpected events (Bohle, Stalmeijer, Konings, Segers, & 
Van Merrienboer, 2014). 
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Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) ADM is “a systematic approach to 
the mental process used by pilots to consistently determine 
the best course of action in response to a given set of 
circumstances” (Federal Aviation Administration, 1991, p. 
4). 
AvGeek “An AvGeek is someone who is passionate about aviation 
and that passion can be shown in countless ways” to 
include photography, aviation club participation, reading 
aviation magazines and books, flying home simulators, 
and/or owning aircraft models (Brown, 2013, par. 4). 
Aviation passion Passion is defined as “a strong inclination toward an 
activity that people like, find important and which they 
invest their time and energy” (Vallerand et al., 2008, p. 1), 
whereas aviation passion is a passionate connection to 
aviation. 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) ASAP is a pilot self-reporting 
program to encourage pilots to report information for 
system improvement without fear of disciplinary action 
(FAA, 2004b).  The ASAP reports are directed to the 
pilots’ airline. 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) The ASRS is a voluntary 
program that receives and analyzes incident reports that 
describe unsafe events and potential hazards from “pilots, 
air traffic controllers, dispatchers, cabin crew, maintenance 
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technicians, and others” to improve safety (NASA, 2015, p. 
4).  This report is submitted to NASA. 
Automaticity When a pilot’s knowledge is at the level where he or she 
does not have to think about what to do, the response is 
automatic (Casner, Geven, & Williams, 2013). 
Automation For the purpose of this study, automation refers to a fully 
engaged auto-flight system, where the autopilot and 
authothrust are both engaged, and aircraft control is 
determined by parameters programed into the computer by 
the pilots, or with pilot mode control panel intervention as 
required per ATC commands (OIG, 2016). 
Automation dependence For the purpose of this study, automation 
dependence is a pilot’s reliance on both the autopilot and 
autothrust (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008). 
Cognitive architecture Cognitive architecture is the framework 
representing the mind’s structures and processes, related to 
working memory, information processing, and long-term 
memory storage (Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). 
Competency For the purpose of this study, competency is “the consistent 
application of knowledge and skill to the standard of 
performance required in the workplace.  It embodies the 
ability to transfer and apply skills and knowledge to new 
situations and environments” (Franks et al., 2014, p. 132). 
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Corporate culture Corporate culture is a pattern of behavior stemming from 
artifacts, espoused values and beliefs, underlying 
assumptions, and policies and procedures, to include 
elements of a safety culture, identifying organizational 
processes (Schein, 2010; Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). 
Confidence The pilot’s belief that he or she will perform well, know 
what they are doing, and will succeed at a given action 
(Johnson, & Fowler, 2011). 
Confusion A situation in which people are uncertain about what to do 
or are unable to understand something clearly; the feeling 
that you have when you do not understand what is 
happening, what is expected, etc.; a state or situation in 
which many things are happening in a way that is not 
controlled or orderly” (Confusion, n.d., para. 11). 
Consciously competent “The crew has the knowledge and skill to cope with 
the situation but must apply much effort to deal with it” 
(Besco, 1997, p. 60). 
Consciously incompetent “The crew knows what they don't know.  This can 
occur when the crew is aware of the gravity of the problem 
but is unable to select suitable responses to the perceived 
situation” (Besco, 1997, p. 59). 
Flexible culture “People can adapt organizational processes when facing 
high temporary operations or certain kinds of danger, 
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shifting from the conventional hierarchical mode to a flatter 
mode” (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015, p. 28). 
Flight skill loss For the purpose of this paper, flight skill loss refers to the 
reduction in manual flying skills. 
Flight training Training in a simulator or aircraft, other than ground 
training. 
Fly-by-wire The term used for an aircraft where electronic signals 
provide input to flight control surfaces versus cable driven 
control (Airbus, 2003). 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) FOQA is a voluntary safety 
program that collects digital performance data during flight 
operations, enabling participating airlines to share de-
identified data to identify operating trends in order to 
improve performance (FAA, 2004a). 
Full autoflight Full autoflight indicates that both the autopilot and 
autothrust are engaged, and the aircraft is being flown per 
pilot programmed commands without mode control panel 
interventions (FAA, 2016; OIG, 2016). 
Full manual flight For the purpose of this research, full manual flight is where 
the pilot manually flies the aircraft without the authothrust, 
autopilot, and flight director engaged (OIG, 2016). 
Glass cockpit A flight deck with integrated electronic instrument displays 
versus analog digital flight instruments termed round-dial. 
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Harmonious passion  Harmonious passion is passion internalized into the 
individual’s identity, where they are highly motivated and 
dedicated, and this passion is in harmony with their life 
(Kocjan, 2015). 
Informed culture “Those who manage and operate the system have current 
knowledge about human, technical, organizational, and 
environmental factors that determine the safety of the 
system as a whole” (Gain, 2004, p. 4). 
Initial flight training  Initial flight training is defined as qualification and 
is the training program administered to a pilot new to an 
aircraft, under the airline’s approved program (FAA, 
2017a). 
Just culture “A just culture refers to a way of safety thinking that 
promotes a questioning attitude, is resistant to 
complacency, is committed to excellence, and fosters both 
personal accountability and corporate self-regulation in 
safety matters” (Gain, 2004, p. 4). 
Knowledge For the purpose of this study, knowledge includes both 
declarative knowledge (factual knowledge the pilot has 
about the aircraft operating, annunciation, and navigation 
systems) and procedural knowledge (pilots know how to 
perform the company’s standard operating procedures), 
pertaining to the aircraft and flight operations. 
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Learning culture “Continuous improvement is a characteristic of a learning 
culture that enables proactive risk management through 
process improvement” (Yantiss, 2011, p. 169). 
Legacy carrier A legacy carrier is an airline that had an established route 
structure prior to the Deregulation Act of 1978 (Wensveen, 
2011). 
Level 0 automation For the purposes of this paper, level 0 automation is manual 
flight, without any automation engaged (Aldana, 2013). 
Level 1 automation For the purposes of this paper, level 1 automation indicates 
that only the flight director is engaged, and the flight is 
being flown without autothrust or the autopilot and is 
considered manual flight for LOSA observations (FAA, 
2013d). 
Level 2 automation For the purposes of this paper, level 2 automation indicates 
that the flight director and the autothrust are both engaged, 
yet the autopilot is disengaged, which is also considered 
manual flight per the OIG (OIG, 2016). 
Level 3 automation For the purpose of this paper, level 3 automation indicates 
that the flight director, autothrust, and autopilot are all 
engaged—termed full autoflight—yet performance 
parameter interventions are available to the pilot, also 
termed tactical autoflight (OIG, 2016). 
Level 4 automation Level 4 automations is a fully automated aircraft, with the 
flight director, autothrust, and autopilot engaged, and the 
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aircraft is being flown per programmed commands without 
mode control panel interventions—the concept of NextGen 
operations (Aldana, 2013; FAA, 2016; OIG, 2016). 
Line Check Safety Audit (LCSA) “LCSA is an event in which a check airman 
occupying the jump seat observes a flight crew in the 
operation of an aircraft” (Esser, 2005, p. 8). 
Line Operational Evaluation (LOE) “LOE is an evaluation of individual 
and crew performance in a flight simulation device 
conducted during real-time.  LOE is primarily designed in 
accordance with an approved design methodology for 
crewmember evaluation under an AQP” (FAA, 2004b, 
p.iii). 
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) “LOFT is conducted as a line 
operation and allows for no interruption by the instructor 
during the session except for a non-disruptive acceleration 
of uneventful enroute segments” (FAA, 2004b, pii).  A 
LOFT can either be an initial qualification LOFT, or a 
recurrent LOFT. 
Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA) “LOSA is an event in which a 
trained individual occupying the jump seat observes a flight 
crew in the operation of an aircraft” (Esser, 2005. p. 8). 
Manual flight For the purpose of this research, manual flight is where the 
pilot manually flies the aircraft without the authothrust and 
autopilot engaged (OIG, 2016). 
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Mode Awareness “Awareness of aircraft configuration and auto flight system 
modes.  The latter includes such aspects as current and 
target speed, altitude, heading, AP/FD armed/engaged 
modes and the state of flight management system (FMS) 
data entries” (Airbus, 2007, p. 1). 
Network driven sampling A term utilized in this research to identify a non-
random sampling method that is a hybrid of purposive 
sampling, snowball sampling and respondent driven 
sampling, where the researcher is a member of population 
that does not have a sampling frame, and relies upon 
recruitment methods of purposive sampling, respondent 
driven sampling, and snowball sampling. 
NextGen The Next Generation Air Transport System, where satellite-
based systems will replace ground-based systems for air 
traffic management (Curtis, Jentsch, & Wise, 2010). 
Obsessive passion Obsessive passion stems from the need for social 
acceptance and self-esteem, where the individual’s identity 
becomes the driving force for the passion, more so than the 
enjoyment (Kocjan, 2015). 
Purposive sampling “A type of nonprobability sampling in which the units to be 
observed are selected on the basis of researcher’s judgment 
about which ones will be the most useful or representative” 
(Babbie, 2013, p. 128).  
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Recency training A recency event is a simulator training event where a pilot 
performs three takeoffs and landings, within 90-days, to 
maintain currency per Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 
121.439 (GPO, 2015). 
Recreational flight A pilot flies an aircraft on their days off, not for hire, but 
for enjoyment. 
Recurrent simulator training Recurrent simulator training is an FAA 
mandate where pilots will receive an approved number of 
simulator days, per airline, for training and evaluation, 
conducted on either a sixth month, nine month, or annual 
cycle (GPO).  A typical example for a cycle could be every 
nine months the pilot will spend two, four-hour sessions in 
the simulator (day-one and day-two).  The first day is 
training, the second day is checking.  
Reserve system An airline operating system where pilots are paid to 
standby, on call, in the event they are needed to fly. 
Respondent driven sampling Respondent-driven sampling (RDS), 
combines "snowball sampling" (getting individuals to refer 
those they know, these individuals in turn refer those they 
know and so on) with a mathematical model that weights 
the sample to compensate for the fact that the sample was 
collected in a non-random way (Volz et al., 2012).  
Reporting culture A culture where reporting safety related information is both 
encouraged and rewarded (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). 
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Safety culture “The shared values, action, and behaviors that demonstrate 
a commitment to safety over competing goals and 
demands” (FAA, 2013b, p. 9).  A positive safety culture 
includes five subcultures—reporting culture, a just culture, 
a flexible culture, an informed culture, and learning culture 
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015). 
Safety management systems (SMS) “SMS is the formal, top-down, organization-
wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the 
effectiveness of safety risk controls.  It includes systematic 
procedures, practices, and policies for the management of 
safety risk” (FAA, 2016, A-2). 
Situation awareness “The perception of the elements in the environment within 
a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their 
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near 
future” (Endsley, 2001, p. 5). 
Snowball sampling Snowball sampling is “a technique for finding research 
subjects.  One subject gives the researcher the name of 
another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, 
and so on” (Atkinson & Flint, as cited in Baltar & Brunet, 
2012, p. 60). 
Social networking site A social networking site (SNS) is a “web-based 
service that allow individuals to construct a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of 
other users with whom they share a connection, and view 
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and traverse their list of connections and those made by 
others within the system” (Boyd & Ellison, as cited in 
Baltar & Brunet, 2012, p. 58). 
Stall “Aerodynamic loss of lift caused by exceeding the critical 
angle of attack” (GPO, 2010, p. 2361). 
Standard operating procedures Airline specific operating procedures, that 
ensure all pilots will perform the same processes and 
procedures in the flightdeck. 
Startle Factor An unexpected event resulting in an unconscious response 
(Casner, Geven, & Williams, 2013; Landman, Groen, Van 
Paassen, Bronkhorst, & Mulder, 2017). 
Stick pusher “A device that, at or near a stall, applies a nose down pitch 
force to an aircraft’s control columns to attempt to decrease 
the aircraft’s angle of attack” (GPO, 2010, p. 2361). 
Systematic reflection “A learning procedure during which learners 
comprehensively analyze their behavior and evaluate the 
contribution of its components to performance outcomes” 
(Ellis, Carette, Anseel, & Lievens, 2014, p. 68). 
Tactical autoflight Tactical autoflight indicates that both the autopilot and auto 
thrust are engaged, but the aircraft is pilot managed with 
heading, speed, and altitude interventions (FAA, 2016; 
OIG, 2016). 
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Targeted sampling “Targeted sampling includes an initial ethnographic 
assessment in order to identify the networks that might 
exist in a given population” (Baltar & Brunet, 2012, p. 60). 
TPO “TPOs are statements of performance, conditions, and 
standards established at the task level,” written as AQP 
directives of training (FAA, 2017a, p. 17). 
Unconsciously competent “Unconsciously competent occurs with overlearning 
in that the knowledge or skill is applied without conscious 
thought” (Besco, 1997, p. 60). 
Unconsciously incompetent “The crew is unaware that they do not know 
something or that they cannot do something.  In other 
words, the crew doesn’t know what they don’t know” 
(Besco, 1997, p. 58).  
Understanding Understanding is a pilot’s ability, beyond knowledge-based 
facts and memorized procedures, to know why procedures 
are accomplished and to identify and understand instrument 
display indications, enabling the pilot to manage the 
aircraft during full automation usage (Level 4) or no 
automation usage (Level 0), whether the automation was 
intentionally disengaged, or a component failed, within any 
given environment. 
List of Acronyms 
AIC Automation-induced complacency 
ADM Aeronautical Decision Making 
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AFC Automated Flight Control 
AGFI  Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index 
ALPA Airline Pilots Association 
AP Autopilot 
AQP  Advanced Qualification Program 
ASAP  Aviation Safety Action Program 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
AT Autothrust 
ATP  Airline Transport Pilot Certificate 
AVE  Average Variance Extracted 
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis 
CA Captain 
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
CFI  Comparative Fit Index 
CMIN/df Minimum Discrepancy/Degrees of Freedom 
CR  Construct Reliability 
CRM Crew Resource Management 
CLT Cognitive Load Theory 
EFA Exploratory Factor Analysis 
EICAS Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System 
ESSAI Enhanced Safety through Situation Awareness Integration in 
Training 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
FD Flight Director 
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FMA Flight Mode Annunciator 
FMC Flight Management Computer 
FMS Flight Management System 
FO First Officer 
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
GFI  Goodness of Fit Index 
GPO Government Publishing Office 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
LCSA Line Check Safety Audit 
LOE Line Operational Evaluation 
LOFT Line Oriented Flight Training 
LOSA Line Operation Safety Audit 
MFI Manual Flight Inventory 
MSA  Measure of Sampling Adequacy 
NextGen Next Generation Air Transport System 
NFI  Normal Fit Index 
NSTB National Safety Transportation Board 
OIG Office of Inspector General 
PF Pilot Flying 
PM Pilot Monitoring 
RMSEA  Root Mean Square Error 
SA Situation Awareness 
SNS  Social Networking System 
WG  Working Group  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
Relevant literature reviewed included six primary subject matter areas: industry 
concern, pilot performance referencing how they operate the aircraft in relation to the 
level of automation, pilot confidence, aircraft understanding, training methodologies, 
safety culture, and aviation passion.  Sub-categories expanded upon automation 
challenges, beliefs and perceptions, trust, complacency, equipment failure, manual flight, 
pilot error, situation awareness, decision-making, experience, advance qualification 
program (AQP), learning, cognition, pilot debrief, feedback, self-assessment, training 
assessment, safety management systems (SMS), and safety culture.  While this literature 
review is not exhaustive, it provides a representative sample of critical research within 
each area.  A summary of the following literature review is presented in Appendix A.   
Industry Concern 
As long as humans continue to build and operate aircraft, human error will be an 
integral component of research, design, development, and training (Sheridan, 2010).  The 
history of aviation safety has evolved from an equipment focus to integrating human 
factors, and is progressing into the organization as a whole with aviation SMS.  Much has 
been learned through research by analyzing accident investigations and pilot safety 
reports, which have driven safety efforts.  Yet, despite known concerns, history repeats 
with aircraft accidents, incidents, and safety reports attributed to issues that have 
transcended the decades—automation dependency, confusion, limited knowledge, 
communication errors, mode awareness, flight skills, and inadequate training (FAA, 
1996; FAA, 2013d).  In the wake of the automated glass flight deck aircraft, an FAA 
human factors safety report identified pilots’ weaknesses in aircraft understanding and 
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automation mode awareness due to inadequate knowledge and skill, and further 
expressed concern for weak automation training with both quality and quantity of training 
(FAA, 1996).  Close to two decades later, similar performance issues prevail despite 
advanced automation and AQP training methodologies (Abbott, 2015; FAA, 2013; OIG, 
2016). 
Industry efforts have been made to address performance issues.  As the result of 
the Colgan Air, Flight 3407, crash during arrival into the Buffalo-Niagara International 
Airport, the Airline Safety and Pilot Improvement Act of 2009 was introduced into 
Congress, yet never passed the Senate (Civic Impulse, 2016).  The act, however, 
introduced regulatory change to increase flight hours for the airline transport pilot (ATP) 
certificate to 1,500 hours, which was subsequently adopted into regulation in 2010 (FAA, 
2013c).  However, where experience was once valued and identified by the number of 
flight hours a pilot acquired, automated aircraft flight hours have been questioned as to 
the quality of experience associated with performance due to automation usage (Harris, 
2012).  In example of flight hours not supporting performance enhanced experience, the 
pilots in a series of catastrophic airline crashes—Air France Flight 447, Colgan Air Flight 
3407, Asiana Flight 214, and UPS Flight 1354—were anything but novice, as these 
pilots’ combined experience exceeded 50,000 flight hours (BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010; 
NTSB, 2014a; NTSB, 2014b; Palmer, 2013).  While these accidents were attributed to 
pilot error due to inadequate skill, critical analysis revealed problems beyond skill to 
include lack of systems and aircraft understanding, and incorrect operational procedures 
(BEA, 2012; NTSB, 2010; NTSB, 2014a; NTSB, 2014b).  Legislation followed the 
Airline Safety Act of 2009, resulting in the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension 
Act of 2010 (GPO, 2010).  Regulatory implementation of NTSB recommendations 
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toward pilot performance, to include stall training, upset recovery training, remedial 
training programs for performance deficiencies, stick pusher training, and weather 
training, became public law (GPO, 2010).  An FAA 2019 simulator mandate will require 
training to include manually flown arrivals and departures, slow flight, loss of reliable 
airspeed, and recovery from bounced landings (OIG, 2016).  Current legislation and 
regulatory mandates have focused on flight training pertaining to simulator training, yet 
did not address knowledge training or assessment measures to ensure understanding 
(GOP, 2010).  Despite this legislation, a preponderance of research has identified pilot 
confusion and lack of understanding to be causal factors of inadequate performance 
resulting in accidents, incidents, or pilot safety reports (Bent & Chan, 2010; Besco, 1997; 
Endsley & Jones, 2012; FAA, 1996; FAA, 2013d; NTSB, 2010; NTSB, 2014a; NTSB, 
2014b; OIG, 2016; Ross & Tomko, 2016; Sherman, Helmerich, & Merritt, 1997; Wise, 
2011; Young, Fanjoy, & Suckow, 2006).  The Air France Flight 447 crash is a poignant 
example of hull loss attributed to pilots’ inability to fly their aircraft with degraded levels 
of automation (BEA, 2012), yet the pilots’ lack of understanding of the Airbus A330 
operating systems may have attributed to the crash (Palmer, 2013).  Air Transat Flight 
236 presents yet another accident where pilot confusion created a total fuel loss 
condition, with a subsequent dual engine failure in an Airbus A330 (FAA, 2015c). 
Flight skill loss due to pilot dependence upon automation presents an additional 
concern.  Yet, current flight training requirements do not provide guidance, nor do they 
mandate manual flight performance or requirements to practice in the simulator, nor is 
the pilot required to demonstrate manual flight performance in the aircraft with a training 
professional to assess performance (FAA, 2017a).  However, the FAA has expressed 
consideration to mandate instances where pilots would be required to manually fly with 
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passengers, despite never having demonstrated proficiency in the aircraft with a training 
professional (Abbott, 2015).  In response to the flight skill loss concern, the FAA 
released a safety alert that encouraged pilots to disengage the autopilot and autothrottle, 
to manually fly the aircraft in order to maintain manual flying skills (FAA, 2013a).  
However, flight skills extend beyond manual flight to operational performance of aircraft 
management, that incorporate both knowledge and procedural performance.  An FAA 
working group (WG) further reported operational performance concerns due to 
insufficient aircraft systems knowledge, procedures, and understanding the aircraft 
condition, where pilots may have difficulty when failures occur and there are no written 
procedures or guidance, resulting in the flight crews’ inability to respond properly (FAA, 
2013d). 
Industry concerns have also indicated that pilots are not manually flying the 
aircraft, which has subsequently resulted in flight skill loss, in addition to their lack of 
aircraft understanding and problems with guidance and control (OIG, 2016).  While pilot 
error has been attributed to 70-90% of aviation accidents, pilot error is not an isolated 
causal factor (Airbus, 2007).  An accident is rarely due to one event, but a chain of events 
that necessitates a system analysis.  Besco (1997) further argues: 
If the problem can be judged to lie exclusively in the head and heart of an 
unworthy flight crew, then no one in the system needs to be responsible for 
changes and improvements.  False comfort is gained when the irresponsible pilot 
is the only threat.  (p. 54)   
The capabilities of commercial aviation have shifted to where technology has 
enabled aircraft to remain airborne for extended periods of time, requiring multiple pilots 
due to crew duty limitations, yet only one pilot will receive the experience of a takeoff 
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and landing per flight segment (FAA, 2008).  Due to reduced vertical separation 
minimums (RVSM), where automated aircraft are able to pass within 1,000 feet at 
altitude, autopilot usage is mandated, which further limits the opportunity for a pilot to 
manually fly the aircraft (FAA, 2015d).  Regulations and company requirements also 
exist for automation usage during low visibility approaches.  The pilot’s lack of ability to 
manually fly the aircraft will continue to increase due to NextGen operations, further 
reducing manual flight opportunities (Curtis, Jentsch, & Wise, 2010).  The concern for 
pilot error in automatic aircraft versus analog aircraft was expressed by Naidoo and 
Vermeulen (2014) when they argued that human errors made in a modern aircraft were 
more likely to end in an accident due to an input-output effect that becomes a 
compounded chain of events.  The Air France, Flight 447, crash is an example of a 
compounded chain of events (BEA, 2012).  Therefore, understanding automation 
challenges of complex highly automated aircraft become essential. 
Automation challenges.  With the advent of glass cockpit and fly-by-wire 
technology, airliner operation has shifted to where pilots no longer fly with skill, but 
manage systems with knowledge application (Harris, 2012).  Automated aircraft 
represent the core of aircraft operations today, where human factors and aircraft design 
integrate to achieve efficient information-processing displays in order to improve safety 
(Curtis, Jenstsch, & Wise, 2010).  However, automation interface is more than an 
autoflight system display, but flight control functionality.  Disengaging the autopilot, 
flight director, and autothrust does not necessarily remove all computer control in a fly-
by-wire aircraft, yet at the same time disengagement is considered manual flight (Airbus, 
2003; Rosay, 2015).  When a pilot manually operates a fly-by-wire aircraft, depending 
upon the level of computer failures or level of automation selected, computers assist 
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behind the scenes controlling surface movements to provide more efficiency, thus 
removing the pilot from traditional flight control management thought processes (Airbus, 
2003; Rosay, 2016).  Whereas pilots once flew an aircraft with a yoke, in a cockpit, 
connected to a cable that directly controlled flight control surfaces, today a pilot manages 
a fly-by-wire aircraft with a control stick, or yoke, that sends a command from a flight 
deck, through wires to computer actuators that move control surfaces to achieve 
computer desired performance, per the pilot’s command.  Early fly-by-wire aircraft were 
designed to be harmonized in order to meet certification requirements, but continuing 
requirements demand fly-by-wire technology to reduce weight, as well as the reduction 
of maneuver capabilities to prevent control loss, which in turn prohibits additional control 
actions (Lelaie, 2012).  While improving passenger comfort, this technology has resulted 
in increased complexity of flight control computers.  This added complexity, however, 
creates more confusion for operating crews (Ross & Tomko, 2016). 
Confusion extends beyond operations to what constitutes manual flight, as there is 
a taxonomy difference between the OIG and the FAA.  Line operation safety audit 
(LOSA) defines manual flight as related to vertical, lateral, or speed deviations, and 
power settings, indicating both autothrust and autopilot are disengaged, yet the flight 
director is not mentioned (FAA, 2013d).  The OIG (2016) identified manual flight with 
only the autopilot disengaged, with the autothrust and flight directors engaged.  However, 
full manual flight indicates no automation—autoflight, autothrust, or flight directors.  
Full autoflight indicates that the autopilot, autothrust, and flight director are engaged, and 
the aircraft is being flown per pilot programmed commands without mode control panel 
interventions—the concept of a NextGen operation (FAA, 2016; OIG, 2016).  Tactical 
autoflight indicates that the autopilot, autothrust, and flight director are engaged, but the 
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aircraft is pilot managed with heading, speed, and altitude interventions.  Current 
operations dictate the use of both types of automation usage—full autoflight and tactical.  
In current operations, aircraft are programed for full autoflight with a departure, route, 
and arrival, yet tactical autoflight is utilized during Air Traffic Control (ATC) 
interventions. 
The focus of automation research, however, has revolved around flight deck 
displays of a glass cockpit and integrated system designs versus the traditional round-dial 
aircraft with limited discussion on flight control operations and understanding the added 
complexity of the fly-by-wire system (Curtis, Jenstsch, & Wise, 2010; Ferris, Sarter, & 
Wickens, 2010; Naidoo & Vermeulen, 2014; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  When 
integrated displays are lost, the crew may be left with minimal operational understanding.  
The Air France Flight 447 crash indicates that aircraft management may not depend 
solely upon mode awareness but a deeper understanding as to what the displayed 
information (or absence of) may be indicating and how to manage the systems to achieve 
flight management goals.  Beyond understanding aircraft displays, automation challenges 
include pilot perceptions, trust, and complacency, in addition to technology related to the 
levels of automation and equipment failure. 
Beliefs and perceptions.  Early research focused on behaviors and attitudes 
toward automation usage and reliance.  While Parasuraman and Riley (1997) reported 
performance was not necessarily connected to the individual’s expectations or automation 
reliability, pilots were initially reluctant to fully utilize automation and defaulted to 
manual flight (Curry, 1985).  Compte and Postlewaite (2004) identified success of 
accomplishing a task be dependent upon the perception of that success.  Therefore, as 
pilots’ confidence increased in their ability (or perception of that ability), automation use 
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increased and ultimately resulted in automation dependence (Parasuraman & Riley, 
1997).  A challenge for researchers became the difficulty in readily understanding why 
pilots were reluctant to disengage their automation and manually fly their aircraft by 
simply asking.  In the search for automation perceptions, Funk et al. (1999) identified 
pilots’ lack of understanding, poor attention, limited knowledge, mode awareness issues, 
and problems managing an automation surprise to be resultant from automation 
complexity.  Naidoo and Vermuelen (2014) later assessed pilot perceptions of automation 
and identified five automation issues to include: (a) lack of understanding, (b) automation 
function may not be transparent, (c) pilot overconfidence in the automation, (d) poorly 
designed equipment, and (e) inadequate training.  While Funk et al. (1999) identified 
aircraft complexity to be causal of automation problems, Naidoo and Vermuelen (2014) 
identified that complexity was not necessarily the issue, but inadequate training of the 
complex aircraft.  Overconfidence and complacency have also been associated with 
automation complexity—in that the greater the confidence in automation, the pilots may 
become more complacent (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007).  However, Parasuraman, Molloy, and 
Singh (1993) argued that overconfidence, while it may be a predictor of behavior, does 
not necessarily dictate complacency, in that a higher workload due to weather, 
distractions, or fatigue could be contributory factors as to pilots’ reliance upon equipment 
during task-saturated situations.  While automation usage due to situational factors may 
be the reason pilots opt to use higher levels of automation at times, the question might be 
asked if situational usage would create reliance and complacency or if a higher level of 
trust in automation versus personal ability caused dependency. 
Trust.  Trust in automation has also been identified as a determinant of 
automation usage—the more trust the pilot has in the automation, the more likely the 
36 
 
pilot is to use it (Ferris, Sarter, & Wickens, 2010; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Whereas 
early automation research attempted to understand why pilots were reluctant to fully 
utilize the automated equipment (Curry, 1985), the challenge shifted to understanding 
pilots’ over-reliance on automation usage (Ferris, Sarter, & Wickens, 2010).  Trust 
continues to be a significant factor in automation usage.  Due to high reliability of current 
technology, elevated trust may result in pilots with greater trust in the equipment than 
they have in their ability to manually to fly (Ferris, Sarter, & Wickens, 2010; 
Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008). 
Complacency.  A variety of operational concerns exist with automation usage, 
from over-involvement with automation at the sacrifice of primary flight situation 
awareness (SA), lack of understanding, over-reliance, and complacency (Young, Fanjoy, 
& Suckow, 2006).  Bailey and Scerbo (2007) reviewed the history of automation-induced 
complacency (AIC) and identified that higher equipment reliability led to higher 
complacency.  However, while the FAA has encouraged pilots to manually fly (FAA, 
2013a), pilots continue to be automation dependent and reluctant to manually fly their 
aircraft, which has impacted performance and resulted in flight skill loss (OIG, 2016).  
Monitoring challenges also continue to plague automation usage and complacency, yet 
Casner and Schooler (2014) identified the innate difficulty of maintaining continued 
focus on highly reliable equipment.  Despite the difficulty in maintaining continued 
vigilance and focus, pilots’ cognitive state of trust in automation will influence their 
choice in levels of automation and associated automation dependence (Parasuraman & 
Wickens, 2008). 
Levels of automation.  Casner and Schooler (2014) conducted pilot awareness 
measurement testing to better understand the relationship between levels of automation 
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and airline pilots’ task-related and task-unrelated thought patterns.  Results identified that 
higher levels of aircraft automation enabled pilots to shift attention to a higher-level flight 
related thought processes pertaining to flight operations, yet during a high automation 
and low task environment, pilots’ minds wandered beyond the flight.  Challenges with 
lack of understanding as how to operate the automation in attempt to solve programming 
issues shifted pilots’ attention toward operational concerns which then further removed 
attention from the overall flight, lowering SA (Casner & Schooler, 2014).  Kaber and 
Endsley’s (2004) research identified that better SA was present during intermediate levels 
of automation versus higher levels.  However, Kaber and Endsley (2004) argued that 
while a fully automated aircraft removes the pilot from direct control, which may result 
in lower SA, the benefit of high automation is that cognitive overload will be reduced, 
supporting improved information processing, which in turn will enable pilots to better 
manage the overall operation. 
Equipment failure.  Strauch (2016) argued that errors in numerous accidents 
were, in part, due to system designers’ inability to identify and acknowledge the impact 
of pilots’ interaction with automation, the pilots’ expertise, and the type of automated 
systems training.  Degani, Barshi, and Shafto (2013) analyzed Air Transat Flight 236—an 
Airbus A330 that lost both engines due to a fuel leak.  Degani et al. (2013) attributed the 
pilots’ reaction to the absence of integrated information within the engine, absence of fuel 
parameters, missing indications from traditional planes such as a yoke tilt with fuel out of 
balance, and purported that fuel available at each waypoint was hidden within the 
computer, as contributing factors.  These authors blamed the equipment failure, due to 
pertinent information embedded within the flight management system, as the causal 
factor of the accident (Degani et al., 2013).  The FAA further attributed the cause of this 
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accident, in part, to the fuel leak itself, and recommended warning systems to alert the 
crew to an increase in fuel burn rate (FAA, 2015c). 
The Air Transat Flight 236 incident presents a poignant example of a mishandled 
event after a system failure attributed to confusion, distraction, and lack of understanding.  
The pilots of Air Transat Flight 236 became distracted due to low oil temperature, low oil 
quantity, and high oil pressure; where the fuel imbalance warning, designed to activate at 
6,000-pound difference between wings, was the crew’s first indication of a fuel leak 
(FAA, 2015c).  The crew from the Transat Flight performed a fuel balancing procedure 
from memory and failed to check the total fuel prior to opening crossfeed valves 
(enabling fuel to flow from one tank to the other), as directed per Airbus procedures, and 
proceeded to dump the remaining fuel out the engine leak (FAA, 2015c).  The pilots’ 
reaction (startle factor) to the unexpected event (automation surprise) has been identified 
as one of the most difficult challenges in training (Casner et al., 2013; Jackman, 2012).  
Lack of mode awareness is an industry concern indicating pilots are unaware of a system 
change, automation degradation, or decrease in performance (FAA 2013a).  The inability 
to identify excessive fuel loss on an Airbus A330 indicates lack of system display 
awareness, as total fuel is always displayed on the engine page during cruise, despite 
researchers suggesting the fuel information was buried deep within the computers 
(Airbus, 2003; Degani, Barshi, & Shafto, 2013).  Lack of systems understanding with low 
oil temperature and high oil pressure related to low fuel, led to distraction, whereas 
information was available to identify a fuel leak, primarily 6,000 pounds of missing fuel 
on the total fuel indicator (FAA, 2015c). 
While it may not be possible to train for every potential situation, pilots must be 
trained to identify failures, manage the aircraft performance, and possess tools and skills 
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for intervention strategies (FAA, 2013d).  Equipment is fallible, and when it fails, pilots 
should have the knowledge, awareness, and ability to fly the aircraft to safety.  Figure 1 
displays the reasons of human error after an equipment failure event. 
 
Figure 1.  Human error after equipment failure.  Reprinted from “Operational use of 
flight path management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” 
FAA, 2013d, Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. 
 
Failure identification, failure recovery, and unanticipated events were associated 
with automation failure.  Yet, highly reliable, technologically advanced aircraft, 
combined with low pilot error rates, have generated challenges in legitimizing predictive 
models to gauge the difference between conditional pilot consequential errors, or 
consequential errors attributed to technology (Wickens, Sebok, Gore, & Hooey, 2012). 
Research has focused on automation side effects in areas concerning 
complacency, bias, surprise, and mental models resulting in cognitive skill decline 
impacting SA (Strauch, 2016).  Skill degradation is a concern that perhaps may be 
misunderstood, in that one must begin with skills prior to losing them, and current 
training methodologies may be leaving pilots short on understanding and knowledge in 
the automated aircraft, without adequate time available to practice flight skills (Wise, 
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2011).  Current training may be resulting in pilots’ reluctance to manually fly their 
aircraft with resultant flight skill loss, thus impacting multiple aspects of performance 
(OIG, 2016). 
Performance 
Pilot performance and human factors have been the core of research for decades, 
and the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) has provided the FAA with data 
identifying causal factors.  Yet incidents continue to occur with thousands of ASRS 
reports submitted annually, reaching the millionth report submitted in 2012 (Connell, 
2012).  Human error has contributed to numerous accidents where fatigue, cognitive 
overload, communication problems, and information processing have resulted in faulty 
decision-making (Helmreich, 2000, p. 781).  While decision-making can be directly 
connected to performance, Besco (1997) identified “knowledge, skills, attitudes, systems 
environment and obstacles” as essential elements of performance (p. 55).  Performance 
tied to automation encompasses an extensive range of research to include manual flight, 
pilot error, situation awareness, decision-making, and pilot experience.  Pilot 
performance in this research is identified by how the pilot chooses to operate the aircraft 
and associated levels of automation, but will not be measured.  However, results of 
performance—how pilots operate the aircraft and automated systems—will be identified 
in relation to pilot error, accidents, major incidents, and ASRS, as reported in the FAA 
working group’s final report of performance-based operations (FAA, 2013d).  
Manual flight.  Despite an FAA safety alert recommending pilots should 
manually fly their aircraft (FAA, 2013a), performance assessment continues to identify 
that pilots are experiencing flight skill loss due to lack of manual flight (OIG, 2016).  
Airline pilots have both opportunity and ability to disengage the automation, yet the 
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question as to pilots’ reluctance to do so has gone unaddressed in current research.  
Human error has also been a consistent factor in aviation accidents since the onset of 
flight and has directed a focus on cognitive architecture to increase safety through 
improved human performance (Gluck, 2010).  Cognitive architecture is the framework 
representing the mind’s structures and processes, related to working memory, information 
processing, and long-term memory storage (Sweller, Van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998).  
Human error extends beyond mode awareness issues and automated flight confusion, to 
include manual aircraft handling errors (OIG, 2016).  The type of errors as identified by 
the WG include:  
• Manual operation is difficult after transition from automated control; 
• Crew coordination problems; 
• Training is inadequate; 
• Behavior of automation, based on pilot input or other factors, may not be 
apparent to pilots; 
• Understanding of automation is inadequate; 
• Inadequate knowledge;  
• Cross-verification.  (FAA, 2013d p. 32) 
Figure 2 depicts the percentages of manual handling errors where manual flight 
was identified as a contributing factor in an excess of 60% of all accidents and 30% of 
major incidents reviewed (FAA, 2013d). 
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Figure 2.  Errors: Manual handling flight controls.  Reprinted from “Operational use of 
flight path management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” 
FAA, 2013d, Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. 
 
LOSA, Flight Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) data, and Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) and Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports may 
provide adequate indicators of pilot procedural knowledge (FAA, 2013), and Line Check 
Safety Audits (LCSA) would explain FOQA results (Esser, 2005).  However, LOSA, 
FOQA, LCSA, ASAP, and ASRS data do not ascertain declarative knowledge, cannot 
assess hand flying performance if the pilots are utilizing automation, nor do they indicate 
why pilots are not hand flying, let alone the pilots’ level of confidence in knowledge and 
ability.   
Pilot error.  Pilot error and flight skill loss have become an industry concern due 
to reliance on automation and lack of manual flight practice (Franks, Hay, & Mavin, 
2014; Geiselman, Johnson, & Buck, 2013; Haslbeck et al., 2012; Moll, 2012).  Research 
identified that flight skill retention in automated aircraft was determined to remain 
relatively intact without consistent performance, yet degradation of cognitive ability 
necessary for manual flight was apparent (Casner, Geven, Recker, & Schooler, 2014; 
Hendrickson, Goldsmith, & Johnson, 2006).  However, Casner et al., (2014) suggest that 
pilots who pay attention to flight performance enroute, with the automation engaged, will 
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perform better with identifying system failures, aircraft tracking, and position awareness, 
more so than ignoring the automated flight performance.  Thus, automation usage in itself 
is not performance debilitating but contingent upon pilot awareness.  Helmreich (2000) 
identified that proficiency errors accounted for about 70% of consequential errors, 
whereas decision-making errors and communication errors accounted for over 40% and 
10% respectively, as depicted in Figure 3.  Helmreich (2000) further reported that 
proficiency errors identified a need for technical training that may necessitate more 
ground school training to educate pilots on systems understanding, whereas decision-
making and communication errors identified a need for team training, representative of 
simulator LOFT training.  As identified, 30% more consequential errors than decision-
making errors and 60% more than communication may indicate a necessity to increase 
technical training, identifying the necessity to improve ground school.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Decision making errors.  Reprinted from “On error management: Lessons from 
aviation,” Helmreich, 2000, Education and debate. 
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Situation awareness.  Endsley (2001) defined situation awareness (SA) as “the 
perception of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 
5).  Inadequate situation awareness (SA) has been attributed to 52% of all accidents 
(Airbus, 2007), and thus is a focus of aviation human factors research.  If data transfer to 
the long-term memory does not occur, the result is an overloaded working memory that 
will prohibit both learning and memory formation, in addition to reducing SA (Endsley, 
1995; Maurino, 2000; Wickens, 2002; Wickens, Gordon-Becker, Liu, & Lee, 2004).  The 
automated aircraft is an integral element of the innate limitation of the working memory 
due to susceptibility of capacity overload as a result of large amounts of complex 
information, which in turn reduces situation awareness (Endsley, 1995; Wickens, 2002).  
Technological advancement enables highly complex machines to remain at altitude for 
extended periods of time, requiring longer periods of automation monitoring, further 
decreasing pilot performance in that sleep deprivation and mental fatigue add to cognitive 
overload (Gonzalez, Best, Healy, Kole, & Bourned, 2011).  Dehydration associated with 
long flights, further negatively impacts cognitive function and memory (Lindseth, 
Lindseth, Petros, Jensen, & Caspers, 2013).  Accounting for the complexity of the 
automated aircraft, fatigue, dehydration, the addition of inclement weather, system 
failures, or unexpected events may therefore impinge upon an already overloaded 
working memory, further reducing SA (Endsley, 2010). 
Automaticity has been noted to be essential for airline pilots to improve SA, as 
lack of automaticity may limit pilots’ decision-making ability (Endsley, 2010).  
Automaticity indicates a pilot’s knowledge is at the level where he or she does not have 
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to think about what to do and the response is automatic (Casner, Geven, & Williams, 
2013).  Besco (1997) is an advocate in support of over-learning to the point where the 
pilot becomes unconsciously competent, in that the pilot performs tasks without 
conscious thought, a level of performance essential for aircraft operations.  However, 
apprehension for automaticity has not gone unnoticed with a concern for reduced SA due 
to a perceived inability to transfer task at hand duties to conscious thought, necessary to 
adapt to changes in the environment (Banbury, Dudfield, Hoermann, & Soll, 2007).  
While routine expertise may lead to quick and immediate reactions, that could be likened 
to rote memorization, performance in a changing environment demands a deeper level of 
understanding that will be adaptable to unique situations (Smith, Ford, & Kozlowski, 
1997).  Smith et al. (1997) argued that adaptive expertise requires precise knowledge, in 
both quality and content, to be structurally organized in the memory, as well as required 
for metacognitive skills necessary for planning, monitoring, and memory.  Bohle, 
Stalmeijer, Konings, Segers, and van Merrienboer (2014) further discussed the elements 
of adaptive expertise where understanding and contextual-based knowledge, combined 
with motivation for problem solving, created more adaptive and flexible strategies for 
unexpected events, whereas routine expertise is limited with a new experience. 
The answer as to when immediate processing due to automaticity would help or 
hinder situation awareness and ensuing performance, lies in the distinction between rote 
memorization versus knowledge based understanding, and routine expertise versus 
adaptive expertise (Bohle et al., 2014; Casner, Geven, &Williams, 2013; Smith, Ford, & 
Kozlowski, 1997; Wise, 2011).  Unconsciously competent would be likened to 
automaticity and adaptive expertise, different from rote memorization that would be 
associated with routine experience.  Where automaticity and adaptive expertise improve 
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performance during novel situations, rote memorization would result in limited 
understanding and memorized procedures that may not transfer to the aircraft beyond 
events practiced and anticipated in the simulator (Casner, Geven, &Williams, 2013).  
Rote memorization does not guarantee the pilot understands the automatic response, 
whereas knowledge-based automaticity and adaptive expertise imply a deeper level of 
understanding.  Research further identified that pilots with a more developed information 
processing ability and working memory improved their situation awareness and 
performance with higher levels of automation; whereas the reverse was true for pilots 
with lower levels of information processing ability and working memory (Jipp & 
Ackerman, 2016).  Yet, during periods of high workload, higher levels of automation 
usage have been identified to improve situation awareness (Endsley, 2010).  However, 
when mental workload is increased due to lack of understanding of complex aircraft 
systems, operations, or interpreting the automation, higher levels of automation will 
reduce situation awareness if the pilot is mentally overloaded (Vidulich & Tsang, 2015).  
Enhanced Safety through Situation Awareness Integration in Training (ESSAI), a 
European research project, assessed the impact of SA in relation to airline accidents and 
incidents, and reported that flight crews improved SA with ESSAI training, beyond FAA 
approved LOFT scenarios (Banbury, Dudfield, Hoermann, & Soll, 2007).  LOFT, an 
AQP requirement, was developed to integrate Crew Resource Management (CRM) as a 
risk mitigation process of pilot error based upon communication strategies (FAA, 2017a).  
However, ESSAI training showed improvements above LOFT training in cognitive 
efficiency, automaticity and interpersonal dynamics subscales, and improved judgment 
assessment, increased flexibility with a changing environment, and improved memory for 
routine performance (Banbury, Dudfield, Hoermann, & Soll, 2007).  Whether automation 
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improves or reduces situation awareness is dependent upon the pilot’s cognitive ability 
and the level of overload under a given situation (Bohle et al., 2014; Casner, Geven, & 
Williams, 2013; Endsley, 1995; Jipp & Ackerman, 2016; Maurino, 2000; Wickens, 2002; 
Wickens et al., 2004).  Cognitive overload is not isolated but also susceptible to multiple 
and changing environmental factors that could impact decision-making (Endsley, 2010; 
Lindseth et al., 2013; Gonzalez et al., 2011). 
Decision-making.  Two different cognitive processing styles have been identified 
with decision-making—analytical and non-analytical.  Analytical processing was noted to 
be slower, more elaborative, required more cognitive effort, and derived more conscious 
ability; whereas non-analytical was quicker, took less cognitive effort, and is often 
accomplished without a conscious effort (Reber, Ruch-Monachon, & Perrig, 2007).  
Captain Sullenberger’s decision to land in the Hudson River, due to his perception of the 
inability to make a runway, was not based upon analytical calculations, but an implicit 
knowledge, based on extensive experience (NTSB, 2009).  Reber et al., (2007) conducted 
research into intuitive problem solving and identified that implicit knowledge was based 
upon unconscious perception, related to perception structure, learning, decision-making, 
and problem solving. 
Information processing is a key component of decision-making when a pilot must 
choose between choices, where the process includes both environment assessment and 
cue seeking, the process of searching the environment for cues pertinent to the situation 
(Vidulich, Wickens, Tsang, & Flach, 2010).  Without adequate SA—a lack of perception 
of the environment, lack of comprehension or understanding of what is being observed or 
experienced, and projection into the future—the pilot may be challenged to make 
informed decisions (Endsley, 2001).  Decision-making represents the third stage in 
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Wickens’ human information processing model (HIP), after stimuli and perception, and is 
followed by execution and feedback, whereas the decision is determined by 
understanding the situation and all elements relative to that situation (Wickens et al., 
2004).  Without adequate knowledge, understanding, or experience, decisions may be 
based on (a) satisficing, where the pilot takes the first available option (Sheridan, 2010b); 
(b) a naturalistic decision based on feeling of familiarity (Sheridan, 2010); or (c) 
heuristics, a mental shortcut associated with cognitive overload (Vidulich et al., 2010).  
While experience has been identified as an essential component of both problem solving 
and decision-making, Vidulich et al. (2010) clarified that experience must be in the 
context of deliberate practice versus routine performance. 
Experience.  “The level of practice and training, as measured by daily flying 
practice and elapsed time since initial flight training, has a significant influence on airline 
pilots’ fine-motor flying skills” (Haslbeck & Hoermann, 2016, p. 539).  In addition to 
frequency and time, the frequency of when and how knowledge is used has also been 
identified as a key factor in pilot performance, with recommendations to address these 
issues during training to ensure pilots’ knowledge had not decreased (Besco, 1997).  
Long-haul pilots experience fewer opportunities for repetition and practice of manual 
flight skills, and automated aircraft provide limited opportunities for knowledge 
application beyond procedural knowledge by both long-haul and short-haul pilots.  There 
is also no requirement for knowledge assessment during pilot recency, or recurrent 
training events beyond rote memorization of limitations or memory items, and no 
requirements for repetition or practice of manual flight skills (FAA, 2017a; GPO, 2015).  
Competency requires (a) practice via repetition (English & Visser, 2014), (b) feedback as 
to the success and/or failure of the pilot’s performance (Hattie & Timperley, 2007), and 
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(c) confidence that performance will result in a safe outcome (Johnson, & Fowler, 2011).  
Repetition for performance cannot be overstressed as it leads to unconscious competency, 
a state where overlearning, automaticity, and adaptive expertise improve situation 
awareness and overall performance (Besco, 1997; Bohle, 2014; Endsley, 2010; Wickens 
et al., 2004). 
Repetition and practice are necessary to take a pilot from novice to expert, yet the 
transition to expert could take up to ten years of practice (Strauch, 2016).  However, 
current AQP mandates do not require pilots to see most Terminal Proficiency Objective 
(TPO) events more than once in the simulator, and many pilots may go years, if ever, 
prior to experiencing the actual event (FAA, 2017a).  TPOs are the “statements of 
performance, conditions, and standards established at the task level” written as AQP 
directives of training (FAA, 2017a, p. 17). 
The nature of long-haul flying and aircraft complexity has also created unique 
challenges for pilot competency and performance.  Long-haul flights demand multiple 
pilots due to the length of flight time; yet, only one pilot conducts the takeoff and landing 
event, preventing three of the four pilots the opportunity to gain experience or maintain 
currency (FAA, 2008).  Reduced vertical separation minimums (RVSM) require autopilot 
usage enroute, thus further eliminating opportunities for manual flight (FAA, 2015d).  As 
opposed to domestic flying, many long-haul pilots also visit a simulator every 90-days, 
per Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.439, to obtain three takeoffs and landings, 
yet meet only minimum requirements during this currency event to make them legal to 
fly.  Thus, pilots have little opportunity during training or line flying to work toward 
higher levels of expertise.  Performance is based on proficient operating skills in a 
simulator, thus the only place to gain expertise is on the flight line (Strauch, 2016).  
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However, flight line operations utilize a fraction of the functionality of highly automated 
aircraft under normal operations.  Therefore, pilots are challenged with the ability to gain 
a level of confidence in systems knowledge and operations beyond the minimum without 
experiencing operations in the simulator (Sherman et al.,1997).  An Airbus Industries 
senior vice president of engineering stated, “FMC’s may offer too many possibilities and 
be too complex, with the result that many pilots rely on only 20% of the software 
features” (Hughes, 1995, as cited in Sherman et al.,1997, p. 312). 
Company policy could also be impacting pilot experience by mandating 
automation usage.  However, an assumption that operators demand higher levels of 
automation usage for fuel efficiencies could be a misunderstanding.  While automation 
usage could maximize fuel efficiencies during enroute flight segments, decision-making 
regarding cruise altitudes, speed, descent planning, gear and flap extension, speedbrake 
usage, and the ability to fly an on-profile approach, will all impact fuel efficiencies that 
are in control of the pilot regardless of the level of automation.  One missed approach due 
to poor planning will cost thousands in added fuel expense.  
Flight hours in automated aircraft do not improve aircraft systems knowledge, and 
they do not increase pilot performance when an unanticipated event occurs (Casner et al., 
2013).  As reported, a typical pilot spends less than two-minutes per flight segment 
manually flying (Lowy, 2011).  While the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.439 
requires pilots to have three takeoffs and landings in 90 days to maintain currency (GPO, 
2015), some pilots may go many months without ever seeing the inside of the flight deck 
of an actual aircraft due to a reserve system.  Despite the three takeoffs and landings 
requirement in 90 days, there are also no requirements for normal operations to conduct a 
pre-flight, practice in-flight operational procedures (normal, abnormal, or emergency), 
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perform navigation tasks, or fly a takeoff or descent profile during a recency event (GPO, 
2015).  In addition, there is no requirement to demonstrate operational competency 
beyond takeoffs and landing proficiency that may be performed with the autopilot and 
autothrust engaged, or systems knowledge assessment (GPO, 2015).  However, mandates 
that require manual flight during initial flight training for departures and arrivals are 
required to be in effect by 2019, yet there are no requirements for recency training, 
indicating this may be a one-time event (GPO, 2010; OIG, 2016).  Performance based 
upon greater operational experience should theoretically increase confidence, but how 
confidence impacts operational performance cannot be overlooked.  
Confidence 
Confidence that corresponds with competence is related to operational success 
and resultant safety, and is critical to operational safety and efficiency (Hattie & 
Timperley, 2007; Johnson & Fowler, 2011; Kern, 1998).  The WG found an over-reliance 
in automation attributed to numerous accidents, incidents, and ASRS reports and further 
reported that pilots’ overconfidence in automation, presented in Figure 4, was a 
contributing factor to one-quarter of the accidents reviewed.  The WG associated 
overconfidence with automation to the pilots’ lack of confidence in their own ability, 
suggesting that they displayed greater comfort in utilizing the automation than taking 
manual control, which resulted in an accident, major incident, or ASRS incident (FAA, 
2013d). 
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Figure 4.  Pilot confidence in automated systems.  Reprinted from “Operational use of 
flight path management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” 
FAA, 2013d, Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. 
 
Confidence has not only been associated with performance but is an integral 
component of the learning process, where the pilot must feel confident that the level of 
performance they achieve will ensure a safe operation (Johnson & Fowler, 2011).  The 
pilot personality is one that innately exudes confidence.  Cuevas (2003) suggests that due 
to this greater confidence level, pilots can deal more effectively with higher amounts of 
stress than less confident individuals.  However, if a pilot does not understand the 
operation of their aircraft, the added stress and associated reduction in confidence may 
impact their ability to perform and willingness to manually fly the aircraft. 
Whereas confidence is essential to positive performance, overconfidence may 
push pilots into more risky behavior, with a feeling of infallibility (Bénabou & Tirole, 
2002; Stewart & John, 2006).  Thus, training programs should focus on teaching pilots to 
control the aircraft, not falsely taking them to a level of overconfidence, which is defined 
as a high-risk employee trait (Stewart & John, 2006).  Corroboration in research further 
identified that “People tend to attribute positive experiences to things that are permanent 
and to attribute negative experiences to transient effects” (Seligman, 1990, as cited in 
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Compte & Postlewaite, 2004, p. 1541).  Thus, a pilot who passes a check ride may 
attribute success to their ability, whereas one that fails the checking event may blame the 
simulator not being representative of the aircraft, blame the supporting pilot for errors 
made, or the instructor’s lack of ability—transient experiences.  Past successes are 
predictive of future success, whereas failures have no predictive impact, yet success and 
failure may shift a pilot’s level of confidence without substantiated performance to 
support that belief system (Compte & Postlewaite, 2004).  Confidence also impacts the 
operator’s decision to utilize automation.  When pilots trust the automation more so than 
their own ability, they tend to become more dependent upon automation, whereas if pilots 
have higher confidence in their ability than automation, they are more apt to disengage 
the automation and manually fly (Parasuraman & Wickens, 2008).  Pilots’ confidence in 
their ability further influences their decision-making and reactions during anticipated and 
actual experiences with the environment (Bandura, 1982).  Self-efficacy is identified as 
the individual’s belief in their ability to create the desired results.  The greater the pilots’ 
perceived self-efficacy, the greater their performance as well as their persistence to 
succeed (Bandura, 1982).   
A study of United Kingdom glass-cockpit pilots’ attitudes with automation 
identified that pilots generally believed they had “a good level of understanding of the 
aircraft and its systems and they felt that automation increased their confidence as a pilot” 
(McClumpha, James, Green, & Belyavin, 1991, p. 111).  However, McClumpha et al., 
(1991) further identified that despite pilots’ confidence on understanding systems, the 
lack of awareness and lack of aircraft understanding may only become apparent during a 
catastrophic failure. 
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Chapman, Lane, Brierley, and Terry (1997) performed a study on 
multidimensional theory of cognitive (mental) anxiety, somatic (physical) anxiety, and 
self-confidence with Tae Kwon-Do athletes during competition.  Results indicated that 
the best performers had higher self-confidence scores and lower cognitive and somatic 
anxiety scores than the lower performers.  Another key point of this study was that 63% 
of the athletes were correctly predicted as winners based upon their scores, with self-
confidence the highest factor.  Fischer and Budescu (2005) utilized 1,200 decision-based 
questions and studied confidence, performance development, and the correlation between 
both.  Findings identified that confidence: (a) develops gradually, (b) does not develop at 
the same rate as performance, (c) develops “at a diminishingly increasing rate that 
depends, at least in part, on the nature of the task,” and (d) develops as a function of 
positive and negative feedback (p. 50).  Fischer and Budescu (2005) state, “In real-life 
confidence often serves as a proxy for, or a predictor of expertise, performance, and 
competency” (p. 51).  Beyond confidence in operational performance, pilots’ confidence 
in a belief they understand the aircraft systems may be overestimated as to their actual 
understanding in they may be operationally proficient, yet unconsciously incompetent 
(Besco, 1997).  
Understanding 
The WG analysis reported a knowledge deficiency, in some capacity, attributed to 
over 40% of the accidents and 30 % of major incidents they reviewed, and LOSA 
narratives identified that flight path errors were due to knowledge deficit and automation 
usage (FAA, 2013d).  Figure 5 depicts the percentage of accidents, incidents, and ASRS 
reports associated with threats due to lack of knowledge.  
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Figure 5.  Threats from insufficient knowledge.  Reprinted from “Operational use of 
flight path management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” 
FAA, 2013d, Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. 
 
Since the 1996 human factors team report, equipment and procedural changes 
have addressed mode awareness and flight management computer (FMC) operation, yet 
lack of understanding as to what the displayed information indicates and operational 
programming errors continue to be industry issues (FAA, 1996; FAA, 2013d; OIG, 
2016).  If pilots do not have a solid understanding of their aircraft, with both cognitive 
and physical skills, the added challenges of NextGen, where satellite-based systems will 
replace ground-based systems for air traffic management, may increase that level of 
instability with added distractions and increased workload (Curtis et al., 2010; Darr et al., 
2010; FAA, 2016).  History shows that when new technology is introduced, an area of 
instability develops, associated with a learning curve, generating an environment open for 
catastrophe (Salas et al., 2010).  Figures 6 and 7 depict the percentage of programming 
and mode selection errors within the flight path management system report (FAA, 
2013d).   
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Figure 6.  FMS programming errors.  Reprinted from “Operational use of flight path 
management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” FAA, 2013d, 
Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team Flight Deck 
Automation Working Group. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Mode selection errors.  Reprinted from “Operational use of flight path 
management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” FAA, 2013d, 
Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team Flight Deck 
Automation Working Group. 
 
Ross and Tomko (2016) investigated 336 ASRS incident reports between June 
2009 and May 2014 with a focus on pilot confusion, utilizing Rosenthal, Chamberlin, and 
Matchette’s (1993) research identifying confusion as two types.  Type 1 was based on 
cognitive function, where the pilot did not understand the experience, whereas Type 2 
was based upon behavior that resulted in confusion, such as reading a wrong checklist 
and confusing the other pilot (Rosenthal et al., 1993; Ross & Tomko, 2016).  The 
implication of these studies was that in 1993 pilots were “1.32 times more likely to report 
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Type 1 than Type 2 confusion, whereas the current results indicated reports of Type 1 
increased to 1.96 times more likely than Type 2”, indicating that lack of understanding, 
where pilots are more overall confused, has increased more so than driven confusion 
(Ross & Tomko, 2016, p. 1302).  In 1993, pilots reported confusion as a contributing 
factor in 1 of 10 aviation safety reports (Ross & Tomko, 2016).  AQP training focused on 
CRM and communication to eliminate pilot error (FAA, 2017a), yet, two decades later 
confusion has become the most reported factor in aviation accidents and incidents (Ross 
& Tomko, 2016).  Ross and Tomko (2016) presented extensive research on multiple 
characteristics of confusion to include: confusion is cognitive-based, associated with 
feelings of uncertainty; appraisal-based reacting to, and in conflict with, the environment; 
subjective involving knowledge and understanding; and that confusion is an authentic 
emotion and a subjective experience. 
Lack of understanding may be an overlooked characteristic leading to confusion, 
where confusion is defined as, “A situation in which people are uncertain about what to 
do or are unable to understand something clearly, and the feeling that you have when you 
do not understand what is happening, what is expected, etc.” (Confusion, n.d., para.11).  
Besco (1997) examined the underlying reasons for lack of understanding and identified 
knowledge inadequacy related to whether or not the knowledge had been acquired in the 
first place, how often the knowledge was used, if the pilot received feedback as to their 
level of knowledge, and issues related to training such as, training curriculum relevance, 
learning methodologies, compatibility with the organization, and the pilot’s aptitude 
toward learning.  To assess pilot knowledge, Besco (1997) recommended eight questions 
to identify if the pilot was unconsciously incompetent, lacking awareness of the 
experience: 
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1. What are the observable facts concerning crew knowledge? 
2. Could the crew comprehend the situation that was occurring? 
3. Could the crew select a reasonable strategy from a set of strategies? 
4. Was the crew aware of all reasonable alternatives? 
5. Did the crew know how to choose alternatives? 
6. Was the crew aware of the consequences of the available alternatives? 
7. Did the crew have knowledge to carry out the chosen strategy? 
8. Could the crew assess the system response to the chosen strategy? (p. 58).  
Wise (2011) conducted a descriptive study to assess airline pilot knowledge at a 
major airline that operates the Boeing B747-400, Boeing B757, and B767 aircraft—all 
automated, glass cockpit aircraft.  The sample included 321 pilots, and results indicated 
that two thirds of those pilots were below an 80% knowledge level, with very few 
demonstrating proficiency greater than the 90% level after training, and more than half 
the pilots exhibited substandard performance with mode awareness and changes in 
automation (Wise, 2011).  These findings of limited knowledge and weakness in 
identifying mode changes parallel challenges at the time of this research, with lack of 
understanding and confusion (IG, 2016).  Parasuraman and Riley (1997) argued that if 
pilots understood how the automation worked, they would have a greater ability to use it 
correctly.  Dismukes, Berman, and Loukopoulos (2007) also identified inadequate 
training and guidance resulting in insufficient knowledge and experience, as causal 
factors in 19 airline accidents.  Endsley and Jones (2012) expanded upon factors that 
contribute to the lack of understanding with automated systems, to include system 
complexity, interface design, and substandard training. 
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The problem with reduced understanding of what the automation is doing, even 
when the system is operating normally, is that it diminishes SA.  Without knowledge and 
understanding it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a pilot to comprehend the 
situation of what is happening (Level 2 SA) in order to project the situation into the 
future (Level 3 SA), thus reducing performance (Endsley & Jones, 2012).  Pilots 
worldwide may be deficient in knowledge of the aircraft they fly, which under normal 
operations may manifest in a safe outcome; however, when the unusual occurs, the 
unexpected event may instigate an inappropriate reaction (Casner, Geven, Recker, & 
Schooler, 2014; Dahlstrom, Dekker, van Winsen, & Nycy, 2008).  The Air France Flight 
447 accident presents yet another poignant example of confusion and lack of systems and 
performance knowledge, where the crew’s inappropriate response indicated the pilots 
were consciously incompetent, aware of the gravity of the situation, yet unable to solve 
the problem (BEA, 2012; Besco, 1997).  However, Pons, and Dey (2015) argue that Air 
France Flight 447 crashed as a result of cognitive processes contrary to lack of 
knowledge.  Yet, cognitive overload and working memory challenges have been 
attributed to knowledge transfer and long-term memory, impacting knowledge 
acquisition (Endsley, 1995; Maurino, 2000; Wickens et al., 2004).  Research further 
indicates that the majority of pilots may not fully understand complete FMC functionality 
and operational modes, recommending the solution to focus on training (OIG, 2016; 
Sherman et al., 1997).  Pilots’ understanding of aircraft systems and operations may be a 
direct result of poor or inadequate pilot training.  
Training 
A preponderance of research and accident investigations attributed automation-
related pilot errors, in part, to inadequate training (BEA, 2012; Bent & Chan, 2010; FAA, 
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2013d; NTSB, 2010; NTSB, 2014a; NTSB, 2014b; Sarter &Woods, 1998; Wise 2011; 
Young et al., 2006).  Bent and Chan (2010) further identified sub-optimal training as one 
of the two most significant flight hazards, with the other being a shortage of experienced 
personnel.  Yet, corporate pressure to shorten training program footprints, while pilots 
train themselves at home as cost saving measures have become the industry norm 
(Dahlstrom et al., 2008).  Young et al., (2006) identified yet another industry norm to be 
a reduction in automation and flight management system (FMS) training due to 
organization concern with financial resources. 
Airlines created standard operating procedures (SOP) where training was 
designed to ensure that all pilots would perform the same processes and procedures in the 
flight deck.  Safety is a crew event, not two pilots operating in isolation; yet, numerous 
accidents have been attributed, in part, to individual pilots not following SOPs.  While 
Giles (2013) attributed the lack of following SOPs to be a choice, causal factors as to 
why pilots ignored SOPs pose the question as to whether it was a pilot’s conscious choice 
not to follow SOP or a result of a cognitive overload with minimal system and 
operational understanding due to training inadequacies (FAA, 2013d; OIG, 2016). 
Training and flight experience affect cognitive abilities, which further impact SA 
(Endsley, 1995), and how pilots are trained will impact learning capacity.  Reducing 
factors that induce overload and restructuring information in a way that will enable pilots 
to formulated thoughts and assimilate previous knowledge could improve learning and 
performance (Kalyuga, 2009; Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 2004).  Figure 8 presents multiple 
areas identified by the FAA working group where training was a contributing factor in 
accidents, incidents, and ASRS incidents.  Whereas non-automation training (manual 
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flight) resulted in the highest number of accidents, automation training was second, 
followed by inadequate basic training.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Accidents, incidents, and ASRS incidents.  Reprinted from “Operational use of 
flight path management systems: Final report of the performance-based operations,” 
FAA, 2013d, Aviation Rule Making Committee / Commercial Aviation Safety Team 
Flight Deck Automation Working Group. 
 
Jamieson and Vicente (2005) identified mode awareness issues to be a byproduct 
of automation, and that confusion in understanding automation functionality was due to 
lack of a mental representation of how the systems operated.  Automation complexity has 
increased the necessity of training needed to master the automation; however, financial 
resources have yet to fulfill the requirement (Strauch, 2016).  The OIG (2016) reported 
that the FAA is lacking in many areas of training mandates, in that there are no processes 
in place to confirm airline pilots received automation and monitoring training, how often 
the pilots manually flew, if they were proficient at manual flight, and there were no 
processes in place to assess monitoring skills.  The FAA has, however, mandated upset 
62 
 
recovery training, manually flown arrival and departures, slow flight, loss of reliable 
airspeed, and recovery from stall and bounced landing training (OIG, 2016).  Beyond 
manually flown departures and arrivals, the focus of this pilot training mandate has 
shifted training from ensuring proficiency with primary flight skills and performance to 
acceptance that flight control errors may occur when the automation fails, and thus the 
industry is focused on training the pilot how to recover once the abnormal condition 
manifests.  Modern day automated aircraft are designed with protections to avoid unusual 
flight characteristics such as stalls, overbanking, and excessive speed (Airbus, 2003), yet 
if automation fails and the pilot has no flight skills to fall back upon, the pilot may put the 
aircraft into an unusual condition that necessitates this type of trained escape maneuver 
(OIG, 2016).  Retention of this training may be in question if this is a one-time event 
during initial aircraft training, and the pilot may not experience such an event until the 
end of their career.  Notwithstanding, cognitive performance requires practice and 
repetition for the pilot to remain proficient (Casner et al., 2014). 
Pilot training has shifted from a pilot-centered focus to a crew-based focus, yet 
the concept of learning may not have been highlighted in this industry change (FAA, 
2017a).  Learning, in part, is dependent upon cognition, repetition, assessment, and 
feedback.  A critical view into pilot training may provide better understanding as to pilot 
deficiencies with mode awareness and operational programming errors (FAA, 1996; 
FAA, 2013d; OIG, 2016). 
AQP.  Airlines have realized an economic benefit to reduce pilot training with the 
advanced qualification program (AQP), meeting personally designed TPO goals 
(Adamski & Doyle, 2005).  AQP is a train to proficiency program that mandates 
inclusion of CRM, LOFT, and line operational evaluation (LOE) scenarios.  AQP 
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simulator training must be aircraft specific; include indoctrination, qualification, and 
continuing qualification (CQ) programs; training and evaluation for instructors and 
examiners; replicate normal flight operation; include a normal crew compliment; collect 
proficiency data; and utilize a full flight simulator (FAA, 2017a).  Under AQP, pilot 
training shifted from individual training and performance assessment to crew-based 
performance, where line-oriented training processes enable crews to manage the aircraft 
while improving team and communication skills (Helmreich et al., 1999). 
AQP is a voluntary program, yet when implemented is expected to exceed 
minimum training standards and demands a full commitment from the airline (FAA, 
2017a).  Within the AQP structure, pilot training is a proficiency-based concept focused 
on an entire system perspective versus individual training components.  AQP shifted 
training and testing of specified maneuvers, procedures, and knowledge, toward this 
crew-based philosophy requiring specific tasks, knowledge, and skills associated with 
seat position, incorporating CRM, and designed by the respective airline (FAA, 2017a).  
However, Hendrickson et al., (2006) presented concerns that under this proficiency 
concept, training would only be proficiency based and focused on training efficiency, not 
on improved understanding and performance, at the expense of skill decline. 
Current training practices have enabled airlines to cancel traditional ground-
schools, where pilots no longer come together in a classroom environment with an 
instructor and fellow classmates to learn aircraft operating systems.  Under AQP, airline 
flight operations management are authorized to enable pilots to teach themselves aircraft 
systems and computer operations via at-home training programs (FAA, 2017a).  This 
training process resides under the assumption that a pilot will acquire correct systems 
understanding, and when an inflight emergency arises, the pilot will have accurate 
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knowledge to deal with it.  If inflight information is not understood or the pilot 
experiences cognitive overload, the pilot may make decisions based upon heuristics, a 
mental shortcut.  While heuristics are purported to provide positive outcomes, this 
process may not lead to the best decision (Vidulich et al., 2010).  An accident such as Air 
France Flight 447 presents a case where the wrong decision to pull the stick aft at altitude 
did not create a positive outcome (BEA, 2012).  Another concern with the at-home 
methodology is that beginners do not have the knowledge and ability to determine what 
information is important and what is not relative to a given situation (Endsley, 2006, as 
cited in Strauch, 2016).  Knowles, Swanson, Holton, and Ellwood (2011) argued that for 
self-directed learning to be effective, it should not be an isolated event, but requires a 
team to include teachers, mentors, and peers.  Yet, under many approved AQP programs, 
pilots are expected to teach themselves aircraft systems without an instructor to facilitate 
questions and without peers or support personnel, which may be leaving pilots short on 
understanding.  Wise (2011) identified current training practices to be problematic when 
he states, 
The pilots just cannot be given a manual and then be expected to memorize the 
contents in order to transfer the knowledge to a practical application.  Without 
meaningful reasoning for the pilots to understand the concepts, procedures, or 
tasks, the pilots only obtain rote knowledge level abilities without knowing how 
to apply the training content.  (p. 151.) 
Learning.  Learning occurs when systems knowledge and procedures move from 
the working memory into the long-term memory, in order to become available for recall 
(Wickens et al., 2004).  Information processing and knowledge acquisition are key 
aspects of learning, where competency defines knowledge application (Franks et al., 
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2014).  In order to learn, pilots must not only have aptitude to learn, but they must also 
have the ability to practice through repetition, receive feedback, and feel confident that 
the level of performance they achieve will ensure a safe operation (English & Visser, 
2014; Hattie & Timperley, 2007; Huddleson & Rolfe, 1971; Johnson, & Fowler, 2011).  
Yet, a disparity between initial pilot training (where the pilot learns a new aircraft) and 
effective line operations (once on the flight line) may exist in terms of managing the 
automated aircraft (Dekker, 2000, as cited in Harris, 2012).  Training that lacks repetition 
and feedback in complex aircraft may directly impact understanding (knowledge), 
performance (manual flying), and pilot confidence in automated aircraft.  Matton, 
Raufaste, and Vautier (2013) argue that pilots cannot learn skills with only explicit 
instruction and declarative knowledge acquisition, and purport that flight skills depend 
upon multiple environmental, physiological, and aircraft cues acquired through repetition. 
Adult learning identifies that pilots’ experience, reflection upon that experience, 
real world application of training elements with problem centered training, where 
motivation is internal versus external, improves learning (Conti, 2009).  However, Wise 
(2011) identified that airline training has been taught utilizing a behavioristic approach, 
which encompasses a teacher-centered focus with limited student involvement.  This 
process opposes the construct of learner directed, adult learning (Conti, 2009).  Whereas 
pilot-centered training, aligned with adult learning practices, focuses on metacognitive 
concepts emphasizing self-evaluation and improves learning.  Many airlines utilize 
computer-based training (CBT) to teach pilots aircraft systems; however, research 
indicates that CBT focuses on declarative knowledge only versus how that knowledge 
will be applied to the operation, and contradicts adult learning theory (Wise, 2011).  Wise 
(2011) identified problems with CBT in that the design had no foundation in adult 
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learning principles, and training included rote memorization of acronyms which may be 
leaving pilots short on understanding.   
Cognition.  Cognition is required for learning as well as sustained performance, 
yet when working memory is overloaded with too much complex, illogical information, 
data do not transfer to long-term memory, which prohibits memory formation (Endsley, 
1995; Maurino, 2000; Wickens et al., 2004).  Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) suggests the 
reduction of causal factors for overload and restructuring information in a manner where 
pilots are able to formulate thoughts associated with previous knowledge would improve 
information processing and memory formation (Kalyuga, 2009; Paas, Renkl, & Sweller, 
2003). 
Automated glass cockpit and fly-by-wire aircraft are highly complex equipment, 
and training manuals present tremendous amounts of unfamiliar information.  The pilot is 
required to read, comprehend, transfer, and retain that information in long-term memory 
for practical application at a later date.  Pilots are also expected to learn, retain, and 
transfer this knowledge from an at-home, train-yourself program, without support or 
clarification.  Literature identifies pilot confusion and lack of understanding to be causal 
factors of inadequate performance that has resulted in accidents, incidents, and pilot 
safety reports (Bent & Chan, 2010; Besco, 1997; Endsley & Jones, 2012; FAA, 1996; 
FAA, 2013d; NTSB, 2010; NTSB, 2014a; NTSB, 2014b; OIG, 2016; Ross & Tomko, 
2016; Sherman, Helmerich, & Merritt, 1997; Wise, 2011; Young, Fanjoy, & Suckow, 
2006).  Current industry performance may be an indication that training methodologies 
could be problematic (OIG, 2016).  Yet, FAA mandates have not addressed current 
training processes, where the first stage of skill development is declarative knowledge 
acquisition (Vidulich et al., 2010).  Nonetheless, declarative knowledge without 
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associated understanding is likened to rote memorization leading to poor SA.  Endsley 
(2010) argues that success of training processes is dependent upon pilots’ experience, 
closeness to the new information, perseverance, and the availability of resources.  
Learning impacts pilots’ SA in that when an unexpected event occurs, and confusion 
disables the pilot from understanding the meaning of that experience, the pilot is unable 
to project the status into the future, which decreases decision-making ability, impacting 
the safety of the flight (Endsley, 2010). 
Pilot debrief.  Systematic reflection, where pilots analyze and evaluate behavior 
relating to performance, requires feedback on both the outcome—success or failure—and 
how to improve the process (Ellis et al., 2014).  The power of the flight crew debrief has 
been the focus of much research and is instrumental in how pilots learn from human error 
(Allen, Jones, & Sheffield, 2010, Morris & Moore, 2000; Ron, Lipshitz, & Popper, 2006, 
as cited in, Ellis et al., 2014).  Learning also depends upon how the debrief was 
conducted per the outcome of the event.  If the checkride was a success, the debrief 
should only focus upon errors made throughout the event to maximize learning, yet after 
a failed experience, the focus must also include what the pilot did correctly (Ellis et al., 
2014).  Ellis et al. (2014) further argued the necessity to accurately assess the experience 
for learning to occur and reported that pilots would become more accountable for their 
behavior if they became responsible to their success and failures during the learning 
process.  The pilot debrief contains elements of both feedback and self-assessment. 
Feedback.  Feedback is an essential component of learning (Hattie & Timperley, 
2007).  Literature supporting pre and post-briefs indicates that effective feedback should 
be task-focused versus person-oriented, to include self-critiques that are participatory in 
nature and where individuals were willing to accept feedback from others (Esser, 2005).  
68 
 
Training that lacks repetition and feedback in complex aircraft may directly impact 
understanding (knowledge), performance (hand flying), and pilot confidence.  Cognitive 
skills must be utilized and practiced often, despite initial learning, to maintain 
competency (Casner et al., 2014).  Not only are practice and repetition necessary 
components of competency, but also essential to learning in creating automaticity and 
adaptive expertise (Bohle et al., 2014; Casner et al., 2013).  However, learning requires 
more than practice, it requires reflection upon that practice to improve performance 
(Mavin & Roth, 2014b).  Mavin and Roth (2014a) further identified the power of video 
as a tool utilized during a pilot debrief with the flight instructor and seat support pilot an 
integral part of the debrief.  Learning is not an isolated event.  When students observe 
their performance utilizing a video, and self-assessment and reflection are done with an 
instructor and peers, maximum performance gains will be realized (Mavin & Roth, 
2014b). 
The length of a training session, in addition to the debrief, may also impact 
learning performance.  Flight training simulator lessons have historically been conducted 
in four-hour sessions, yet Mavin and Roth (2014b) identified that a four-hour session left 
the pilots fatigued and less apt to remember what happened during the training event, 
contrary to effective reflection.  A three-hour session, however, found the pilots were 
more amicable to discussing the training session in detail, due in part to less fatigue and 
more timely memory of events, which may indicate that shorter simulator sessions, with 
extended debrief, to include videos, may support improved learning performance (Mavin 
& Roth, 2014b).  The pilot debrief provides an opportunity for feedback which has been 
linked to improved performance, whereas Besco (1997) purports that the benefits of 
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feedback in aviation training have been the most undervalued benefit, denying the pilot 
an opportunity for self-assessment.  
Self-assessment.  Historically, aviation safety has been judged by the lack of 
accidents.  However, pilots may also view their personal performance based upon safely 
landing at destination versus whether or not boundaries of safety were reached, and 
without means to assess their knowledge or level of performance in order to improve.  
Automated aircraft provide extensive latitude for safety, meaning there is a great deal of 
room for error as automation is a safety net that minimizes consequences of pilot 
performance.  Therefore, pilots have the opportunity to perform and respond to 
mismanaged arrivals, poor decision-making, and lack of SA without resulting in a 
consequential event, whereas continual success may create erroneous mental models of 
adequate performance (Dismukes, 2010).  While self-assessment is an integral part of 
effective learning, pilots must possess the resources to accurately measure performance in 
order to adjust their self-assessments (Sitzmann, Ely, Brown, & Bauer, 2010).  Esser 
(2005) purports that assessments should not only provide continuous feedback that 
identifies individual progress and areas for improvement but should also be based upon 
an established level of performance, with self-assessment an essential component.  Self-
assessment extends to assessing performance in daily operations; however, under AQP, 
the training itself should be assessed (FAA, 2017a).  
Training assessment.  An integral component of training, an AQP mandate is the 
requirement to ascertain training effectiveness through data collection in addition to 
crewmember, instructor, and evaluator assessment (FAA, 2017a).  Johnson and 
Goldsmith (2016) identified the fundamental connection between training and assessment 
as a dual role in effective training. 
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The quality of training can be no better than the quality of the data used to assess 
the training.  This relationship between training and assessment is the 
fundamental core of AQP.  Under AQP it is not sufficient to simply train.  It must 
be demonstrated that the training ensures proficiency, and this can only be 
accomplished with quality assessments that tell us precisely what aspects of the 
curriculum and training are working and what components are not.  (p. 19) 
Safety control systems are designed around processes to gather data in order to 
improve safety.  The primary reason for a data acquisition in the data management 
process is designed to establish a systematic quality control system to ensure the efficacy 
of pilot training and qualification processes that foster continual improvement (Air 
Transport Association’s Data Management Focus Group, 1998).  The AQP guide 
provides an outline for how training and assessment data should be utilized: 
• Provide assurances of proficiency levels. 
• Establish expectations and determine variations from those expectations. 
• Assess instructional quality. 
• Validate training assumptions. 
• Analyze effectiveness of instructors and evaluators. 
• Provide instructor and evaluator feedback. 
• Refine the training and/or measurement process. 
• Indicate where training changes are needed. 
• Validate alternative training technologies. 
• Provide common grounds for sharing of information between carriers. 
• Provide a quantitative means for CRM assessment.  (FAA, 2017a, pp. 2-3) 
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Despite data collection requirements and guidelines on how to collect good data, 
adequate measurement to determine training effectiveness has eluded the industry 
(Nemeth, 2015).  Pilot performance, as identified by accidents, incidents, and ASRS may 
be better indicators of training effectiveness than current AQP data collection processes 
during simulator training events and electronic reviews (BEA, 2012; FAA, 2013d; NTSB, 
2010; NTSB, 2014a; 2014b; OIG, 2016).  Training assessment has been an ongoing 
challenge; however, until recently, little research existed on effective simulator training 
evaluation measures, yet effective evaluation is the only way to determine training 
program effectiveness, and is worth the financial investment (Banbury et al., 2007).  Roth 
(2015) conducted research to investigate airline pilot assessment methods and expressed 
concerns. 
Examiners did not perceive and process all relevant facts (attributes) of an event, 
which mediated how they rated the performance that could be seen…  There is 
therefore mounting evidence that in the flight examiners’ workplace, assessment 
is based on categorization, which can be mathematically modeled using fuzzy 
logic.  (Roth & Mavin, 2015, as cited in Roth, 2015, p. 223) 
Accepted training assessment processes do not necessarily substantiate that 
learning has taken place in the form of understanding and retention, with the capability to 
transfer that knowledge to the aircraft (Walcott, & Phillips, 2013).  Quality pilot training 
is a proactive safety strategy, which is dependent upon policy, risk management, safety 
assurance, and safety promotion—all elements of an SMS (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  The 
AQP guide was designed to assist training and assessment with safety assurance and 
safety promotion, the focus of SMS, where corporate culture may be the key to success.  
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Safety Culture and SMS 
Corporate culture is a pattern of behavior stemming from artifacts, espoused 
values and beliefs, underlying assumptions, policies, and procedures, to include elements 
of a safety culture, identifying organizational processes (Schein, 2010; Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015).  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) defines safety culture as, “the shared 
values, actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing 
goals and demands,” and comprises five sub cultures—reporting, just, flexible, informed, 
and learning (FAA, 2013b, p. 9).  Safety culture is therefore the essence of the 
corporation’s culture in that behaviors, values, beliefs, and how the organization does 
business relative to safety and associated processes that include communication, 
reporting, flexibility, information sharing, and improvement strategies.  Therefore, safety 
culture is inclusive in the corporate culture and is the essence of the organization’s 
culture.  Safety culture emphasis lays on communication in a flexible, blame free, 
accountable environment that encourages reporting safety concerns, where management 
has both the knowledge and ability to support the system’s overall safety goals focused 
on continual improvement (Patankar & Sabin, 2010: Reason, 1997; Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015; Torres, 2008).  An airline’s safety culture establishes the foundational support of a 
successful safety management system (SMS) (Woo, 2015).  SMS is defined as: 
An organization-wide comprehensive and preventive approach to managing 
safety.  An SMS includes a safety policy, formal methods for identifying hazards 
and mitigating risk, and promotion of a positive safety culture.  An SMS also 
provides assurance of the overall safety performance of your organization.  (FAA, 
2015b, para. 2) 
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SMS risk mitigation and safety assurance are designed to improve overall 
organizational performance in preparation for NextGen (Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  Thus, 
the FAA mandated all U.S. airlines to have an SMS in effect as of January 2018 (FAA, 
2015a).  SMS importance extends beyond regulatory compliance, but also makes logical 
business sense in comparison to the costs associated with an accident (Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015).  However, in order to be effective, SMS demands a positive safety culture—
reporting culture, just culture, flexible culture, informed culture, and learning culture 
(Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  Thus, SMS implementation will be in name only without a 
positive safety culture.  Corporate culture also plays a key role in pilots’ performance 
beyond espoused values, corporate rules, and written procedures, in that the unwritten 
rules are what often guide behavior and impact performance (Roughton & Crutchfield, 
2014).  Corporate culture therefore extends to performance in that how the airline culture 
behaves and transcends to employee performance standards. 
If the informal, unwritten motto of the people in an organization is “the best way 
to advances in this organization is to shut up and not make waves”, the entire 
professional force will eventually lower their personal performance standards.  
(Besco, 2004, p. 160) 
Deviation from standard operating practices (normalization of deviance) may 
become the normal practice when the organization encourages or pushes operating limits 
(Besco, 2004).  Just as SMS demands safety assurance, maximizing safety efforts require 
performance monitoring and improvement measures as well as feedback and recognizing 
positive performance to ensure operational efficiency with maximized safety efforts 
(Mager & Pipe, 1997; Stolzer & Goglia, 2015).  Goh (2003) further stressed the 
importance of a learning organization that encourages employees to improve their 
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knowledge, to experiment and try novel methods of problem solving and search out 
feedback.  Bent and Chan (2010) identified that many airlines, at best, meet regulatory 
requirements, yet compliance does not necessarily mean to the highest standards.  The 
process of only meeting minimal regulatory compliance diminishes hazard identification 
and risk mitigation processes required for SMS (Roughton & Crutchfield, 2014). 
The evolution of airline safety resembles SMS processes of hazard identification 
and risk mitigation, supported by an informed and learning culture (Adamski & Doyle, 
2010; Gesell & Dempsey, 2011; Patankar & Sabin, 2010).  Human factors research drove 
the creation of CRM, AQP, threat and error management (TEM), and LOSA in an 
attempt to reduce pilot error and improve safety (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).  CRM, 
originally termed cockpit resource management, became the first regulatory mandate to 
teach crewmembers interpersonal and communication skills in order to reduce pilot error 
(Helmreich et al., 1999).  CRM was not a one-time fix but an evolutionary process during 
the 1990s that encompassed five stages expanding over a decade to include theory, 
teamwork emphasis, team expansion, AQP, and TEM (Helmreich et al., 1999).  AQP 
required CRM training in the form of LOFT and LOE scenarios (FAA, 2017a).  This shift 
in training moved individual-based performance focus to crew-based performance 
(Helmreich et al., 1999).  TEM was designed to assist pilots in identifying operational 
threats in order to mitigate risk (Helmreich, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 2001; Mathew & 
Thomas, 2004).  The understanding was that errors would occur; however, if pilots’ 
awareness expanded to potential threats, pilots would then become prepared for those 
events that would otherwise have been unexpected (Helmreich et al.,1999; Merkt, 2010). 
LOSA created the platform for trained observers to monitor performance on 
actual flights, document threats, and record scores based upon pre-established behavior 
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criteria (Leva, Cahill, Kay, & McDonald, 2010).  However, multiple issues have created 
a concern with the efficacy of LOSA to include lack of feedback for improvement, 
inability to identify the entire chain of events, inability to assess pilots’ understanding of 
the aircraft and operations, how TEM was connected to the LOSA process to mitigate 
risk, and failure of data to improve operational processes (Leva et al., 2010).  The 
aviation industry is moving to more proactive safety measures, somewhat likened to 
TEM with risk mitigation, but extended beyond the flight deck to the entire corporation, 
where SMS demands entire organizational processes to proactively look at operational 
practices, identify threats, and mitigate risk, where communication is essential and 
becomes an integral part of every organization’s safety culture not only to comply with 
FAA mandates but for improved organizational safety (FAA, 2015a; Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015). 
The Continental Express Flight 2574 (NTSB, 1992) and ValueJet Flight 592 
(NTSB, 1997) accidents were attributed to corporate culture, which began the shift to an 
aviation organizational safety culture, where management revised attitudes, beliefs, 
actions, norms, rules, and acceptable levels of risk moved forefront (Mearns & Flin, 
1999). 
Safety culture is the enduring value and priority placed on worker and public 
safety by everyone in every group at every level of an organization.   It refers 
to the extent to which individuals and groups will commit to personal 
responsibility for safety, act to preserve, enhance and communicate safety 
concerns, strive to actively learn, adapt and modify (both individual and 
organizational) behavior based on lessons learned from mistakes, and be 
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rewarded in a manner consistent with these values.  (Wiegmann, Zhang, Von, 
Thaden, Sharma, & Mitchell, 2002, p. 8)   
To exemplify a safety culture attitude, a CEO at a major airline asserted that every 
employee was required to report anything not right in his operation, but despite that 
assertion of a reporting culture, 15 Air 21 whistle blower actions (Wendell H. Ford 
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century) have been filed against this 
airline, due to retaliation of employees reporting safety violations from 2008 to 2018, and 
42 recorded court cases of alleged harassment (FOIA, 2018).   
An effective SMS also requires the organizational safety culture to facilitate line 
employees’ ability to implement SMS principles in daily operational duties while the 
organization assesses performance.  However, Chen and Chen (2012) identified that a 
gap may exist between employee involvement, corporate assessment, and proactive 
response.  American Airlines Flight 587, an Airbus A330 that crashed due to incorrect 
rudder response during a wake turbulence encounter presents an example of this gap.  
This crash was attributed to incorrect training; however, numerous documents surfaced 
years after the crash that identified an incorrect process in upset recovery training had 
been a known training issue (Fraher, 2015).  Yet, due to lack of communication and 
information sharing required with informed, reporting, and learning cultures, essential to 
a safety culture, this information was never addressed until after the accident. 
The FAA continues to balance safety and economics.  Early technology was 
improved upon to reduce systems failure and adapt human factors into design.  Yet, 
human error resulting in communication problems prompted the safety side of the FAA 
to create CRM, while the economics side developed AQP (FAA, 2017a).  Under AQP, 
the combination of communication training was incorporated into the LOFT and LOE 
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scenarios to improve performance, while at the same time enabled airlines to decrease the 
amount of training, and subsequently a new generation of automated accidents occurred 
due to lack of understanding, confusion, mode awareness, and flight skill loss (FAA, 
1996).  Economics are driving NextGen, and the FAA is proactively working toward 
safer skies with proactive measures via safety culture and SMS mandates, yet accidents, 
incidents, and ASRS continue due to lack of understanding, confusion, mode awareness, 
and flight skill loss (FAA, 2013d).  Safety culture is the foundation of SMS, which will 
facilitate a safer environment for NextGen operations (FAA, 2015b; FAA, 2016; Stolzer, 
Halford, & Goglia, 2015); however, a gap may exist between safety culture, SMS, 
NextGen, and training, resulting in ongoing performance issues.  The Evolution of 
Aviation Safety, shown in Figure 9, displays industry change related to accidents, 
program development, and the future of aviation associated with risk mitigation and 
training to improve safety, preparing for a NextGen and SMS future (Petitt, 2015a).  Each 
accident was due, in part, to lack of understanding.  
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Figure 9.  Evolution of aviation safety. Adapted from Petitt K. K. (2017).  Structural 
redesign of pilot training and the automated aircraft.  International Journal of Aviation 
Systems, Operations and Training. 
 
Experts predict an increase in the accident rate to an unacceptable level from 
2020-2025, due to added complexity of air-based systems (Patankar & Sabin, 2010).  
With the added complexity of the NextGen environment, human error in automated 
aircraft is likely to increase if pilots are not properly trained to achieve deeper 
understanding of aircraft operations (Skitka, Mosier, Burdick, & Rosenblatt, 2000).  
While corporate culture impacts performance in multiple ways, unethical culture can 
negatively impact employee engagement and lead to potential burnout; whereas the 
greater an employees’ perception of cultural ethics, the greater work engagement 
(Huhtala, Tolvanen, Mauno, & Feldt, 2015).  Engagement has been noted to be similar to 
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passion in a sense that strong motivation to engage in work activities, such as learning a 
new aircraft, is indicative of an authentic self and an aspect of performance (Kocjan, 
2015). 
Aviation Passion 
Passion has been associated with an individual’s strong involvement in a favorite 
activity and is defined as, “a strong inclination toward an activity that people like, find 
important and which they invest their time and energy” (Vallerand et al., 2008 p. 1).  
When passion is focused on aviation, that individual may be termed an AvGeek.  An 
Avgeek is defined as “someone who is passionate about aviation and that passion can be 
shown in countless ways,” to include photography, aviation club participation, reading 
aviation magazines and books, flying home simulators, or owning aircraft models (Brown 
& Moore, 2013, par. 4).  An Avgeek is not necessarily a pilot, but if the pilot were to be 
an Avgeek, their passion toward aviation could be carried into the job with a potential for 
increased performance. 
Two types of passion exist: harmonious passion and obsessive passion.  
Harmonious passion is the essence of an Avgeek, where the passion is internalized into 
the pilot’s identity, the individual is highly motivated and dedicated, and the passion is in 
harmony with their life (Kocjan, 2015).  Astakhova (2014) describes harmonious activity 
to be fulfilling, gratifying, and fun-filled where the passionate person experiences 
enjoyment.  While Kocjan (2015) likened passion to engagement, Schaufeli, Taris, and 
Van Rhenen (2008) and Vallerand et al., (2003) characterize the difference between 
harmonious passion and engagement, in that the passionate person identifies with their 
passion, and work engagement represents the person’s feeling toward work.  Ho, Wong, 
and Lee (2011) purport work engagement is similar to job passion when personal 
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identification and satisfaction with the job exist.  An aviation passion that is combined 
with the job of flying could create a harmonious passion that is both representative of job 
satisfaction and personal passion, creating increased work engagement. 
People with harmonious passion have been reported to have better work 
performance, whereas those with job passion feel more identification and satisfaction, 
enhancing the desire to perform well because there is a personal meaning and love for the 
job (Ho, Wong, & Lee, 2011).  When a pilot is passionate about aviation, in addition to 
enjoyment, the pilot’s self-concept within that passion becomes their identity (Ho, Wong, 
& Lee, 2011).   
Ho, Wong, and Lee (2011) clarified that harmonious passion exists because the 
individual loves the job characteristics, not because they have to do the work for social 
approval, whereas obsessive passion, based on identity, can lead to feelings of superiority 
and importance.  Kocjan (2015) reported that obsessive passion stems from the need for 
social acceptance and self-esteem, where the identity of what a pilot means becomes the 
driving force for the passion, more so than the enjoyment.  Harmonious passion was 
identified to be a positive force on performance, as opposed to obsessive passion 
(Vallerand, 2008). 
Elements of passion in regard to focus and immersion versus absorption depend 
upon intentional concentration and the quality of effort, whereas the pilot with greater 
harmonious passion should have greater absorption manifesting into higher levels of 
performance (Ho, Wong, & Lee, 2011).  Ho, Wong, and Lee (2011) further identified that 
attention did not necessarily increase performance, and suggested this could be due to job 
complexity, greater challenges, and higher demands, all which are associated with highly 
automated aircraft. 
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Shaufeli et al., (2008) identified that work engagement increased performance 
related to passion based on three dimensions—first the individual must be dedicated, 
resilient, with the ability to persevere despite problems.  Second, they must be inspired, 
proud, enthusiastic, and realize the significance and challenges of their work; and third 
they must be engrossed and absorbed in what they are doing.  Motivation, engagement, 
and many years of deliberate practice, identified as deliberate engagement, are essential 
to improving performance (Ericsson, 2008; Vallerand et al. 2008). 
Despite the difference between harmonious passion and obsessive passion, 
positive performance in an aircraft could be realized with either type of passion due to the 
amount of dedication and engagement in the job, be it pure enjoyment or the need for 
identity.  However, a culture that promotes both engagement and harmonious passion will 
require performance feedback necessary for increased, permanent wellbeing, and 
improved performance (Schaufeli et al., 2008).  Engagement tied to passion of an Avgeek 
may be where the worker immerses themselves into their job and could be the answer to 
improved performance; whereas the disengaged pilot is not motivated and will detach 
from the job and be less motivate to self-study and learn beyond what is being provided 
in training (Kocjan, 2015). 
Data Collection Research 
Social network system (SNS).  From first quarter 2010 to first quarter 2018, 
Twitter had 336 million active users (Statista, 2018) connected via the Internet that has 
over three billion users (Davidson, 2015).  The use of the Internet has become an 
extremely effect tool to identify many target populations that cover the globe, that would 
not otherwise have been possible.  These Internet venues are termed SNS.  Boyd and 
Ellison, as cited in Baltar and Brunet, (2012) define SNS as:  
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Web-based service(s) that allow individuals to construct a public or semi-public 
profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with whom they 
share a connection, and view and traverse their list of connections and those made 
by others within the system.  (p. 58)   
Access to participants via SNS is an increasing form of locating research 
participants versus traditional data gathering methods, with positive results.  King, 
O’Rourke, and DeLongis (2014) utilized Facebook and found gathering data directly into 
electronic databases was rapid, cost-effective, and enabled bypassing traditional and 
professional associations, in addition to the immediacy that enabled participants to access 
the survey per their schedule, an essential feature for commercial pilots who may have 
irregular flight schedules.  Grant-Muller et al., (2015) reported the benefits and increased 
role of data collection via social media in the transport sector, viewing this process as 
opportunistic and efficient when data was needed in a timely manner.  Paper surveys 
were available to eliminate potential bias based on computer-generated survey data only.  
However, Grieve, Witteveen, and Tolan, (2014) studied the difference between online 
versus offline data collection with pen and paper, and identified online results were 
comparable in terms of internal reliability with construct relationships.  Data collection 
during disaster relief also realized advantages with face validity due to immediacy and 
the ability to survey in a timely manner, and Spence, Lachlan, and Rainear (2016) further 
purport that SNS was a better option of gathering data because they believe existing 
research has been conducted with random but flawed samples. 
SNS recruiting has been identified as a worthwhile option when there is no 
available list of the population (Spence, Lachlan, & Rainear, 2016), such in the case of 
pilots worldwide.  In support of online data collection, Greive, Witteveen, and Tolan 
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(2014) revealed that an online methodology missed less data, showed greater disclosure 
with sensitive material, and bivariate correlations identified similar patterns, despite 
online or traditional data collection methodology.  Greive, Witteveen, and Tolan (2014) 
further argued that online data collection was not only more representative but was more 
diverse, that it may provide greater quality data, and suggested that people may be more 
apt to take a survey on line, if they were so inclined, and more apt to provide authentic 
responses.  One concern Greive, Witteveen, and Tolan (2014) proposed was that the 
findings with searching qualified subjects via Facebook may not necessarily be 
generalized; however, they also reported that socially value-laden measures showed 
higher degrees of confidence, and that overall the difference with online data collection 
versus traditional methodology was minimal.   
SNS has proven to be an effective means for data collection when research 
necessitates non-probability sampling (Babbie, 2013; Sibona & Walczak, 2012; Vogt, 
Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012; Woodley & Lockard, 2016).  Types of non-probability 
sampling include purposive or judgmental sampling, snowball sampling, and respondent 
driven sampling.  Network driven sampling is a term utilized in this research to reflect a 
hybrid data collection process that combines elements of snowball sampling, respondent 
driven sampling, and purposive sampling. 
Best Practices.  For effective SNS recruitment, messages must be specific to the 
targeted market, but target marketing is more favorable to distinct groups such as the 
target population in this study (Aaker & Brumbaugh, 2000; Dubicki, 2007).  “Messages 
need to be both informative and persuasive… also need to capture the patron’s attention–
graphics grab the reader’s attention better than text, and slogans or catchy phrases are 
even more memorable” (Dubicki, 2007, p. 11).  Groves and Dipko (2004) reported that 
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survey respondents participation increased by as much as 40% if the topic interested them 
versus not, and the response rate included, in part, the manner in which the survey request 
presented the topic.  Industry related tweets that grabbed the reader’s attention, aligned 
with the concept of social exchange theory, where success with recruitment strategies 
was due to participants taking the survey based upon perceptions of what they would 
receive in return (Sibona & Walczak, 2012).  Sibona & Walczak (2012) further identified 
the necessity to openly support group values and validate that the participants were 
making a difference by taking the survey (Sibona & Walczak, 2012).  A qualitative study 
further identified trust as vital and interpersonal communication essential to internet 
research (Dziubaniuk, 2014).  Persuasion is acceptable, whereas undue influence is not 
(Barton, Eggly, Winckles, & Albrect, 2014).  While coercion is never allowed due to 
undue influence, Barton et al. (2014) articulated the difference between persuasion and 
undue influence, reporting bioethicists’ definition of undue influence occurs if the 
participants were not properly informed of the research and lacked understanding of what 
they were doing when they signed the informed consent. 
Nonprobability sampling.  Nonprobability sampling is a methodology utilized 
when there is no sampling frame, and participants are not on a master list (Babbie, 2013).  
Palinkas et al. (2015) presents research utilizing multiple approaches with purposeful 
sampling and identifies the effectiveness of hybrid designs.  Network Driven Sampling 
(NDS) is a hybrid of snowball sampling, respondent driven sampling, and purposive 
sampling that focuses on the target population (Babbie, 2013; Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 
2012; Sibona & Walczak, 2012; Woodley, & Lockard, 2016).  NDS was utilized to 
mitigate bias while utilizing SNS, by focusing on the target population (Babbie, 2013; 
Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012; Sibona & Walczak, 2012; Woodley, & Lockard, 2016).   
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Purposive sampling.  Purposive (judgmental sampling) is, “A type of 
nonprobability sampling in which the units to be observed are selected on the basis of 
researcher’s judgment about which ones will be the most useful or representative” 
(Babbie, 2013, p. 128).  The target population was identified and the judgement to select 
as many members of that population directed targeting subjects within that population via 
SNS.  Sibona and Walczak (2012) identified the challenges of recruiting and determined 
the use of Twitter was extremely effective in purposive sampling methods.  
Recommendations to increase response rate via Twitter included adopting social 
exchange theory, where the participants actions of taking the survey were based upon 
what they thought they would receive in return (Sibona & Walczak, 2012).  Sibona and 
Walczak (2012) further identified a necessity of a relationship between the researcher and 
participants to be based on trust.  If the given target population queried had access to a 
researcher’s profile on SNS and where able to identify her as part of the community, 
participants may be more likely to participate due to that connection.  In addition to the 
aforementioned recommendations, participants should also feel value that their opinion 
matters, should be validated that they are part of a group that is making a difference, and 
due to social propensity where people like to help another in need, asking for help would 
encourage support, all of which should improve the response rate (Dillman, Smyth, & 
Christian, 2008).   
Snowball sampling.  Snowball sampling is a type of convenience sampling that 
has been identified as an effective method of contacting target populations that may 
otherwise be difficult to access due to size, hidden populations, or subject sensitivity 
(Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012; Woodley & Lockard, 2016).  Snowball sampling was 
effectively utilized in a doctoral research project where the experiences of black female 
86 
 
faculty in higher education located in New Mexico were studied, which otherwise would 
have been difficult, if not impossible, to locate this unique population (Woodley, 2014).  
Kahan and Al-Tamimi (2009) utilized snowball sampling to effectively recruit hard to 
find Middle Eastern-American young adults, and Temple and Brown (2012) utilized 
snowball sampling when they recruited cannabis users, which otherwise may not have 
been possible.  However, while snowball sampling is not without concern, snowball 
sampling has been proven necessary to gather data in certain studies.  Woodley and 
Lockard (2016) reported concerns pertaining to snowball sampling to include selection 
bias, subjects’ diversity, and validity. 
Respondent driven sampling.  Respondent driven sampling (RDS) is a chain-
referral method where the respondents are incentivized to act as an agent on behalf of the 
researcher versus providing names to the research.  Similar to snowball sampling but with 
a mathematical model to compensate non-random sample collection, respondent driven 
sampling is also based upon hidden populations that have no sampling frame, where 
anonymity is essential within the group, often because of illegal behavior 
(Heckathorn,1997).  RDS was developed by Heckathorn (1997) for a drug abuse HIV 
study, and while this method of data collection has become extensively used in the public 
health sector for drug and sexual tendency research, there is ample opportunity to utilize 
concepts of RDS in other areas.  RDS is also beneficial when anonymity is essential due 
to the criticality of concerns for repercussions of reporting performance related issues and 
identifying organizational culture.  RDS recruitment methods have also been effectively 
moved to the internet enabling minimum resources to gather a larger sample of the 
population quickly (Wenjert, Cyprian, & Heckathorn, 2008).   
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To address deficiencies of chain-referral models, mapping the targeted population 
has been utilized to recruit subjects from a variety of areas, to ensure participants will be 
from different areas versus one (Heckathorn,1997).  The concept of mapping could be 
utilized to create a list of worldwide airlines and operators to contact potential 
respondents from each airline, in addition to company type—airline, charter, and 
corporate or fractional.  Heckathorn (1997) further identified that RDS is an incentive 
driven method in that those who recruit participants to assist would receive double 
incentives—one incentive to participate and another to recruit.  Despite the option of 
financial incentives, the results of participants volunteering to recruit other participants 
versus providing names could improve efficiency over snowball sampling by reducing 
workload.  Slganik and Heckathorn (2004) remind researchers that RDS is a sample of 
convenience with associated bias, similar to snowball sampling, and suggest the strength 
of RDS is found within exploratory research.   
Summary 
In 1942 military pilots were provided manuals, learned aircraft systems and 
procedures on their own, and then showed up to the aircraft to learn how to fly 
(Stromberg, 2016).  Now, decades later, airline pilots learn aircraft systems and 
procedures on their own via a flash drive and then learn how to fly in a simulator (FAA, 
2017a).  The same process exists, albeit with different technology.   
Industry concern.  Modern day aircraft create a complex conundrum between 
improving safety through advanced technology with improved efficiency and reliability 
in order to reduce pilot error.  However, the added complexity has increased 
opportunities for pilot confusion, lack of understanding, complacency, and dependence, 
all of which have led to pilot error.  A direct consequence of automation usage is flight 
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skill loss, and automated aircraft have created issues with complacency and mode 
awareness challenges.  Industry concerns point to training, while AQP data collection and 
training assessment have been an ongoing industry challenge that may be an integral part 
of performance issues. 
Performance.  Automation dependency has been identified as an insidious culprit 
taking pilot skills while at the same time inducing complacency.  While high levels of 
automation usage can both improve and reduce situation awareness, an in-depth 
understanding of aircraft systems and operations may improve operational performance.  
Trust in equipment is also a determining factor in the level of automation usage.  Where 
the pilot places trust for highest performance (the pilot or automation) may determine the 
level of automation used.  There is a direct connection between performance and causal 
factors of accidents and incidents.  Passion and engagement improve performance, 
whereas a disengaged pilot will become detached and non-motivated, negatively 
impacting performance. 
Accidents and incidents.  Aviation accidents are rarely attributed to one causal 
factor.  Confusion, limited knowledge, communication, mode awareness, lack of flight 
skills, and training concerns continue as causal factors attributing to airline accidents, 
incidents, and ASRS.  Flight skill loss appears to be attributed to pilot dependence and 
over-usage of automation.  Yet pilots have the ability and opportunity to disengage the 
autopilot, autothrust, and flight directors for most departures, arrivals, and areas outside 
RVSM airspace, yet many are reluctant to do so or are prohibited by corporate culture 
and company regulations.  Airline accidents and incidents will continue to drive 
legislation. 
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Legislation.  Current FAA legislation has implemented stall training, upset 
recovery training, remedial training, stick pusher training, weather training, and 
requirements for manually flown arrivals and departures, slow flight, loss of reliable 
airspeed, and recovery from bounced landings.  However, no legislation exists to address 
whether or not instructors are able to effectively conduct and/or evaluate the 2019 FAA 
training mandates, or how airline management is to evaluate those instructors.  
Legislation to improve declarative knowledge with deeper understanding of systems and 
aircraft operations, or training that improves learning, has yet to be addressed. 
Learning.  Training for unexpected events continues to be a difficult challenge, 
yet how pilots learn has become a science unto itself, with focus on feedback, repetition, 
and confidence.  Feedback and self-assessment in a pilot debrief are necessary for 
effective learning, as are adult learning techniques.  While SA may not be a learned trait, 
per se, training, cognitive ability, and experience all impact SA, thus SA becomes a 
byproduct of learning.  Improved situation awareness is essential in aircraft operations 
because it enables better decision-making.  Yet, corporate culture and a training 
environment must support employee involved learning, establish policy, manage risk, 
assure safety, and promote safety. 
Corporate culture and SMS.  Corporate culture impacts employee performance, 
inside and outside the flight deck.  Whereas a safety culture defines corporate culture, a 
positive safety culture is the foundation of an SMS.  The FAA has mandated all U.S. 
airlines implement SMS, a proactive safety management system designed to mitigate 
risk, establish policy, and provide safety assurance and safety promotion.  Applying SMS 
principles to pilot training may reduce industry issues and improve pilot performance.  
An unethical culture can negatively impact employee engagement, whereas the greater an 
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employees’ perception of cultural ethics, the greater work engagement.  Passion and work 
engagement are closely related.   
Literature gap.  The gap in the current literature consists of unanswered 
questions as to why pilots are not manually flying their aircraft and what is causing a lack 
of understanding, confusion, and mode awareness issues, and if lack of understanding, 
confusion, and mode awareness are influencing pilots’ unwillingness to manually fly.  In 
current generation glass aircraft, manual flight does not dismiss the requirement of 
understanding operational modes or avoid the need to understand the data on the moving 
maps and instrumentation, as information does not disappear with the autopilot and 
autothrust disconnected.  The pilot must understand and manage copious amounts of 
information.  Manual flight means that the pilot must be able to manually control the 
aircraft and at the same time understand pitch, path, and speed modes in relation to 
performance required for the flight regime, as well as associated guidance for navigation 
and approach modes of operation.  In a fly-by-wire aircraft, computers are still 
controlling some aspect of the aircraft and providing computer driven information to 
flight control surfaces during manual flight.  Therefore, learning which buttons to push 
by rote memorization takes far less cognitive effort than manual flight, and perhaps less 
training, too.  If the pilot does not understand the functionality of the automation or the 
information presented, disengaging the automation will only add to cognitive overload as 
the pilot will have to manage the aircraft in an unfamiliar system, within a dynamic 
environment.  
While improved understanding would naturally increase confidence, whether or 
not lack of systems understanding is the attributing factor to lack of confidence 
associated with manual flight is open for question.  Training practices such as lack of 
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manual flight in a simulator, lack of repetition, or lack of demonstrating the ability of 
manual flight with a training professional in the aircraft could diminish confidence and 
create the reluctance to disengage the automation.  Ample research identifies multiple 
factors of automation dependency; however, automation does not control the pilot.  
Unless corporate policy, or FAA regulations, mandate automation usage, the pilot has a 
choice.  Thus, a question exists as to why pilots are choosing to not disengage the 
automation, despite FAA recommendations (FAA, 2013a).  The question must also be 
asked if regulatory and corporate policy could be hindering crew performance.  A great 
deal of literature identifies how people learn, yet that literature appears to be in conflict 
with approved training methodologies to include flash drive, train-at-home ground 
schools, and simulated events that are experienced once, without repetition, under the 
AQP program.  Industry officials have identified the problem—pilots’ lack of flight 
skills, lack of monitoring ability, and exhibit confusion in the aircraft—and this 
performance problem has been identified as an attributing factor to accidents and 
incidents.  Yet, there is a gap in research as to why pilots are unwilling to manually fly, 
pilots’ level of understanding and how that level impacts operational performance, and in 
what capacity training practices may be leaving pilots deficient in confidence to manually 
fly their aircraft.     
Data collection.  To fill the literature gap and fully understand why pilots may 
not be flying their aircraft and lack understanding necessitated a worldwide sample.  In 
that a master list containing airline, corporate, fractional, and charter pilots worldwide 
does not exist, SNS was utilized to capture a sample of that population that would be 
representative of the entire population.     
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to address industry problems, fill the literature gap, and add to the body 
of knowledge regarding automation dependence, confusion, lack of mode awareness, and 
flight skill loss, the Manual Flight Inventory (MFI) survey was constructed and utilized to 
gather data concerning pilots’ understanding, proclivity toward automation usage, 
training practices, safety culture, and aviation passion.  Participants were commercial 
pilots from airlines, corporate and fractional operators, and charter flight departments 
worldwide who fly international and/or domestic, long and/or short-haul operations, with 
a required crew compliment of two or more pilots.  Survey data were cleaned, meaning 
the data were analyzed and fixed if identified as invalid, imputed, and divided into three 
datasets— training, validation, and test—in order to cross-validate.  Imputation was the 
process to “replace the unobserved score with some estimated value (Byrne, 2010, p. 
290).  Three models were built, and each model was evaluated with each dataset utilizing 
descriptive statistics and exploratory factor analysis (EFA), a multivariate statistical 
method to extract underlying factors (dimensions) among the selected input variables in 
the study.  Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was then used to identify the relationships 
between latent variables and constructs.  Three CFA models were tested with cross-
validation similar to the EFA process, utilizing all three datasets.  Analysis and 
comparison as to the best model fit was determined, and the full dataset was tested on the 
final CFA model.  Hypotheses were formed, and SEM was utilized to test path analysis in 
order to accept or not accept the hypotheses.   
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Research Approach 
The MFI survey was developed by querying FAA designees and industry 
professionals as to their assessment of manual flight issues; analysis of current training 
methodologies, NTSB reports and FAA standards; and this information was combined 
with a thorough literature review.  The researcher was able to synthesize this information 
due to a foundation of practical experience and authored the survey instrument.  After the 
survey instrument was developed, eight subject matter experts performed extensive 
analysis of the survey instrument prior to implementation.  The MFI was utilized to 
gather data on pilots’ understanding of aircraft and flight management systems, manual 
flight tendencies, training, aviation passion, and safety culture.  A multivariate statistical 
method, exploratory factor analysis (EFA), was utilized to extract underlying factors 
(dimensions) among these selected input variables in the analysis.  These dimensions 
represent factors that are inter-correlated among the survey items.  The MFI was 
assessed, tested, and a pretest was conducted with EFA and CFA.  Then data for the 
complete study was collected and EFA, CFA, and SEM were conducted.  
Factor analysis.  EFA and CFA are types of factor analysis that were both 
utilized in this research.  EFA was conducted with SPSS (a statistical software program) 
to determine the strength of variables, convergence, reliability, and the discriminant value 
to ensure constructs were distinct.  Current research purports, “EFA is preferable at the 
beginning phase of scale development because there may be unanticipated, but 
substantively meaningful factors influencing subsets of items or unanticipated cross-
loadings” (Flora & Flake, 2017, p. 82).  CFA was conducted with AMOS (a statistical 
software program) and is utilized when “the researcher has some knowledge of the 
underlying latent variable structure (Byrne, 2010, p. 6).  Therefore, initial research was 
94 
 
performed with EFA followed by CFA.  Observations of theoretical constructs that 
cannot be observed directly are considered latent variables or factors (Byrne, 2010).  
Examples of latent variables have been identified in behavioral sciences such as 
psychology to be self-concept and motivation, or within education, verbal ability and 
teacher expectancy (Byrne, 2010).  Byrne identified that factors related to observable 
variables could make measurement possible with factor analytic modeling, if the 
observed variables were produced by the latent constructs.  Statistical modeling in 
exploratory factor analysis explains how observed items and latent variables are related to 
one another (Byrne, 2010).  Factor analysis is a statistical concept that originated from 
the common factor model stating that, “each indicator in a set of observed measures is a 
linear function of one or more common factor and one unique factor” (Brown & Moore, 
2013, p. 361).   
Criterion used for factor analysis.  The factor extraction method used for this 
study was the maximum likelihood (ML) technique.  ML has the reputation of being the 
most commonly used factor analysis procedure (Brown & Moore, 2013; De Winter & 
Dodou, 2011; Hair et al., 2010; Williams, Onsman,  Brown, 2010). ).  Maximum 
likelihood factor analysis (MLFA) also generates a factor solution that will best emulate 
the underlying population (De Winter & Dodou, 2011).  In addition, results with ML are 
not dependent upon data distribution (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Fabrigar et al., 1995).  
ML has desirable statistical properties, making it the basis for most developments in 
factor analysis and related methods (Tinsley & Brown, 2010).  The ML extraction 
technique, used in EFA, corresponds with IBM’s AMOS (Analysis of Moment 
Structures) CFA estimation method as the default factor estimation.  Another 
consideration in factor analysis is the axis rotation methodology to clearly segment the 
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identified factors.  Factor rotation used in this study was oblique rotation because the 
study assumed there would be a meaningful correlation between the extracted factors.  In 
addition, oblique rotation utilizing Promax rotation has an advantage of being fast and 
simple (Abdi, 2003).  Factor analysis also has strict multivariate assumptions that if 
violated could increase the likelihood of a Type I error as well as reduce the power of the 
analysis (Tinsley & Brown, 2000).  A Type I error being the incorrect rejection of a null 
hypothesis (De Veaux, Velleman, Bock, 2010).  Multiple assumptions of factor analysis 
were considered prior to running factor analysis, in order to determine the appropriate use 
of the model.  Factor analysis assumptions included: (a) sample size, (b) input variable 
inter-correlation, (c) measure of sampling adequacy, (d) explanation of total variance, (e) 
factor loading, (f) reliability measurement, (g) convergent validity, and (h) discriminate 
validity (Hair et al., 2010; Williams, Onsman,  Brown, 2010). ). 
Design and procedures.  Observed data were gathered with the Manual Flight 
Inventory (MFI) survey, developed and validated for the purpose of this research.  This 
survey instrument was created to assess pilots’ declarative and procedural knowledge, 
their proclivity toward automated flight, identify their passion for aviation, assess training 
practices, and query pilot perceptions of training and safety culture.  The MFI survey was 
developed based on a thorough literature review and in consultation with extensive 
subject matter experts.  Survey design was based upon best practices recommended by 
Ruel, Wagner, and Gillespie (2016) and Wise, Abbott, Wise, and Wise (2010).  
Constructs were conceptually defined, and questions were written as variables of each 
construct.  Demographic and background information queries were written in multiple 
choice and dichotomous questions.  Eight subject matter expert (SME) volunteers, 
representative of the population, assessed the survey instrument to ascertain clarity, 
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directness, understanding, and context, in addition to identifying construct and variable 
relationships, and an inter-rater reliability analysis was conducted.  The survey and 
questions were edited and re-evaluated.  This process continued until no more changes 
were required.  The survey was pretested and analyzed with EFA, followed by a CFA 
measurement model analysis.  Sample size for both the pretest pilot study with EFA and 
CFA, and the full dataset with EFA, CFA, and the full SEM was determined and 
dependent upon the number of latent and observable factors, effect size, statistical power, 
and probability level (Cohen, 1988; Westland, 2010).  Table 1 represents an overview of 
the scale development, data collection, and the methodological process.  
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Table 1 
Scale Development, Data Collection, and Methodological Process  
 
 
 
 
Scale development and pre-testing.  The researcher utilized acquired aviation 
experience combined with a literature review associated with automation dependence, 
confidence, manual flight, training, understanding, aviation passion, and safety culture to 
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develop conceptual definitions for fives constructs—manual flight (MF), pilot 
understanding (PU), pilot training (PT), safety culture (SC), and aviation passion (AP).  
While empirical research related to confidence was identified in the literature review, 
confidence was not a construct due to potentially high cross-loading with the factor pilot 
understanding.  
Twenty-six SEM questions (Q6 - Q31) were written to represent each construct.  
Hair et al. (2010) recommended a minimum of three questions per construct for strength.  
However, Young and Pearce (2013) suggest that a factor containing two variables would 
be deemed reliable if the variables were “highly correlated with each another (r > .70) but 
fairly uncorrelated with other variables” (p. 80).  A proactive measure to ensure the 
minimum number of variables remained after factor extraction was to ask five or more 
questions per construct, in the event variables were removed due to cross-loading or low-
loading issues. 
The survey design ensured the questions were simple, direct, specific, with no 
double-barreled questions, that ask two questions in one (Ruel et al., 2016; Wise et al., 
2010).  Ruel et al. (2016) advised to avoid abbreviations, slang, ambiguity, and double 
negative questions, and recommendations were heeded.  A seven-point Likert scale was 
utilized for the SEM opinion and operational based questions, which enabled pilots to 
answer knowledge-based questions on a level from extremely unlikely to extremely 
likely versus an absolute.  The assumption was if the pilot absolutely knew the systems 
question, they would select extremely likely (7).  However, anything below extremely 
likely would indicate doubt in absolute knowledge.  The odd number of selections was 
intended to prevent a forced choice that an even number scale would create.  Inasmuch as 
there are many options such as aircraft type, the option to select other was provided for 
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those questions that did not have a comprehensive list.  To simplify demographic data 
and assist with further anonymity of the airline, corporate location data was limited to 
nine geographic areas versus all countries.  Based upon results with the pilot study, 
categorization and questions were reordered to place the SEM questions first in the 
survey due to potential survey fatigue.  Those respondents that did not finish the survey 
but completed the SEM questions were utilized for the factor analysis.  The SEM 
questions were not grouped together per construct; however, the remaining questions 
pertaining to manual flight, training, experience, and perceptions of automation usage 
were grouped in categories.  One grouping of dichotomous questions pertained to the 
participant’s opinion on automation regarding perception of safety despite the cautions on 
dichotomous questions in that “questions rarely have two possible answers” (Ruel et al., 
2016, p. 58).  The question, “Is autopilot usage safer than manual flight?” would fall 
within that warning.  The answer is difficult to answer yes or no because it depends upon 
many variables—mental fatigue, physical fatigue, overall flying experience, experience 
of fellow crewmembers, experience of the active arrival or location, cognitive ability, 
inter crewmember tension or conflict, life stress, pilot age, weather, location of flight, 
time of flight, time of crewmember’s break, quality of crew rest, passenger issues, 
recency of training, length of flight, circadian rhythm, or any combination of these 
variables, or others.  However, to include the response it depends, it was assumed the 
results would include all participants selecting it depends on every question— because it 
does.  Thus, participants were asked these questions without any variables other than is it 
or is it not safer, strictly based upon their opinion.  Formatting the pages with the online 
survey was also important, in that only three to four questions were presented on each 
page.  This assisted the participant in moving to the next page without the feeling of 
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taking a long time to complete a page, creating a perception that the survey was moving 
quickly.  Aviation related motivational quotes were placed at the end of each category to 
engage the participant to see what was next, and an indication of progress half way 
through was presented and updated with each segment until the end of the survey, in 
order to inform the participant of time remaining to encourage them to finish versus quit, 
close to completion.  
Research questions were written, and the survey was developed, then both the 
survey and a survey assessment form were provided to eight aviation subject matter 
experts (SMEs) representative of the target population, to take, assess, and evaluate the 
survey per Gaskin’s (2017a) recommendation on survey assessment measures.  SMEs 
represented the target population—airline, corporate/fractional, and charter flight 
department pilots, some were retired with a vast amount of experience.  SMEs included: 
(1) retired airline captain with 38-years of flying experience with a 30 career airline pilot 
career overlapped with 22 years as an Air Force pilot, who is type-rated on the A330, 
B747-200, B737, C-141, T38, and T41, with flight engineer experience on the B747 and 
B727 aircraft, and has flown a variety of light aircraft and gliders; (2) an airline captain 
who retired early to pursue opportunities with Boeing flight operations, who is type-rated 
on B787, B777, B747-400, B767, B757, B737, DC9, MU300, BE400, and DA20 aircraft; 
(3) first officer for an international airline with experience from nine airlines, and 
instructing experience on the B747-400, who is type-rated on the B747-400, B767, B757, 
B737, ATR42/72, ERJ-170/190, and A320, and flies general aviation aircraft on his days 
off; (4) retired airline captain currently flying corporate, charter operations, and general 
aviation, and type-rated on the B777, B747-400, B747-200, and B757 aircraft; (5) retired 
captain with 51-years of instructional experience, 41-years as part 121 director of 
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training, currently flies charter, and is type-rated on the A320, B777, B747-400, B767, 
B757, B737, B727, BE-300, C-650, DA-50, DC10, DC9, DC3, and LR-45; (6) retired 
captain with heavy Boeing experience, chief pilot, and flight operations director, type-
rated on the B747-200, B747-400, B767, B757, B737, and SIC on EA500, and currently 
flies gliders; (7) Corporate flight operations manager, corporate pilot, PhD in Aviation 
with dissertation on safety management systems, and type-rated on the T-38/C, OV-10A, 
F-16/C, HS-125, G-IV, DA-50, DA-2EASy, and DA-7X; and (8) retired airline captain 
with 34-years line experience on Boeing heavy aircraft, 17-years management 
experience, director of training at an international airline, and 11 years instruction and 
training program development, type-rated on the F-8, B757, B747-200, and curriculum 
development on the B747-8.  Of the eight SMEs, five received initial flight training in 
general aviation, one Air Force, one Navy, and one Marine, and all SMEs have flown 
domestic and international operations.  
Part one of the survey analysis form queried opinions on the first half of the 
survey concerning demographics and background information for readability and content 
the SMEs identified as important and to test the timing of the survey.  Part two of the 
assessment form was utilized to assess the variable questions on four measures: (1) 
understanding, (2) directness, (3) clarity, and (4) context (Ruel, Wagner, & Gillespie, 
2016).  Questions were reworded if the SME participants overall experience was a 
challenge with reading the passage.  The questions were clarified if the SME participants 
were not sure how to answer a particular question.  The questions were reworded if the 
SME participants took too long thinking about how to answer a question.  Finally, if the 
SME participants could not answer because the answer was dependent upon something 
else, then the context of the question was addressed.  The overall assessment on four 
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measures was based upon overall consensus among the raters.  Part three of the survey 
assessment form was used to determine if the questions measured what they were 
intended to measure.  Each SME participant was provided a list of constructs with 
definitions and then asked to identify which question belonged to which construct.  Based 
on Gaskin’s (2017a) recommendation, eight raters were utilized requiring >70% 
consensus to be deemed adequate to proceed.  This evaluation and editing process 
continued until no corrections were necessary.  Inter-rater reliability was assessed after 
the raters performed their respective evaluations.  After the survey instrument was 
complete, a pilot study was conducted to pre-test the MFI survey instrument to detect 
potential problems prior to surveying all participants.   
Pilot study.  A pilot study was conducted to test the reliability and validity of the 
survey instrument.  Survey data were gathered for the pilot study in order to pretest the 
MFI survey instrument.  A great deal of discussion has transpired as to the correct 
number of participants for a pilot study.  MacCallum, Widaman, Preacher, and Hong 
(2001) purport “that if communalities are high, recovery of population factors in sample 
data is normally very good, almost regardless of sample size, level of over determination, 
or the presence of model error,” and determined a sample size as small as 60 to be 
adequate (p. 636); whereas, Hertzog (2008) suggested utilizing 10% of the anticipated 
sample size.  Gorsuch (1983) suggested a minimum of 100 participants for a pilot study, 
which was supported by Kline (1994) who also added an additional recommendation that 
the respondent to variable ratio should be 2:1 (Ke, 2001).  Cattell (1978) recommended a 
ratio range of respondent to variable of 3:1 to 10:1 (as cited in MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & 
Podsakoff, 2011).  Ultimately, the minimum number for the pre-test and the full SEM 
was based upon the number of latent and observable factors, effect size, statistical power, 
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and probability level, utilizing Soper’s (2017b) online calculator.  This decision selected 
created a requirement for the highest number of participants of all suggested methods 
because the larger the sample size, the stronger the results (Hair et al., 2010). 
Considering this was new scale development, meaning this measurement tool has 
not been previously validated, SPSS was utilized to perform EFA to confirm the strength 
of variables, convergence, reliability, and discriminant validity to ensure constructs were 
distinct.  According to Hair et al. (2010) and Williams (2012), EFA requirements should 
include sample size criteria, input variable inter-correlation, and measures of sampling 
adequacy, explanation of total variance, factor loading, reliability measures, and 
convergent and discriminate validity.  EFA was performed with SPSS on a pilot test with 
113 participants, based upon the criteria of maximum likelihood (ML) factor extraction 
and the axis rotation utilizing the oblique rotation methodology and eigenvalues > 1 to 
determine the amount of variance.  Measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) was 
determined prior to factor extraction by Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) and Bartlett's test of 
Sphericity.  Chi-square estimation determined the goodness of fit.  Validation of 
extracted factors was tested for discriminant validity, convergent validity, and inter-item 
reliability with Cronbach's Alpha.  Due to the low validity testing of Pilot Training, the 
PT factor was removed to improve the strength of the model.  The CFA model was built 
with four factors, run, and the proposed MFI first-order CFA model, with a sample size 
of 113, showed satisfactory assessment of model specification, model identification, 
construct validity, and the validity of the measurement model to proceed with the full 
research.  The survey instrument was modified per the pilot test results.  Due to the large 
sample size collected, the Pilot Training factor was included in the final research, and the 
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original 5 factor model was utilized for the full research.  The assumption that the large 
sample size would address validity issues of the Pilot Training factor was confirmed. 
Full research.  Soper’s calculator, based upon Westland’s formula, was utilized 
to determine minimum sample size and identified to be 1,599 responses (Soper, 2017b; 
Westland, 2010).  However, due to the large sample size utilized for the SEM—5,661 
after filtering and imputation—the data was able to be randomly split into three groups at 
approximately 33% each: training dataset (1,831); validation dataset (1,887); and test 
dataset (1,943).  Three EFA models were then built with the training dataset to gain a 
better picture of the emerging factors.  A meaningful relationship requires a shared 
variance to be above .3 (Nandy, 2012).  Therefore, factors with low commonalties of less 
than .3 were removed.  The commonalities in the first model were removed one at a time.  
This process continued until all commonalities were .3 or greater.  In the second EFA 
model, the commonalities were also removed based on the <.3 criteria, but this time they 
were removed two and three at a time.  Whereas the first two models were built by 
removing variables with low commonalities, the third EFA model was built utilizing 
factor loading—anything less than .3 on the pattern matrix was removed, one by one.  
After the <.3 factor loadings were removed, the construct was assessed to determine 
average loading of all variables.  If it appeared a variable with a factor loading of a low .4 
(despite meeting the .3 criteria) would lower the overall average of the construct below 
the required .5, the low variable was also removed to avoid negatively impacting 
convergent validity.  Variables in two of the models were inversely recoded due to 
negative values.   
All three models were assessed for construct reliability, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity.  The validation dataset and test dataset were both subsequently 
105 
 
utilized on the three models and were compared to determine the best model.  Harman’s 
single factor test was conducted to identify common method bias, meaning the amount of 
variance related to the measurement method was tested versus variance in the model 
(MacKenzie & Podsakoff, 2012).  Utilizing EFA without rotation, all variables were 
loaded onto a single factor, and if the variance of the new factor was less than 50%, no 
bias existed (Podsakoff et al., 2003).  CFA followed, and a similar process with split data 
for cross-validation was performed to determine the best model fit.  A number of 
variables were covaried on each of the models, and some variables were removed.  The 
final model selection was run with the entire dataset, and then two additional runs were 
conducted with the same dataset for further model re-specifications by covarying 
variables.   
Population/Sample.  The target population included commercial pilots from 
airlines, corporate and fractional operators, and charter flight departments worldwide who 
fly international and/or domestic, long and/or short-haul operations, requiring a crew 
compliment of two or more pilots.  Pilots who had retired or were between jobs within 
the previous 12 months and met specified qualifications were able to participate.  A 
sample of this population was utilized to draw inferences about the entire population.  
Social network systems (SNS) such as Facebook, Twitter, and Linkedin were utilized to 
identify the target population.  The SNS target population was utilized in a variety of 
manners to expand the sample size.  The hybrid method of nonprobability sampling was 
the most efficient method of gathering a broad sample due to the size of the target 
population, the vast geographic displacement of participants, the sensitivity of questions 
concerning flight performance and level of understanding, in combination with the 
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distinct fact that pilots belong to a community with access to each other, yet not located 
on one central database.   
Sample size.  Soper (2017a) utilized a formula developed by Westland (2010) to 
determine adequate sample size and created a priori sample size calculator.  The formulas 
utilized for this calculator follow.  
Error function: 
 
Lower bound sample size for a structural equation model: 
 
where j is the number of observed variables, k is the number of latent 
variables, ρ is the estimated Gini correlation for a bivariate normal random 
vector, δ is the anticipated effect size, α is the Sidak-corrected Type I error 
rate, β is the Type II error rate, and z is a standard normal score. 
Normal distribution cumulative distribution function (CDF): 
  
where µ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation, and erf is the error function.  
(Soper, 2017a) 
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Soper’s calculator was utilized with an effect size of .1, a statistical power of .8, 
and probability level of .05 to determine minimum sample size for the model structure 
pretest, and then again to determine the sample size for the EFA, CFA, and full SEM 
(Soper, 2017b; Westland, 2010).  With five constructs and the initial 26 variables, a 
sample size of 113 participants was collected to validate the model structure.  A 
minimum of 1,599 participants were required to conduct the SEM.  However, to increase 
the strength of the SEM, the minimum survey count was exceeded in order to split the 
data for cross-validation.   
Network Driven Sampling (NDS).  As of January 31, 2015, there were 154,438 
airline transport pilot certificates (ATP) and 101,164 commercial pilot certificates (FAA, 
2016).  Social Network Systems (SNS) was utilized to sample this expansive and 
worldwide population.  Multiple methods were utilized, termed Network Driven 
Sampling (NDS) to include Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn in order to create a more 
representative sample.  Multiple methods were necessary to maximize data collection due 
to the unique processes and functionality between each of the various SNS in order to 
create a more representative sample.   
Sampling bias.  A bias concern resides when the subjects are hand-chosen 
because they may be non-representative of the population, with further concern that those 
selected by snowball sampling or respondent driven sampling would choose others based 
upon personal bias (Baltar & Brunet, 2012; Heckathorn, 1997; Woodley & Lockard 
2016).  SNS enabled the researcher to invite potential participants “apparently” 
representative of the population within each network, not those based upon previous 
personal relationships that would create bias.  SNS identifies potential participants’ 
qualifications such as their work history, current aircraft flown, current organization, 
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photos of their aircraft, name, type-ratings, and other identifying information to indicate 
they would be representative of the population.  Connections were also made with 
potential participants within the aviation community circle, that were not personally 
known, by requesting a connection, followed by a survey request.  For example, when 
(who is a LinkedIn member) corporate pilot, captain, or first officer was typed into the 
search with filters box, a list of corporate pilots, captains, or first officers populated, 
respectively.  A connection request to those specific pilots who randomly populated from 
the search was made.  If the connection request was subsequently accepted, a request to 
participate in the survey, by providing a link to the website that explained the purpose of 
the research, was made, with a request they share the website link with their colleagues, 
which hosted the survey link.  While those colleagues would be acquaintances of the pilot 
asking them, and perhaps friends, they would also be representative of the population due 
to their current employment status.  To perform the pilot study, 113 qualified participants 
were personally contacted and requested to complete the survey in order to test the 
reliability and validity of the instrument.  This selection process included bias, in that half 
of those participants were known to the researcher from associated venues, and many 
were friends.  The other half were internet acquaintances from social media venues.  
Participants were intentionally sampled from a variety of airlines and SNS venues to 
ensure the pretest sample was more generalizable.  They were not selected by how they 
might respond, only selected because they would respond.  Another bias in selecting 
friends for an aviation safety study is that many friendships may be built because people 
are likeminded, therefore data could realize similar results.  To further assist with 
reducing this bias, data collection was extended beyond acquaintances.  
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Sampling selection and diversity.  The criticism of nonprobability sampling and 
diversity exists in the written definition of hidden, marginalized, or hard to reach 
populations, whereas the concern is this process limits the generalizability of the study 
(Heckathorn, 1997; Woodley & Lockard, 2016).  However, while the selected population 
for this research is not hidden, pilots are known and vast, covering the world, they are not 
contained on a master list.  While random selection from an airline list would appear to 
increase generalizability due to a random selection methodology, this would not be 
generalized to the larger population due to airline specific training, equipment, and 
corporate culture.  In an attempt to address the generalizability issue and diversity, SNS 
was not limited to the geographic limitations of traditional snowball sampling and RDS 
reliant upon personal relationships as the first step.  SNS contains contacts for the 
representative population, while not inclusive, provided a means to access this population 
when the pilots were not personally known.  SNS protections are also in place that a 
person cannot directly solicit any person on a SNS system (short of openly posting a link 
to an open forum for anyone to see) unless each party agrees to a connection that enables 
direct communication.  A potential benefit this researcher experienced during the SNS 
data collection process is that she has thousands of connections within LinkedIn, Twitter, 
and Facebook and was better able to apply elements of respondent directed sampling.  
Babbie (2013) also recommended an interviewer to wear similar clothing as the 
respondents for effective interviewing strategies to help with a subliminal connection to 
encourage participation.  Therefore, potential participants who viewed credentials, prior 
to accepting a connection to communicate, were better able to identify with the researcher 
in that they wore the same clothing—a pilot uniform.  In addition, the target SNS was 
varied between LinkedIn, Twitter, and Facebook, with each group similarly connected, 
110 
 
but perhaps for a different type of connection, which could bias who took the survey and 
potentially impact internal validity.  For example, LinkedIn represents more of a business 
connection; Twitter could be business, passion, and entertainment; and Facebook would 
be more associated with social circles of family, friends, coworkers, and passion.  
Sampling selection and validity.  Validity concerns with generalizability of the 
study also identified that external validity would be higher if surveys were provided 
randomly to participants versus being provided to friends (Baltar & Brunet, 2012).  SNS 
includes a worldwide population, with pilots who fly a variety of aircraft, work for a 
variety of operators such as airlines, corporate or fractional, and charter who are either a 
captain or first officer and accessing them would greatly improve generalizability of the 
study.  While snowball, respondent driven, and purposive sampling could be initiated on 
a friendship basis, the utilization of SNS expanded the population to beyond known 
friends or acquaintances.  The survey was provided directly to the target population who 
were connected, via SNS, whereas SNS participants were located worldwide, work for 
multiple organizations, fly a variety of aircraft, and are not deemed as friends, but are 
connected due to a particular passion, job, or interest.  SNS enabled a broad spectrum of 
participants beyond the friendship-based concern, to be accessed in order to initiate 
network driven marketing. 
Social Network Systems (SNS).  In order to gather an adequate representative 
sample of the worldwide population in a timely manner, SNS was utilized to identify 
qualified participants.  As part of the target population, the researcher was connected to 
thousands of pilots via SNS such as Linkedin, Twitter, and Facebook.  Furthermore, her 
participation in aviation groups such as Flight Safety, AOPA, NAFI, Eurocontrol, 
International Society of Women Airline Pilots (ISA +21), and ninety-nines (99s), and 
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maintaining connections to pilots from both domestic and international aviation venues 
further supported network driven sampling efforts.  The initial sample response, prior to 
cleaning, was 7,487.  This large number of pilots was unknown to the researcher on a 
personal basis, yet were bounded within an SNS and included in the population being 
studied.  An assumed bias was that aviation venue contacts may have a greater aviation 
interest beyond work, and that passion could transfer to the job resulting in more self-
directed learning that could impact understanding, confidence, and manual flight 
tendencies.  Thus, the passion aspect of aviation was assessed in the survey instrument, 
and a broad sample was selected beyond aviation venues.  Alternatively, it could be 
assumed that many of these pilots could be connected to these aviation sites to improve 
their career positions and may not have an extra passion.  In an effort to reduce this 
potential bias, participants connected to SNS were asked to provide the survey to their 
colleagues in order to extend the survey to qualified participants not associated with SNS.  
Sharing the survey with colleagues could appear to induce more bias in the form of 
purposive introduction, however, the pilots are simply sharing with those who are 
qualified, and not for any other selection process; therefore, all pilots should be equal 
despite how they were selected.  
The primary difference in this study from Facebook recruiting methods from 
earlier research was that only qualified participants, representative of the population, 
were directly contacted on FB and LinkedIn, and a target specific search with hashtags 
was utilized on Twitter to identify the population within the bounds of the SNS system.  
Target specific means that all efforts to recruit participants were focused only on the 
target population.  This increased the internal validity of the study with more control as to 
whom was taking the survey. 
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To address concerns of knowing who was taking the survey, King, O’Rourke, and 
DeLongis (2014) suggested protections to include monitoring IP protocols and cross 
mailing addresses and to identify reporting countries.  In an attempt to eliminate the 
ability for participants to complete the survey more than once, protections were added 
into the data collection site which prevented the survey from being repeated from the 
same computer and search engine.  However, in that no financial rewards were provided 
to participate, this further reduced motivation of anyone attempting to take the survey a 
second time.  The survey site also enabled the participant who was kicked off or ran out 
of time to reinitiate the survey at the point they previously stopped. 
Social media has been successful in Facebook and Twitter recruiting, but not 
without concern of openly posting the survey link on the internet.  This research 
addressed participant motivation to identify what would entice the target population 
versus all others, to improve internal validity.  When rewards are provided for 
participation, the reward itself could motivate non-qualified participants into taking the 
survey.  Therefore, the participants in this study were not provided an extrinsic reward, 
but it was assumed the intrinsic value of being involved within their industry would be 
motivation enough, while at the same time removing the potential of nonqualified 
participants from taking the survey.  Qualified participants as identified on SNS were 
contacted either directly via SNS or notified with informational messages that would only 
be engaging to the target population, providing more control and knowledge that the 
participants taking the study were in fact qualified to do so.  The elimination of monetary 
rewards further reduced motivation for non-qualified individuals to take the survey.  SNS 
has enabled people to connect, engage, and share information worldwide, and provided 
the opportunity to connect with individuals in the target population that would otherwise 
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be an un-accessible group.  Pilots who engage in social media have private access to their 
personal accounts.  This population is visible via SNS; however, they can only send 
personal communication after a connection is made.  Therefore, contacting a qualified 
participant via SNS, with a personal connection, name, and occupation listed, provided a 
better indication that the pilot was the person taking the survey, than Facebook open 
recruiting methodologies that have been proven successful, which improved internal 
validity (Grant-Muller et al., 2015; Greive, Witteveen, & Tolan, 2014; King, O’Rourke, 
& DeLongis, 2014; Spence, Lachlan, & Rainear, 2016). 
For ease of communication, a URL (PetittAviationResearch.com) assisted with 
presenting the research information, qualifications, and displayed the survey link.  
Additional precautions were taken to make the domain private, by purchasing protections 
that were touted to increase security by preventing hacking and establishing protections 
from stalkers.  A private one-page website (Appendix B) was designed specifically for 
this research that explained the history of the research, the purpose, qualifications to 
participate, anonymity, and provided a link at the bottom of the page that connected the 
potential participant to the electronic informed consent and the survey instrument 
(Appendix D).  Business cards were made with the link to the website in order to ensure 
every participant received the same brief as to the purpose of the study, and those cards 
were provided to pilots at aviation venues, on an airplane, or walking through a terminal, 
which enabled participants to access the link at a later time.  An aviation blog was 
utilized to provide aviation posts to elicit participation from pilots and provided a link to 
the research website.  This process created great efficiency in the survey dissemination 
process.  Each SNS was used sequentially and assessed as to the effectiveness of each.  
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Twitter process.  The data collection process began with an attempt to identify 
and place qualified participants of 28,000+ Twitter followers into a group.  Twitter was 
extremely problematic in that effectively the only way to make that happen would have 
been to start at the most recent connection and not shutdown the computer until the job 
was complete.  However, Twitter froze within the first hundred selections, and each time 
the program reopened, it would start at the most recent connection.  Thus, there was no 
systematic way to begin where the researcher left off.  However, many pilots were 
previously categorized in an aviation group, and more were added as they connected 
during the data collection process.  This list enabled access to send a direct message to 
those qualified participants.  Sending direct messages enabled control of who received 
the request versus tweeting the research link on the open internet.  However, this too 
became problematic because Twitter blocked a cut and paste after 4-5 messages were 
sent.  Twitter was effective to disseminate links to the to the informational blog post that 
contained the website link where the purpose of the research was reiterated in order to 
gain access to the survey link.  This process of creating multiple steps, links, and websites 
to reach the survey link may have lost potential participants due to an element of 
intentionally induced hassle.  However, the effort was conducted to retain an element of 
control on Twitter to assist in ensuring that the potential participants knew precisely the 
purpose of the research prior to reaching the survey link.  A hashtag (#) is a Twitter 
search methodology than enables Twitter members to specifically search items of interest 
and see those particular messages, whereas those uninterested would not see the message 
unless they happened to be watching, real time, the Twitter member who posted the 
tweet.  Due to the hashtags such as #Aviation, #Safety, and #Pilots with aviation 
messages that highlighted current aviation events or issues, aviation communities who 
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viewed those tweets and read the blog posts connected with the researcher in order to 
provide contact information for aviation groups, unions, airlines, and associations, 
resulting in successful snowballing.   
Facebook process.  Facebook (FB) notifies participants of friends’ birthdays in an 
email.  Therefore, six months prior to data collection, the research began compiling a 
master list from the birthday email notifications of qualified participants.  A master list of 
qualified participants was made and utilized to send a personal request to visit the 
informative website and, if interested and qualified, to take the survey.  Each time a 
private message on FB was sent, others who were connected to both that person and the 
researcher were viewed, and those qualified applicants were added to a list and a request 
sent.  The process of randomly looking at friends of friends to see who was not 
connected, but qualified, was also followed by a connection request.  However, the 
5,000-friend limitation on FB hindered that process.  FB did not limit the number of 
personal messages that could be sent at a time and was extremely effective when 
requesting help from friends on Facebook who were not qualified participants but knew 
qualified participants.   
LinkedIn process.  LinkedIn was the most efficient and effective of all SNS 
venues with data collection of a broad sample from a worldwide population.  LinkedIn 
allowed categorization of qualified participants who were current contacts in alphabetical 
order, which enabled sending messages and keeping track of who a message was sent to, 
but most importantly provided the ability to pick up where the researcher left off the day 
prior.  After 920 current qualified LinkedIn contacts were sent a request, filters such as 
captain, first officer, and corporate pilot were input, enabling a connection request sent to 
those demographics.  When the potential participant accepted the connection, they were 
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subsequently sent a message thanking them for the connection with a request to take the 
survey and were provided a link to the website that articulated the purpose of the research 
and provided the survey link.  The message also requested they share it with their 
colleagues.  When participants acknowledged they would take the survey, they were 
personally thanked for their efforts.  The ability to randomly find qualified applicants 
without knowing them reduced the friendship based bias concern.  In an attempt to 
further improve upon the generalizability, a website that listed 149 world airlines 
(SeatGuru, 2018) was utilized.  This list was not all inclusive as U.S. air freight operators, 
one U.S. regional airline, and a fractional airline that were known, but not on the list, and 
were subsequently added.  However, this list was a solid representation of world airlines, 
and those operators that were not on the list were included.  Then, 154 company names 
were typed into the filter on LinkedIn, one by one.  The names that populated within each 
organization did not have any apparent order, as they were not alphabetized or listed by 
position.  Up to 100 requests were sent to qualified participants from each organization, 
dependent upon how many qualified applicants populated on the company list.  Some 
organizations did not have 100 available.  This was extremely effective in that if the pilot 
recipient responded shortly thereafter with acceptance, indicated the participant was 
actively engaged in LinkedIn, and a request to visit the website was sent.  Some users 
sign up for social media sites they rarely visit, therefore there was no way to determine if 
the selected participant wan inactive on the site versus non participatory.  Utilizing the 
list of airlines and LinkedIn with purposive sampling enabled contact with thousands of 
qualified applicants, many who stated they would share the research with their 
colleagues.   
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Aviation blog.  Flight to Success (Petitt, 2018d), written by the researcher, is an 
aviation blog dedicated to providing industry issues, aviation education, supporting 
aviation professionals, and promoting aviation events.  This blog has proven instrumental 
in survey response for numerous aviation studies in masters and doctoral research 
projects, where posts were written with a link to the respective surveys, and subsequent 
Tweets with hashtags on Twitter and postings on Facebook and LinkedIn messages 
advertising the post with industry related hashtags resulted in successful data collection 
(Petitt, 2015b; Petitt, 2018a; Petitt, 2018b; Petitt, 2018c).  The Flight to Success blog was 
utilized to provide the link to Petitt Aviation Research on multiple posts throughout the 
data collection to communicate the research, address industry issues, provide updates on 
the survey count, thank pilots for their participation, and request the aviation community 
to continually share the link.  Messages via Twitter, FB, and LinkedIn were effective 
means of encouraging pilots to read the blog posts.  The blog then served as a means to 
explain the research, identify qualifications, and posted the link to the research site that 
once again explained the history, the purpose, qualifications, and anonymity and provided 
the survey link.  The blog, as did LinkedIn, displayed the researcher’s profile, that may 
have assisted in data collection in part due to her being a member of the community.  
This blog had 3,184,700 views as of June 8, 2018, and 21,238 in the month of May 2018.  
The results of readership may be due, in part, to effective marketing strategies that 
included tweets, FB posts, and LinkedIn messages that followed marketing best practices.  
A reference to the research was included at the bottom of those posts, with direction to 
the website that explained the context of that research and requirements to participate.  
The associated tweets and blog posts identified and supported group values, identified 
that participants were making a difference in the aviation industry, had an opportunity to 
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impact safety, and were supporting an aviation future for the next generation of pilots, 
with a purpose to visit the blog.  The shared group values of this target population were 
utilized to create effective and efficient recruitment efforts.  The researcher carefully 
evaluated each statement in comparison to the research questions and identified that none 
of the recruiting statements would in any manner influence how the participant could 
answer the questions, only capture their attention to visit the blog.  Survey questions were 
based upon the participant’s personal practice, company policy, operational decisions, 
and individual demographics.  When utilizing persuasive tweets, it became essential to 
ensure there was no undue influence to encourage participants to take the survey.  
Therefore, protections were taken by connecting recruiting tweets on Twitter and FB 
posts directly to the blog post, not to the survey link.  At the end of the blog post, the 
reader was provided the requirements for the survey and provided yet another link to the 
website.  Once the reader went to the website, they were provided the purpose of the 
research, history, and requirements to participate, with the link to the survey at the 
bottom of the page.   
Data Collection Device 
To address the concern that a computer driven survey may identify a bias for 
pilots without computer access, the survey was provided in both a paper and electronic 
format.  Paper surveys were provided to pilots, face to face, and occurred with random 
contact at the airport or professional functions.  Only thirty-four paper surveys were 
received, as pilots felt more comfortable taking a card and doing the survey on line.  The 
electronic survey was made available via a website, and the link to that website was 
distributed with business cards, sent to qualified participants via SNS and provided to a 
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variety of pilots and aviation organizations—all representatives of the population being 
studied for effective network driven sampling.   
Survey instrument description.  Multiple-choice questions were utilized to 
ascertain specifics concerning training, background information, opinions on automation, 
and demographics, whereas Likert questions were asked to ascertain manual flight 
tendencies, knowledge, training, aviation passion, and safety culture.  In that surveys may 
have a tendency for bias, due to some participants overestimating their ability (Bénabou 
& Tirole, 2002; Compte & Postlewaite, 2004), a seven-point Likert scale was written to 
assist in eliminating some of that bias by enabling pilots to answer knowledge-based 
questions on a level of extremely unlikely to extremely likely, versus a dichotomous 
response.  It was considered that pilots may be more likely to falsely answer if given a 
yes or no option related to understanding.  If provided an actual test question, the 
assumption was the pilot would look up an answer they did not know.  In addition, due to 
the variety of aircraft flown, an actual test was not feasible.  Thus, the Likert scale, and 
design of the questions, provided the opportunity to answer an opinion to their assumed 
level of knowledge versus an exact answer, with the assumption the pilot would be less 
likely to falsely overstate their knowledge.  A pilot may not feel compelled to state they 
absolutely knew the answer to a question, if they were not absolutely sure, and had the 
opportunity to select a lower level, but high enough without feeling inadequate.  
However, unless the pilot was not absolutely sure—extremely likely—that he or she 
understood the aircraft systems, indicated by level six or below, that response may 
identify a lack of understanding.  A missed approach is a time critical event, and the pilot 
must have absolute knowledge.  Potential concern as to the assessment of actual 
120 
 
knowledge versus an over-confidence of knowledge that may not exist remains for 
discussion.   
Multiple efforts were made to reduce non-response bias potential, in that the 
survey was designed to ensure clarity, context, understanding, and directness and was 
tested with eight subject matter experts, followed by an inter-rater reliability test.  A few 
adjustments were made to the survey after the pretest, such as moving the SEM questions 
from the end of the survey to the beginning, removing the section for comments, adding 
the fractional operator option, and minor adjustments to the non-SEM questions.  The 
timing was estimated to be 10-15 minutes and averaged 13 minutes.  However, comments 
from some international participants, with English as the second language, indicated they 
took much longer, and at times up to 30-40 minutes.  Progress updates, and motivational 
quotes were included in an attempt to reduce survey fatigue and encourage the 
participants to continue reading.  The participants were also assured anonymity with their 
identity and their respective company, which assisted in gaining participation.  However, 
dozens of comments were sent via LinkedIn and emails regarding detailed information 
from their airline regarding safety, manual flight, industry concerns, corporate culture, 
and a variety of operational issues.  These participants sent comments with trust that their 
identity would remain anonymous while presenting this information, due to fear of 
retaliation, but accepted the content could be utilized in the discussion to provide a 
broader picture.    
Variable constructs are presented in Table 2.  Associated operational definitions 
with sources are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 2 
MFI Variable Constructs Identified 
 
 
Construct 
 
Construct Label 
 
Construct Input 
 
Manual Flight  MF   Survey Variables MF_1 - MF_5 
Pilot Understanding PU Survey Variables PU_1 - PU_5 
Pilot Training PT Survey Variables PT_1 - PT_6 
Safety Culture SC Survey Variables SC_1 - SC_5 
Aviation Passion AP Survey Variables AP_1 - AP_5 
 
 
Table 3 
MFI Construct and Operational Definitions  
 
Construct Operational Definitions References 
 
Manual Flight 
 
Manual flight is where and when the pilot makes 
the decision to manually fly the aircraft without 
the autothrust and autopilot engaged.  The flight 
director may or may not be engaged during 
manual flight.  
 
 
FAA, 2013d: OIG, 
2016 
 
Pilot 
Understanding 
 
Pilot understanding is the pilot’s ability to know 
why procedures are accomplished, and to identify 
and understand instrument display indications, 
flight management computer operations, and 
aircraft system operations in both emergency and 
normal operations.  
 
Besco, 1997; Ross & 
Tomko, 2016 
 
Pilot  
Training  
 
Training activities that support learning and 
performance to include feedback, repetition, and 
methodologies for understanding systems and 
processes versus rote memorization, in both the 
classroom, simulator, and on the aircraft.  
 
Ellis, Carette, Anseel & 
Lievens, 2014; English 
& Visser, 2014; FAA, 
2006; Kalyuga, 2009; 
Matton, Raufaste, & 
VAutier, 2013; Paas, 
Renkl, & Sweller 
 
Aviation 
Passion 
 
Aviation passion includes (but not limited to): 
aviation club participation, aviation based social 
circles, recreational flight, reading aviation 
magazines and books, and/or purchasing aviation 
products.  This passion is also internalized into 
the pilot’s identity, in harmony with their life, 
where flying is fulfilling and gratifying.  
 
Astakhova, 2014; 
Brown, 2013; Koejan, 
2015 
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Safety  
Culture  
 
Safety culture includes a reporting culture, just 
culture, learning culture, flexible culture, and 
informed culture.  Reporting safety related 
information is both encouraged and rewarded, a 
questioning attitude is valued in an environment 
that is resistant to complacency, committed to 
excellence, where proactive risk management 
promotes continuous improvement, and 
flexibility enables empowerment to exceed 
regulatory compliance, and leadership has 
knowledge about human technical factors to 
support safety.  
 
Gain, 2004; Schein, 
2010; Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015: Yantiss, 2011 
 
 
Conceptual definitions for latent and observable variables of manual flight, 
understanding, pilot training, safety culture, and aviation passion, with associated 
questions are as follows. 
Manual flight.  Manual flight (MF) was identified by the pilot’s inclination to 
hand fly the aircraft, as to where and when the pilot was willing to disconnect the 
automation and to what levels.  There are multiple combinations of automation usage 
between the autopilot, autothrust, and flight director.  However, as defined for this 
research, manual flight was considered flight without the autopilot and autothrust.  This 
series of questions was designed to ascertain where the pilot was inclined to disengage 
the automation and to what level. 
Manual flight questions. 
MF_1 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to disengage both the 
autopilot and autothrust prior to beginning the arrival phase? 
MF_2 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to disengage both the 
autopilot and the autothrust on final approach prior to 1000 feet? 
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MF_3 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to disengage both the 
autopilot and the autothrust on final below 1000 feet and prior to 200 feet 
before touchdown? 
MF_4 How likely are you to keep the autothrust engaged until after touchdown? 
MF_5 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to fly without 
any automation engaged (no autopilot, no autothrust, and no flight director) 
during the course of the flight? 
Pilot understanding.  Pilot understanding (PU) is a latent variable defined by the 
pilot’s ability, beyond knowledge-based facts and memorized procedures, to understand 
why procedures are accomplished and how to manage the aircraft without direction, and 
to identify and understand instrument display indications.  This series of questions was 
designed to ascertain the pilots’ opinion of their knowledge of aircraft systems during 
inflight operations. 
Pilot understanding questions.  
PU_1 How likely is it that you understand all functionality of the flight 
management system (FMS) on your aircraft?  If no FMS, leave blank. 
PU_2 How likely is it that you could pass a systems oral on your current aircraft 
without any studying or preparation first? 
PU_3 If your aircraft is on final approach (fully configured) without the autopilot 
and autothrust engaged, and you execute a missed approach at 200 feet, how 
likely are you to know all the items displayed in the flight mode annunciator 
(FMA) during the missed approach?  If no FMA, leave blank.  
PU_4 If your aircraft lost one or more of its hydraulic systems, and the Engine 
Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) or something similar (if 
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installed) and in-flight reference manuals or written procedures were not 
available, how likely are you to know what to do? 
PU_5 If an emergency were to occur, beyond knowing what to do by following a 
directed procedure, how likely are you to know why most emergency 
procedures are written? 
Pilot training.  Pilot training (PT) is a latent variable defined as the activities that 
will support learning to include feedback, reflection, repetition, and understanding versus 
rote memorization.  This series of questions was designed to ascertain how the pilot was 
trained and elements of pilots’ perceptions of their respective employer’s training 
program. 
Pilot training questions. 
PT_1 During your employer’s pilot training (ground school), how likely is it that a 
pilot will receive feedback to ensure clarity of aircraft systems operations? 
PT_2 How likely is it that during your initial checkout, on your current aircraft, 
the systems training (ground school) was based on rote memorization versus 
in-depth understanding? 
PT_3 How likely is it that during your initial checkout, on your current aircraft, 
the procedures training in the simulator was based on rote memorization 
versus in-depth understanding? 
PT_4 During your initial operating experience (in-flight pilot training) on your 
current aircraft, how likely was it that your instructor encouraged you to 
disengage both the autopilot and autothrust? 
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PT_5 During your initial checkout, or your current aircraft, how likely were you to 
repeat event sets multiple times, during simulator training, until you felt 
comfortable? 
PT_6 How likely was it that your pilot training (simulator) debriefing sessions 
included self-assessment and reflection, in conjunction with your 
instructor’s comments? 
Safety culture.  A positive safety culture includes five subcultures—reporting 
culture, just culture, flexible culture, informed culture, and learning culture (Stolzer & 
Goglia, 2015).  Safety culture is a latent variable to include reporting culture where 
reporting safety related information is both encouraged and rewarded (Stolzer & Goglia, 
2015); just culture is where the organization “promotes a questioning attitude, is resistant 
to complacency, is committed to excellence, and fosters both personal accountability and 
corporate self-regulation in safety matters” (Gain, 2004, p. 4); flexible culture is where 
organizational processes are adapted to unforeseen events and shift from a hierarchical 
mode to a flatter mode to achieve improved safety with the ability to exceed regulatory 
compliance (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2011); an informed culture, where, “Those who 
manage and operate the system have current knowledge about human, technical, 
organizational, and environmental factors that determine the safety of the system as a 
whole” (Gain, 2004, p. 4); and a learning culture is where proactive risk management 
promotes continuous improvement (Yantiss, 2011).  Culture is identified by behavior that 
stems, in part, from beliefs and underlying assumptions, and can be most readily assessed 
by querying perceptions of those within that environment as to their belief systems 
(Schein, 2010).  This series of questions was designed to ascertain safety culture to 
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include, reporting culture, just culture, learning culture, flexible culture, and informed 
culture. 
Safety culture questions. 
SC_1 How likely is it that employee suggestions are taken into consideration by 
your employer? 
SC_2 How likely are you to critique and report any aspect of your employer’s 
training program if you perceive it as substandard? 
SC_3 How likely is it that your employer’s leadership team in pilot training, 
involved in program development, has knowledge of how humans learn and 
is aware of technology to improve learning? 
SC_4 How likely are you to agree with the following statement—the best way to 
have a successful career as a pilot is to keep quiet and not make waves? 
SC_5 How likely is it that your employer will exceed minimum regulatory 
compliance? 
Aviation passion.  Aviation passion (AP) is a latent variable associated with the 
individual’s involvement in an aviation activity beyond the work experience, such as 
recreational flight, aviation club participation, reading aviation magazines and books, 
flying home simulators, or purchasing aviation themed products.  This passion is also 
internalized into the pilot’s identity, in harmony with their life (Kocjan, 2015), where 
flying is fulfilling and gratifying (Astakhova, 2014).  This series of questions were 
designed to ascertain the pilots’ level of aviation passion. 
Aviation passion questions. 
AP_1 How likely is it that you will attend an aviation conference or an aviation 
social event within the next 12 months? 
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AP_2 How likely are you to acquire aviation themed products?  Examples include 
(but are not limited to) an aircraft model, t-shirt, artwork, or coffee mug. 
AP_3 How likely are you to read aviation books or magazines for enjoyment? 
AP_4 How likely are you to go to the airport or join a social media site to connect 
in order to socialize with other aviators? 
AP_5 How likely are you to agree with the statement—I feel great pride being a 
pilot, and it defines who I am? 
Multiple choice and dichotomous questions.  The FAA has mandated a number 
of required AQP elements in order to train pilots to proficiency.  Specific observable 
requirements for AQP (that are essential to learning) were queried with dichotomous and 
multiple-choice questions.  Additional questions included whether the operator was AQP 
certified and if the pilot was given a traditional oral versus an electronic test.  AQP is a 
program that enables operators to train-to-proficiency, providing a flexible means of 
training.  While no training program is the same for each operator under AQP, there 
remains certain AQP requirements mandated by the FAA (FAA, 2017a).  This series of 
questions was designed to ascertain training elements related to length of briefing times, 
traditional ground school versus an at home study program, tools utilized such as videos 
for the debrief, and required elements of crew compliment, that may or may not be in the 
operators’ program, but applicable to learning. 
Demographic data.  These questions were designed to identify data such as 
gender, length of time on aircraft, seat position, if they had experience as an instructor, 
pilots’ age, and if the pilots participated in recreational flight for leisure activity. 
The pilots were asked which geographical region their organization was based, in 
order to identify if geographical culture impacted performance.  English is the required 
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language of pilots worldwide; therefore, if the pilot participants are operating in the air 
traffic control (ATC) system, it was assumed they should possess language skills 
necessary to understand and respond to the questions on the Manual Flight Inventory 
survey.  Regulatory mandates per country should not impact and vary any response to 
questions asked on the MFI, yet, each airline, even within the United States, has different 
corporate cultures, policies, and procedures, that varied more so than government 
regulations.  Corporate policy among airlines and regions are discussed, as company 
mandates appear to impact manual flight decisions more so than personal choice.   
Instrument reliability.  Construct reliability (CR) was checked to determine the 
extent to which the latent constructs were homogenous in their measurements, and CR 
values were required to be >.7 (Hair et al., 2006).  In order to identify the consistency 
between test items being measured with similar responses, Cronbach’s alpha was utilized 
to measure the scale reliability (Kline, 2011).  The design of the MFI survey instrument, 
the specificity of questions, and SME evaluative assessment process assisted in reliability 
of the instrument to support external reliability and the ability to repeat this study with 
similar findings. 
Instrument validity.  To measure construct validity, the sample size was large 
enough to assess model fit, factor loadings, and convergent and discriminant 
validity.  Convergent validity assessed the degree of which two or more measures of the 
same construct were correlated, and discriminant validity determined whether or not the 
factors were distinct and uncorrelated, both of which are types of construct reliability.  A 
factor correlation matrix was utilized to display the correlation coefficients between the 
factors on the EFA to test for discriminant validity.  With discriminant validity, the EFA 
extracted factors were not to exceed the correlation coefficient of ±0.70 per Gaskin 
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(2017).  In addition, the factor correlation matrix was required to have no bivariate 
correlations coefficients greater than .70, indicating extracted factors were distinct, and 
discriminant validity was achieved.  Hair et al. (2010) established a three-category factor 
loading of ±.30 minimal, ±.40 important, and above ±.50 practically significant.  
Convergent validity was achieved if the variables did not converge.  
Construct validity was based upon distinct relationships between variables, 
whereas content validity measured the scope of meanings within a particular concept 
(Babbie, 2013).  Internal validity showed that the intended variables to be measured were 
actually what was measured and were dependent upon the design of the questions and 
subject matter experts’ assessment.  Utilizing commercial pilots who fly for an airline, 
charter, and corporate or fractional worldwide, in both international and/or domestic 
operations that include long and/or short-haul operations, achieved external validity by 
increasing the generalizability of the study. 
Treatment of the Data 
Paper survey data were input into an external data collection site and combined 
with electronic responses, then all data were extracted from that external data collection 
site.  Data were treated anonymously in that names were not collected with the surveys, 
nor was employer information collected.  The data were cleaned, analyzed for missing 
responses, filters built, and imputed.  The data was split into three sets: training, 
validation, and test and used on three different EFA models and three different CFA 
models.  EFA was run, and tests were conducted with SPSS.  CFA was run with AMOS.  
SEM was run with AMOS, and hypotheses were evaluated.  Data were analyzed and 
displayed for a visual depiction.  
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Data preparation.  Data were reviewed evaluating missing responses, and the 
decision to filter eight variables was made.  Missing data were analyzed to ensure 
percentages were not excessive and occurred in a random fashion.  The data were 
imputed, and a clean set prevailed.  Due to the large sample size, the data was randomly 
split into three groups at approximately 33% each, for cross-validation.  Three EFA 
models were built, and SPSS was utilized to ensure the strength of the items, 
convergence, reliability, and the discriminant value to determine if the constructs were 
distinct for each model.  The models were compared, and CFA was conducted in a 
similar fashion to confirm the relationship between the latent and observed variables in 
order to verify that the constructs represented the variables.  Normality was established, 
as non-normality could affect variances and covariance tests (Byrne, 2010).  The 113 
pretest participants’ survey data were not included in the final EFA, CFA, and SEM 
analysis. 
Filtering process.  Data were cleaned, and frequency tables for each individual 
question were analyzed to ensure only seven points existed, and the number of missing 
variables were reviewed.  A filter was then created to remove participants who left eight 
of the 26 questions blank.  The decision to remove participants who left six questions 
blank (Q6_MF_1; Q7_M11_MF_2; Q22_PT_4; Q26_MF_5; Q27_MF_4; Q29_MF_3) 
was based upon an assumption the questions were left blank due to the inability to answer 
because the equipment was not available.  These questions were based upon autopilot and 
autothrust usage and were essential to the manual flight (MF) and pilot training (PT) 
constructs.  Upon further evaluation, two additional SEM questions were problematic 
(Q7_PU-1; Q25_PU_3) in that the question recommended to be left blank if the pilot did 
not have the equipment, therefore those participants who left those particular questions 
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blank were also assumed to not have the equipment and were removed from the dataset.  
Thus, a filter was created to remove participants who left the aforementioned questions 
blank.  After the data were filtered, the frequencies were checked for each variable to 
confirm everything was within a 1-7 per the Likert scale. 
Missing data.  Data were analyzed for the number of missing variables to 
determine randomness and identify total percentage of missing values and percentage of 
missing variables.  Hair et al. (2006) purports if missing data are 10% or less for an 
individual participant, it could be ignored as long as the missing data occurred in a non-
specific random fashion, with the total number of missing variables less than 30%, and 
total missing values less than 5% (Tabaschnick & Fiddell, 1983).  After the number of 
missing values was determined not to be a factor, an MCAR (Missing Completely At 
Random) test was utilized to ensure the missing data occurred in a random fashion.  After 
determining that missing data occurred in a random fashion, the data were imputed to 
replace the missing values.  The multiple imputation utilized was a linear regression 
approach to predict the missing values.  The data were imputed six times and averaged 
the missing values.  After the data were imputed, it was compared to the mean identifying 
the same number.  The imputed values were input into the data creating a clean set with 
no missing variables.   
Assessment of the measurement model.  To validate the measurement model 
(the relationship of the indicator variables to its respective latent variable) critical 
assessment of individual path estimates (significance and size), construct validity 
(reliability measure, convergent validity, and discriminant validity), model fit, and 
diagnostic test of the standardized residual covariances were conducted.  Eigenvalues 
represent the amount of variance by a single factor, and only factors with eigenvalues* 
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greater than 1 should be considered significant, disregarding the others (Hair et al., 2010).  
Kaiser (1965) established criterion of the eigenvalue > 1 Rule.  However, Hair et al 
(2010) recommended the cumulative percentage of variance should be greater than .50 to 
consider good estimates in identifying the number of factors extracted from the dataset.    
Inter-correlation among input variables.  A correlation matrix was used in the 
factor analysis process to display relationships between individual variables (Williams, 
Onsman,  Brown, 2010). ).  Correlation coefficients over ±.30 are identified to be good 
indicators of factorability (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).   
Measure of sampling adequacy.  Prior to factor extraction, several tests were 
conducted to assess the suitability of the respondent data for factor analysis to include the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy, and the Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (Williams, Onsman,  Brown, 2010). ).  Williams (2012) recommended that a 
KMO index above 0.50 was suitable for factor analysis, and Hair et al. (2006), stated, 
“values above .50 for either the entire matric or an individual variable indicate 
appropriateness” (p. 103).   
Factor loadings.  Factor loadings are the correlation of the input variables within 
each extracted factor (Hair et al., 2010).  Hair et al. (2010) established factor loading 
criteria to be considered acceptable for factor structure interpretation with the range from 
±.30 to ±.40 and loadings of ±.50 or greater to be considered practically significant. 
Path estimation.  Factor loading estimates can be statistically significant but still 
too low to qualify as good items.  As such, standardized regression estimates below 0.50 
were considered low loadings and were addressed in this study (Hair et al., 2010).   
Model fit statistics.  Goodness of fit will measure how well the model 
“reproduces the covariance matrix among the indicator variables” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 
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708).  Modification indices (MI) identify cross factor loadings or covariance errors.  
Model fit statistics that were checked include: 
• GFI (goodness of fit): >.90 to .95 is good, 1 is a perfect fit. 
• AGFI (GFI adjusted for degrees of freedom): >.90 to .95 is good, 1 is a 
perfect fit. 
• NFI (normal fit index): >.95 is acceptable, 1 is a perfect fit.  
• CFI (comparative fit index): >.95 is acceptable, 1 is a perfect fit.  
• RMSEA (root mean square error): <.05 good fit. 
• CMIN/df (minimum discrepancy/degrees of freedom): Good = 0, and 1-2 
acceptable.  (Hair et al., 2006)  
Descriptive statistics.  Quantitative data were gathered from the MFI survey in 
reference to demographic data such as age, flight hours, seat position, and geographical 
location, and mean, mode, skewness, standard deviation, and kurtosis were analyzed and 
displayed by means of histograms and a chart for a visual depiction. 
Reliability and validity testing.  Validation of the extracted factors was a three-
step process of the extracted factors to include testing for discriminant validity, 
convergent validity, and reliability.   
• Discriminant validity refers to the “degree to which two conceptually similar 
concepts are distinct” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 137). 
• Convergent validity “assesses the degree to which two or more measures of 
the same concept are correlated” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 137). 
• Construct reliability (CR) refers to the “measure of reliability and internal 
consistency of the measure variables representing a latent construct” (Hair et 
al., 2006, p. 771).   
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Discriminant validity determined if the constructs were distinct from the other 
constructs (Hair et al., 2006).  Discriminant validity testing was accomplished by 
comparing the AVE with the squared correlation estimates to each path.  The AVE must 
be higher than the square correlation of the path to identify discriminant validity (Hair et 
al., 2006).  Convergent validity determines whether or not the indicators converge.  
Cronbach’s alpha in SPSS was used to confirm reliability.  The average variance 
extracted (AVE) should be ≥ .5 which identifies that indicators converged as they should.  
High construct reliability (CR) indicates good reliability, and values should be >.7 (Hair 
et al., 2006).  Whereas AVE is a measure of convergent validity, Malhotra and Dash 
(2011) state, "AVE is a more conservative measure than CR.  On the basis of CR alone, 
the researcher may conclude that the convergent validity of the construct is adequate, 
even though more than 50% of the variance is due to error” (Malhotra & Dash, 2011, 
p.702). 
Assumptions.  Prior to performing the SEM, three assumptions were tested to 
include normality, linearity, and independence of errors. 
Normality.  Normality was graphically checked by analyzing histograms for 
distribution, boxplots for outliers, and Q-Q plot line to determine if observations hugged 
the line.  Skewness and Kurtosis value within +/- 1 is ideal, and +/- 2 is acceptable 
(Warner, 2013).  Skewness and Kurtosis ratio test determined the standardized scores 
threshold by dividing the value by the standard error, which created a standardized value.  
By standardizing the value, the threshold for standardized scores could be applied.  A 
standard value of 0.05 equaled a threshold of +/- 1.96 or 2.0, and three standard 
deviations had a standard value of 0.10 equal to +/- 2.56 or 3.0, to be considered normal.  
Kolmogorov-Smirnov, a test of normality, was conducted, with desirable results to be 
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close to zero; however, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality is sensitive to large 
samples, meaning it is difficult to pass with a large sample.  Ideally there should be a 
non-significant observation; however, a sample size >1,000 is more than likely to get a 
significant test, as the formula EN=n(i)/N includes the population size (Chakravarti, 
Laha, & Roy, 1967).  The process of data transformation versus dropping cases that were 
slightly over three was utilized in order to not lose the value of those individual cases.  
Data transformation methods, mathematical techniques, utilized to assist in standardizing 
normality by four methods were Log 10, square root, inversed, and squared, and the 
greatest enhancement was utilized.  Each of the factors were standardized with an attempt 
to capture the data points that were greater than two or three.  There are two types of 
outliers—potential and influential.  Potential are acceptable, but influential could distort 
and negatively impact the results.  Univariate normality was also assessed, but based 
upon the multivariate model, multivariate normality was more important to achieve. 
Linearity.  To have a meaningful regression analysis, the expectation is that the 
factors from EFA to CFA have a meaningful linear relationship.  Linearity estimates if 
there is a linear relationship between variables.  The Pearson Correlation was examined 
to identify if a linear relationship exists.  The correlation should be either -1 as a negative 
relationship or +1 as a positive correlation, avoiding 0 which indicates no correlation.  
Anything between .25 and > .3 is considered medium size relationship, and >.5 is 
considered a large relationship.  With a large sample, any effect detected will provide a 
significant relationship. 
Independence of errors.  This test will confirm that the residuals are not 
correlated with previous errors, with the goal to have errors independent from each other.  
Errors should occur in a random fashion.  Systematic errors, or correlated errors, would 
136 
 
indicate a problem with the model.  Mahalanobis distance was utilized to detect outliers.  
Mahalanobis d-squared “measures the distance of cases from the means(s) of the 
predictor variable(s) (Field, 2013, p. 307). 
Common method bias.  Common method bias can occur due to rater 
characteristics, item characteristics, item context, or measurement context (Podsakoff et 
al., 2003).  Rater characteristics are often attributed to social desirability response.  Item 
characteristic could also be a social desirability response or interpretation of the question, 
but also placement of the question with item context effects, as related to other items in 
the survey (Wainer & Kiely, 1987).  Measurement context identifies the context or 
situation of survey analysis.  To test and then control for common method bias, a 
Common Latent Factor (CLF) was utilized in AMOS, where a path to each variable was 
created and constrained to zero in order to identify bias.  The five factors and items 
associated with those factors, along with the CLF was imputed into the data, creating a 
new dataset.  Adjusting for the CLF due to known bias assisted in avoiding a Type I error 
or rejecting a null hypothesis that is true.  
Hypothesis testing.  Hypotheses were written with two themes as the result of the 
EFA.  The first identified the direct response of each construct upon the other taking into 
consideration the other factors.  Direct response hypotheses were written as multivariate 
hypotheses versus univariate with the assumption that each factor within the model will 
impact the relationship to some extent.  The questions revolving around the hypotheses 
are what is impacting pilots’ willingness to manually fly, what is impacting 
understanding, and what impacts pilot training.  A mediation hypothesis was also tested, 
where one construct predicts another yet may be mediated by another construct, whereas 
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the original univariate relationship exists.  Figure 10 presents the path model for the 
mediation process.  
 
 
Figure 10.  Mediation path model.  Mediation path model adapted from MacKinnon, D. 
P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M.S. (2007).  Medication analysis.  Annual Review of 
Psychology. 58(1), p. 595. 
 
Direct response hypotheses:  
H1A: Pilots’ aircraft understanding positively influences willingness to 
manually fly, controlling for pilot training, aviation passion and safety culture.  
H2A: Training positively influences willingness to manually fly, controlling for 
pilot understanding, aviation passion, and safety culture.  
H3A: Aviation passion positively influences pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
controlling for pilot training, safety culture, and understanding. 
H4A:   Safety culture positively influences pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
controlling for pilot training, aviation passion, and understanding.  
H5A:      Safety culture positively influences pilot training, controlling for manual 
flight, aviation passion, and understanding.  
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H6A: Aviation passion positively influences pilot training, controlling for 
manual flight, safety culture, and pilot understanding.  
H7A Pilot understanding positively influences pilot training, controlling for 
aviation passion, manual flight, and safety culture.  
H8A Manual flight positively influences pilot training, controlling for aviation 
passion, understanding, and safety culture.  
H9A:      Safety culture positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
manual flight, aviation passion, and pilot training.  
H10A: Aviation passion positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
manual flight, safety culture, and pilot training. 
H11A Pilot training positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
aviation passion, manual flight, and safety culture.  
H12A Manual flight positively influences understanding, controlling for aviation 
passion, pilot training, and safety culture.  
Mediation hypothesis.   
H13A:  Safety culture positively influences pilot training, which influences a pilot’s 
willingness to manually fly.  
The SEM model was utilized to better understand the relationship between the 
latent variables and to examine the hypothesis in order to determine whether or not to 
accept or reject the hypotheses.  Modification indices were checked to determine cross 
loadings, and paths and variables were removed per the model fit statistics results.  Hair 
et al. (2010) identified that factor loading estimates could be statistically significant but 
still too low to qualify as good items, such that standardized regression estimates below 
0.50 would be considered low loadings.  Hair et al. (2010) also proposed to use the 
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average of the standardized regression, and the squared multiple correlation estimates of 
items within each construct as an approximation of convergent validity.  Thus, average 
standardized regression estimated values greater than .50 and average squared multiple 
correlation greater than .30 would both indicate adequate convergent validity.  P-values 
were identified as significant at .001.  Results determined acceptance of hypotheses.   
Ethical and IRB considerations.  Ethical considerations were applied with the 
subjects and their associated employer and within the scientific community.  Primary 
assurance was made that no harm would come to the participants either physically or 
psychologically.  A consent form was signed prior to participants conducting the survey, 
to enable utilization of their information in this research.  The survey was not deemed 
harmful because anonymity was assured.  Participants’ names were not gathered, and 
employers were not identified.  Survey data were de-identified from the pilot and their 
respective geographical location and will remain anonymous.  Pilots who provided 
additional comments will remain anonymous.  An Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
application was submitted prior to data collection, to ensure that human rights were 
protected (Appendix E) and IRB exemption (Appendix C).   
Summary 
New scale development measured latent constructs of manual flight, aircraft 
understanding, training, aviation passion, and safety culture to understand the relationship 
between constructs to address industry concerns of automation dependence, confusion, 
lack of mode awareness, and flight skill loss.  SEM was selected for this research because 
it simultaneously provided a combination of regression and factor analysis that assisted to 
better understand how latent variables influence other latent variables.  A challenge with 
SEM was more than the required large sample size, but the fact a worldwide pilot 
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population is a vast group not represented on a master list dictated nonrandom sampling 
methods.  The nonrandom sampling methods included elements of snowball sampling, 
respondent driven sampling, and purposive sampling, referred to in this research as 
network driven sampling.  Utilizing SNS with a hybrid data collection process proved an 
effective data collection.  LinkedIn was the most effective of SNS due to functionality, 
efficiency, and the ability to invite qualified participants from countries, airlines, 
corporations, and fractional airlines worldwide, that would not have otherwise been 
possible.  A variety of steps were utilized to address challenges with SNS and random 
sampling to include: recruiting via multiple venues of SNS; combining aspects of 
purposive sampling, snowball sampling, and respondent driven sampling; utilizing an 
effect size of one to increase the minimum required size; efforts to expand the sample to 
multiple airlines and flight operations worldwide while randomly selecting potential 
applicants from each list as a representative sample belonging to LinkedIn; added 
protections with the survey collection process to prevent multiple entries and hackers; 
carefully designed and evaluated the survey questions; collected five times the required 
data to cross-validate and provide more stability of the model; and expanded the research 
worldwide with airlines, charter, fractional, and corporate pilots in order to provide more 
generalizability. 
The design of a new inventory was essential to narrow the gap between 
operational practice and current research dealing with aviator performance related to 
automation usage.  EFA was effectively utilized, and the preferred methodology with 
scale development, followed by CFA and SEM (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Flora & 
Flake, 2017; Hurley, Scandura, Shriesheim, Brannick, Seers, Vandergerg, & Williams, 
1997).  Whereas current literature addresses pilot fatigue, automation challenges, 
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situation awareness, safety culture, confidence, and learning methodologies, there 
continues to be a gap between real world operational problems and current research as to 
what is impacting performance issues beyond the unwillingness to manually fly.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Chapter IV presents the sequential results of all phases throughout the research 
process.  Survey analysis of the survey instrument, MFI, is first presented followed by 
pilot testing of the instrument.  The data from the pretest of the instrument, termed Pilot 
Test, was utilized to perform first EFA and CFA, testing for intercorrelation, measures of 
sample adequacy, AVE, factor loadings, goodness of fit, reliability, and validity testing, 
and are presented for the four-factor model.  The pilot test results for the five-factor path 
model to include C.R., AVE, MSV, and model fit measures are presented in Appendix I, 
Tables 11, and 12, respectively.  The data treatment for the full sample is presented, 
followed by three EFA models, with the pilot training factor included, providing three-
model comparisons with the five-factor model, followed by three CFA models with 
comparisons, and the selection process of the final model.  Testing for intercorrelation, 
measures of sample adequacy, AVE, factor loadings, goodness of fit, reliability, and 
validity testing for the final model were performed.  Common Method Bias was tested, 
and the results are presented.  Prior to performing the SEM, five assumptions were tested 
to include normality, linearity, multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and independence of 
errors.  Hypotheses testing was included for thirteen hypotheses.  SEM results and 
Automation opinion-based results are displayed in Appendix F and Appendix G, 
respectively.  
Survey Instrument Analysis 
Inter-rater reliability.  Rater demographics identified that five of the eight raters 
are currently retired, which is approximately 62.5% of the rater participants, and three 
raters reported they are currently active pilots, which amounts to 38.0 % of the sample 
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data.  All eight raters are male (n = 8), and each rater reported they have been or are 
current flight instructors (100.0%).  Seven of the eight raters reported they were a captain 
(CA) (86.5 %), and one rater was a first officer (FO) (12.5 %).  Average age of the raters 
is M = 60.25 (60 years old) with the youngest age reported at 25 years of age and the 
oldest reported age at 73.  Case summaries revealed the observed median score in each of 
the 26 Manual Flight Inventory (MFI) survey items correctly corresponded to the study’s 
assumed five factors.  An intraclass correlation was conducted to determine if there was 
an absolute agreement between the eight raters in the overall assessment of the survey 
items and to test whether the raters correctly assigned the inventory that corresponds to 
the five theoretical factors of the Manual Flight Inventory scale, as presented in Table 4.  
The results indicated a significant and adequate measure of absolute agreement between 
the eight raters, ICC = .986, 95% C.I. [0.976, 0.993], p < .001.  
 
Table 4 
Intraclass Correlation Coefficient Between Raters 
 
 Intraclass 
Correlation 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
F Test with True 
Value 0 
F Test with True 
Value 0b 
 Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound Value df1 df2 Sig 
Average 
Measures 0.986 0.976 0.993 56.985 25 175 0.000 
 
There was sufficient evidence to support the study’s assumption that the scores 
between the eight raters were in absolute agreement and statistically significant with 
>70% consensus, based on Gaskin’s (2017) recommendation, and deemed adequate to 
proceed.   
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Pilot Test 
 The pilot test was conducted to test the reliability and validity of the survey 
instrument.  Soper’s calculator was utilized with an effect size of .1, a statistical power of 
.8, and probability level of .05 to determine minimum sample size for the model structure 
pretest, and the resulting number satisfied the minimum of greater than 100 (Soper, 
2017b; Westland, 2010).  With five constructs and 26 variables, a sample size of 113 
participants was the minimum required.  The study’s sample size, n = 115, was therefore 
deemed appropriate for an EFA study.  The maximum likelihood (ML) factor extraction 
method was used for the study.  Oblique factor rotation was used because the study 
assumed there would be a meaningful correlation between the extracted factors.  A 
meaningful inter-correlational relationship existed across the indicator variables.  
Prior to factor extraction, several tests were utilized to assess the suitability of the 
respondent data for factor analysis to include the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of 
Sampling Adequacy and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity (Williams; 2012).  The KMO 
value for the study achieved an acceptable rating, and the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity 
revealed a significant test.  A meaningful relationship between the input variables and the 
respective indicator variables was identified.    
The factor analysis extraction method identified four dimensions—Safety Culture, 
Pilot Understanding, Aviation Passion, and Manual Flight.  Of the 26 input variables 
selected for factor extraction, 17 showed adequate factor loading to their respective 
factors.  In terms of model fit of the extracted factor model (EFA), the goodness of fit 
resulted with a non-significant outcome, an indication that the four extracted factor model 
adequately fit the pilot data.  Measure of model fit using the chi-square estimation 
indicated a parsimonious fit of the model at the EFA stage.  A confirmatory factor 
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structure of the Manual Flight Inventory (MFI) measurement model was built with four 
latent constructs to include Manual Flight (MF), Pilot Understanding (PU), and Safety 
Culture (SC), and Aviation Passion (AP), along with their respective indicator variables 
and measurement error terms.  Model identification was achieved, which identified the 
theoretical possibility for the SEM program to derive a unique estimate of every model 
parameter (Kline, 2011).  The model identification was over-identified, meaning the 
model will more likely provide a meaningful estimation of the hypothesized CFA 
model.   
To validate the measurement model (the relationship of the indicator variables to 
its respective latent variable) critical assessment of individual path estimates (significance 
and size), construct validity (reliability measure, convergent validity, and discriminant 
validity), model fit, and diagnostic test of the standardized residual covariances were 
conducted.  The unstandardized and standardized regression estimates of the individual 
paths of the proposed first-order factor structure model identified that two of variables 
had a medium sized effect, whereas the other 15 indicator variables had large effect sizes.  
Construct validity has three main parts to include construct reliability of items within 
each of the four constructs, convergent validity, and discriminant validity (Hair et al., 
2010).  The average standardized regression estimates in each of the four factors of MFI 
were greater than .50, and the average squared multiple correlation in each of the factors 
was greater than the .30, an indication of large effect sizes.  Overall, although the path 
estimates of the indicator variable showed significant results at p < .001 and mostly have 
an observed large effect size, there were issues to be considered since convergent validity 
was not assumed.  In terms of discriminant validity, both AVE and maximum shared 
variance (MSV) were used to conduct distinctiveness of the four factors.  Each of the four 
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MSV values were less than their respective AVE values, and thus discriminant validity 
was achieved.  Model fit measures also identified an excellent and good fit in all 
measures meeting the following standards in Table 5: 
 
Table 5 
MFI Pilot Test Model Fit Measures 
 
Measures Acceptable Thresholds Observed Model Fit 
CMIN/df <3.0* 1.275 
CFI >.95 Excellent; >.90 Traditional; > .80 Permissible* 0.937 
GFI >.95 Excellent; >.90 Traditional; > .80 Permissible* 0.883 
AGFI >.80* 0.840 
SRMR <.05 Good Fit; .05-.08 Adequate Fit, >.10 Poor fit* 0.076 
RMSEA <.05 Good Fit; .05-.10 Moderate, >.10 Poor fit* 0.049 
PCLOSE 1=Perfect  0.507 
*Hu and Bentler (1999) 
 
The pilot test for the proposed MFI first-order four-factor CFA model showed 
satisfactory assessment of model specification, model identification, construct validity, 
and the validity of the measurement model.  However, due to the large sample size 
collected, the five-factor model was utilized for the full sample EFA and CFA, followed 
by the SEM.  All SEM questions from the MFI survey were retained for the full analysis, 
as were the additional questions.  Changes were made to the survey that include: (1) 
moving the SEM questions forward in the survey to capture the SEM data in the event of 
survey fatigue, and (2) the option for comments was removed. 
Full Sample Demographics 
The initial data download included 7,490 surveys spanning the globe with graphic 
results displayed in Figures 18 through 22. 
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Figure 18.  MFI seat position questions, full data sample, identifying 52% of participants 
were Captains, 42% first officers, 1% cruise pilots, 2% between jobs, and 3% retired.  
 
 
Figure 19.  MFI age question, full data sample, identifying the percentage of age range of 
the demographics.  The greatest percentage were ages 21-35 at 29%, with the next three 
categories, 36-40, 41-45, and 46-50, were similar at 13-13.5%.   
 
Captain 52% First Officer 42% Cruise Pilot 1%
Between jobs 2% Retired 3%
CaptainsFirst Officers
<21:  0.67% 21-35:  29.22% 36-40:  13.57% 41-45: 13.19% 46-50: 13.54%
51-55:  11.80% 56-60: 9.20% 61-65: 5.45% 66-70: 1.65% 71-75: 1.02%
76-80: 0.28% 81-85: 0.26% 86-90: 0.09% >90: 0.07%
41-45
46-50 36-40
21-35
56-60
61-65
51-55
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Figure 20.  MFI gender questions, full data sample, identifying that 91% of the 
population were men in relation to 9% female pilots. 
 
 
Figure 21.  MFI most current employer question, full data sample, displaying that close 
to 70% of the demographic were employed at an airline, 16% regional, 10% 
fractional/corporate, and 7% charter operation. 
 
Male:  91% Female:  9%
Female 
Male
Major Airline:  66.61% Regional Airline:  16.04%
Corporate/Fractional: 10.26% Charter:  7.10%
Major Airline
Regional Airline
Corporate
CharterFractional
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Figure 22.  MFI corporate headquarters location question, full data sample, identifying 
44% participants were from the United States, 24.5% were from Europe, and 17.5% were 
from Asia, Australia/Oceanic. 
 
Operating experience.  Operating experience is depicted in Figures 23 through 
27.  Operating experience includes instructor and check airman experience, if any, total 
flight time, type of flight time in the previous 12 months, type of aircraft flown, to 
include flight deck and trim type, typical number of daily cycles, to include long or short 
haul, and type and time since initial flight training.  
 
 
Europe:  24.54% Asia, Australia/Oceanic: 17.45%
United States:  43.85% Canada:  5.53%
Mexico: 1.56% South America:  2.73%
Africa:  3.24% Central America/Caribbean: 0.81%
Alaska:  0.28%
United States
Europe
Asia Australia
/Oceanic
150 
 
Figure 23.  MFI instructor/check airman experience and total flight time questions, as 
identified by the full data sample.  
 
 
 
Figure 24.  MFI recreational and employment flight hours questions from the full data 
sample in the previous 12 months. 
 
 
Figure 25.  MFI type of aircraft, flight deck, and trim, questions from the full data 
sample. 
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Figure 26.  MFI type of employment flying and legs flown daily questions, from the full 
data sample. 
 
 
Figure 27.  MFI primary flight training and time since initial training was conducted 
questions, from the full data sample, identifying that the 43% of the demographic were 
general aviation pilots, and 68% experienced training within the previous 5 years.  
 
Demographic comparison.  In order to determine the representativeness of the 
sample to the population, demographic comparisons were evaluated in two categories.  
Age (DataUSA, 2018a) and gender statistics (DataUSA, 2018b) from 2016 were 
compared to the population in the MFI survey, 2018.  Table 6 represents the age 
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comparison where both the MFI and USA category from 21-35 represented the highest 
percentage at 29% and 25%, respectively.  Category 36-40 was 14% MFI versus 10% 
USA, 41-45 was 13% MFI versus 11% USA, category 51-55 were both 12%, 56-60 was 
9% MFI versus 8% USA, and 61 to 65 was 7% MFI to .4% USA.  Despite that DataUSA 
statistics was two years earlier, it becomes difficult to adjust an age increase comparison 
assumption over the two-year period in that aviation is a career that enables pilots to join 
the career at any age below the mandatory retirement, as well as allows them to exit the 
career early.   
 
Table 6 
MFI Data Comparison Age with DataUSA 2016 Data 
 
 
The gender demographic presented in Table 7 displays the comparison of the 
female population of the MFI survey to be 9% to the USA data of 7%.  The 2% increase 
could be due to activities to increase female pilots in this workforce (Petitt, 2015).  The 
age and gender demographic comparisons from the MFI survey with DataUSA identify 
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the data closely approximated the 2016 statistics population and is closely representative 
of the survey population. 
 
Table 7 
MFI Data Comparison Gender with DataUSA 2016 Data 
 
 
 
Full Sample Data Treatment  
The initial data download included 7,490 surveys.  Data were reviewed evaluating 
missing responses and eliminated respondents that had more than 70% missing data.  
Eight variables were filtered, meaning any respondents who left the following eight 
questions blank were removed from the dataset: SEM—Q6_MF_1; Q7_PU1; 
Q11_MF_2; Q22_PT_4; Q25_PU_3; Q26_MF_5; Q27_MF_4; and Q29_MF_3.  Missing 
data were analyzed to ensure percentages were not excessive and occurred in a random 
fashion.  The dataset was imputed, and a clean set prevailed to include 5,661 responses.  
Due the large sample size, the data was randomly split into three groups at approximately 
33% each, for cross-validation.   
Filtering process.  Data were cleaned and frequency tables for each individual 
question were analyzed to ensure only seven points existed, and the number of missing 
variables were reviewed.  A filter was created to remove participants who left eight of the 
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26 questions blank.  After the data was filtered, the frequencies were checked for each 
variable to confirm everything was within a 1-7 per the Likert scale and looked normal.   
Missing data.  Data were analyzed for the number of missing variables to 
determine randomness and identify total percentage of missing values and percentage of 
missing variables.  Hair et al. (2006) purports if missing data is 10% or less for an 
individual participant, it could be ignored as long as the missing data occurred in a non-
specific random fashion, with the total number of missing variables less than 30% (Hair 
et al., 2006) and total missing values less than 5% (Tabaschnick & Fiddell,1983).  Figure 
28 represents the number of missing variables to be very low at .168%.  
 
 
 
Figure 28.  MFI percentage of missing variables, as presented with depiction of missing 
variables, number of cases with missing variable, and percentage of total missing 
variables. 
 
Missing variable patterns in Figure 29 identified there were no patterns.  The 
visual in the bottom right of the figure is related to the missing data on two sequential 
questions, 30 and 31; however, no patterns exist.  
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Figure 29.  MFI missing value patterns, reflecting a block of missing responses on 
questions 30 and 31.  
 
An MCAR test (Missing Completely At Random) was utilized to ensure the 
missing data occurred in a random fashion.  This test resulted in non-significance at .988, 
meaning there was no non-random occurrence.  Acceptable level is <5% variable levels 
and <30% for missing values (Hair et al., 2006; Tabaschnick & Fiddell, 1983).   
Imputing data.  Multiple imputations were utilized with a linear regression 
approach that predicted missing values and replaced them.  The data was imputed six 
times and averaged the missing values, which then replaced the missing values in each of 
the variables.  SEM questions, Survey questions 6 through 31, retained 5,661 valid cases. 
Dataset division.  Due to the large sample size—5,661 after filtering and 
imputation—the data was randomly split into three groups at approximately 33% each: 
training dataset (1,831); validation dataset (1,887); and test dataset (1,943).  Table 8 
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presents the total number of participants in each dataset.  The training dataset was utilized 
to build three EFA models, and all datasets were utilized on each model.   
 
Table 8 
MFI Cross-Validation 
 
  Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Training Data Set 1831 32.3 32,3 32,3 
 Validation Data Set 1887 33.3 33.3 65.7 
 Test Data Set 1943 34.3 34.3 100.0 
 Total  5661 100.0 100.0  
 
Full Sample EFA Model Comparison  
Three EFA models were then built with the training dataset to gain a better picture 
of the emerging factors, utilizing the original five factors.  All three models were 
analyzed with each dataset in addition to the full dataset.  A meaningful relationship 
requires a shared variance to be above .3 where a shared variance is a correlation r, and 
.30 is considered medium correlation indicating that there is a relationship (Nandy, 
2012).  Factors with low commonalties well below .3 were removed in the first two 
models.  The commonalities in the first model were removed one at a time.  This process 
continued until all commonalities were close to, or greater than .3.  In the second EFA 
model, the commonalities were also removed based on the <.3 criteria, but this time they 
were removed two and three at a time.  Whereas the first two models were built by 
removing variables with low commonalities, the third EFA model was built utilizing 
factor loading—anything less than .3 on the pattern matrix was removed, one by one.  
After the <.3 factor loadings were removed, the construct was assessed to determine 
average loading of all variables.  If it appeared a variable with a factor loading of a low .4 
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(despite meeting the .3 criteria) would lower the overall average of the construct below 
the required .5, the low variable was also removed to avoid negatively impacting 
convergent validity.  Variables in two of the models were inversely recoded due to 
negative values.  The process continued until three models resulted. 
Inter-correlation among input variables.  Correlation coefficients over ±.30 
were identified to be good indicators of factorability (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  Table 
14, Appendix I: Inter-item Correlation Matrix, displays the correlation matrix for the first 
EFA model constructed with the full dataset.  Correlation coefficients that are above the 
±.30 threshold are significant at a .001 significance level.  The correlation matrix 
identifies there are meaningful inter-correlational relationships that exist across the 
indicator variables compared.  
Measure of sampling adequacy.  Prior to factor extraction, several tests were 
utilized to assess the suitability of the respondent data for factor analysis to include the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and the Bartlett’s Test of 
Sphericity (Williams; 2012).  Williams (2012) recommended that a KMO index above 
0.50 is suitable for factor analysis, and Hair et al. (2006) confirms that values above .50 is 
appropriate for an individual variable or the entire matric (p. 103).  KMO value for the 
three models are .755, .737, and .745, respectively, well above the criterion set by 
Williams, and achieved an acceptable rating under Hair’s guidelines.  The study’s sample 
size also met the required measure of sampling adequacy for factor analysis.  Bartlett’s 
test of Sphericity revealed a significant test with p < .001 on all three models identified in 
Table 9.  A meaningful relationship between the input variables and the respective 
indicator variables exists with all three models.  Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
residual covariance is proportional to an identity matrix is rejected.  
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Table 9 
MFI KMO and Bartlett’s Test Model Comparison with Test Data 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Kaiser-
Meyer -
Olkin 
 
0.755 
 Kaiser-
Meyer -
Olkin 
 
0.737 
 Kaiser-
Meyer -
Olkin 
 
0.745 
Measure 
of 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Approx 8200 
 Measure 
of 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Approx 7302 
 Measure 
of 
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Approx 7694 
Bartlett’s 
Test of 
Sphericity 
df 153 
 Bartlett’s 
Test of 
Sphericity 
Df 120 
 Bartlett’s 
Test of 
Sphericit
y 
df 136 
Sig. 0   Sig. 0   Sig. 0 
 
Extracted factors.  The factor analysis extraction method of each model retained 
all five dimensions—Safety Culture, Pilot Understanding, Aviation Passion, Manual 
Flight, and Pilot Training.  Each dataset and the total dataset were run on all three 
models.  Of the 26 input variables selected for factor extraction, 18 input variables 
showed adequate factor loading to their respective five factors in model 1, 16 input 
variables in model 2, and 17 input variables in model 3.  Table 10 reveals the comparison 
of the three models and the identification that model 2 represents a slightly better model, 
with an average common variance (communality) of .344 which is above the required .30 
threshold established by Hair (2010).  The decision to retain factors slightly below .30 
was based upon the EFA process being exploratory, where more stringent guides were 
utilized in the CFA.   
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Table 10 
MFI Communalities Model Comparison 
 
Model 1 Test Set  Model 2 Test set   Model 3 Test set 
Communalitiesa  Communalitiesa  Communalitiesa  
 Initial   Initial   Initial 
Q11_MF_2 0.511  Q11_MF_2 0.496  Q11_MF_2 0.496 
Q29_MF_3 0.403  Q29_MF_3 0.352  Q29_MF_3 0.354 
Q6_MF_1 0.384  Q6_MF_1 0.381  Q6_MF_1 0.383 
Q26_MF_5 0.323  Q26_MF_5 0.322  Q26_MF_5 0.323 
RecQ27_MF4 0.244  Q16_AP_4 0.373  Q16_AP_4 0.375 
Q16_AP_4 0.376  Q10_AP_3 0.342  Q15_AP_1 0.326 
Q15_AP_1 0.326  Q15_AP_1 0.326  Q10_AP_3 0.345 
Q10_AP_3 0.348  Q18_AP_2 0.255  Q18_AP_2 0.255 
Q18_AP_2 0.256  Q31_SC_3 0.394  Q31_SC_3 0.395 
Q12_PU_4 0.304  Q30_PT_6 0.267  Q30_PT_6 0.271 
Q9_PU_5 0.319  Q24_SC_1 0.294  Q24_SC_1 0.295 
Q7_PU_1 0.201  RecQ19_PT3 0.455  Q12_PU_4 0.303 
Q17_PU_2 0.249  RecQ13_PT2 0.442  Q9_PU_5 0.319 
Q31_SC_3 0.395  Q12_PU_4 0.294  Q7_PU_1 0.194 
Q30_PT_6 0.272  Q9_PU_5 0.279  Q17_PU_2 0.248 
Q24_SC_1 0.296  Q17_PU_2 0.232  RecQ19_PT3 0.455 
RecQ19_PT3 0.455     RecQ13_PT2 0.443 
RecQ13_PT2 0.444       
Average Communality 
0.339 
 Average Communality 
0.344 
 Average Communality 
0.340 
 
Table 11 displays a total of five dimensions in each model with eigenvalues 
greater than 1.0.  In model 1 the five factors explain close to 59% of the cumulative 
variance between the extracted factors, model 2, 62.5%, and model 3, 61 %.  All three 
models are well above Hair’s suggested cumulative variance of 50% or greater as a 
threshold value (Hair, 2010); however, model 2 appears to be the strongest. 
 
Table 11 
MFI Total Variance Explained Comparison 
 
Model 1 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Cumulative % Total 
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Variance 
1.  MF 3.453 19.184 19.184 2.19 
2.  AP 2.45 13.609 32.793 1.979 
3.  SC 2.058 11.432 44.224 1.906 
4.  PU 1.521 8.451 52.676 2.021 
5.  PT 1.123 6.237 58.913 1.807 
Model 2 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total 
1.  MF 3.314 20.714 20.714 1.984 
2.  AP 2.27 14.185 34.899 1.952 
3.  SC 1.995 12.472 47.370 1.876 
4.  PU 1.331 8.32 55.691 1.816 
5.  PT 1.094 6.836 62.527 1.816 
Model 3 
Factor Initial Eigenvalues Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative % Total 
1.  MF 3.422 20.13 20.130 1,872 
2.  AP 2.279 13.408 33.539 1.753 
3.  SC 2.001 11.771 45.309 1.514 
4.  PU 1.497 8,807 54.116 1.496 
5.  PT 1.11 6.533 60.649 1.356 
 
 
The scree plot comparison of the three models, Figure 30, identified five 
extracted factors with the line of the infliction point separating the five significant 
eigenvalues greater than 1.0 from eigenvalues (below 1.0) that were deemed not 
significant extracted factors.  Models 2 and 3 were more distinct than model 1.   
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Figure 30.  MFI scree plot comparisons with three five-factor models, identifying the 
variability in data, as identified by the eigenvalues.  
 
Factor loadings.  Factor loading is the correlation of the input variables within 
each extracted factor (Hair et al., 2010).  The factor loadings of each input variable to 
their respective factor or dimensions with the three model comparisons are presented in 
Table 12.  Hair et al. (2010) established factor loading criteria to be considered 
acceptable for factor structure interpretation with the range from ±.30 to ±.40 and 
loadings of ±.50 or greater to be considered practically significant.  Each of the five 
extracted factors have a factor loading greater than 0.50, verifying the significance of the 
factor loadings within each of the structures (factors/dimensions) from the data set.  
Factor loadings for the three models and each of the five factors are as follows: Safety 
Culture dimension had factor loadings = 0.657, 0.656, and 0.631; Pilot Understanding 
dimension had factor loadings = 0.594, 0 .621, and .0573; Aviation Passion dimension 
had factor loadings = 0.655, 0.652, and 0.640; Manual Fight dimension had factor 
loadings = 0.693, 0.733, and 0.742; and Pilot Training factor had factor loadings = 0.803, 
.810, and 0.797.  
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Table 12 
MFI Pattern Matrix Comparison 
 
MODEL 1 
 Factor 
  Manual  
Flight 
Aviation 
Passion 
Safety 
Culture 
Pilot 
Understanding 
Pilot  
Training 
Q11_MF_2 0.859     
Q29_MF_3 0.689     
Q6_MF_1 0.575     
Q26_MF_5 0.519     
RecQ27_MF4 0.514     
Q16_AP_4  0.756    
Q15_AP_1  0.649    
Q10_AP_3  0.646    
Q18_AP_2  0.570    
Q31_SC_3   0.963   
Q30_PT_6   0.512   
Q24_SC_1   0.496   
Q12_PU_4    0.667  
Q9_PU_5    0.633  
Q7_PU_1    0.564  
Q17_PU_2    0.51  
RecQ19_PT3     0.915 
RecQ13_PT2     0.690 
MODEL 2 
Q11_MF_2 0.883     
Q29_MF_3 0.658     
Q6_MF_1 0.596     
Q26_MF_5 0.529     
Q16_AP_4  0.749    
Q15_AP_1  0.646    
Q10_AP_3  0.644    
Q18_AP_2  0.57    
Q31_SC_3   0.945   
Q30_PT_6   0.522   
Q24_SC_1   0.502   
RecQ19_PT3    0.984  
RecQ13_PT_2    0.635  
Q12_PU_4     0.769 
Q9_PU_5     0.582 
Q17_PU_2     0.512 
MODEL 3 
Q11_MF_2 0.878     
Q29_MF_3 0.651     
Q6_MF_1 0.611     
Q26_MF+5 0.572     
Q16_AP_4  0.735    
Q15_AP_1  0.642    
Q18_AP_2  0.622    
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Q10_AP_3  0.559    
Q31_SC_3   0.963   
Q30_PT_6   0.48   
Q24_SC_1   0.45   
Q12_PU_4    0.71  
Q9_PU_5    0.555  
Q17_PU_2    0.537  
Q7_PU_1    0.49  
RecQ19_PT3     0.921 
RecQ13_PT2     0.672 
 
Goodness of fit.  In terms of model fit of the extracted factor model (EFA), 
Table 13 displays the goodness-of-fit test comparison of the three models and the training 
data set.  Results identified all three models were non-significant, indicating that the 
extracted factor model adequately fit the data.  Measure of model fit using the chi-square 
estimation indicated a parsimonious fit of the model for each of the three models at the 
EFA stage—model 1: X2(73) = 463.971, p = 0; model 2: X2(50) = 309.419, p = 0; model 
3: X2(61) = 357.193, p = 0. 
 
Table 13 
MFI Goodness-of-fit Comparison 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Goodness-of-fit Test  Goodness-of-fit Test  Goodness-of-fit Test 
chi-
square 
df Sig.  chi 
Square 
df Sig.  chi-
square 
df Sig. 
463.971 73 0  309.419 50 0  357.193 61 0 
 
 
Full sample reliability and validity.  Validation of the extracted factors was a 
three-step validation process of the extracted factors to include testing for discriminant 
validity, convergent validity, and reliability.   
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Discriminant validity.  The factor correlation matrix comparison displays the 
correlation coefficients between the factors to test for discriminant validity.  Table 14 
provides the relative measure of strength of the relationship between the five extracted 
factors in each model.  According to Gaskin (2012), validation of the extracted factors 
should not exceed correlation coefficient of ± 0.70.  Gaskin’s validation assumption of 
correlation coefficient less than 0.70 relates to issues with highly correlated factors, 
which would diminish those factor’s individual contributions because highly correlated 
factors would essentially become a single factor, and discriminant validity would not be 
achieved.  The factor correlation matrix presented shows there was no bivariate 
correlation coefficient greater than .70 in any of the three models, indicating that each of 
the extracted factors were distinct and thus achieved discriminant validity.  
 
Table 14 
MFI Three Model Correlation Comparison 
 
Model 1   Model 2 
Factor MF AP SC PU PT  Factor MF AP SC PU PT 
MF 1 0.144 0.062 0.208 0.034  MF 1 0.154 0.062 0.032 0.239 
AP 0.144 1 0.169 0.29 0.076  AP 0.154 1 0.167 0.075 0.293 
SC 0.062 0.169 1 0.297 0.411  SC 0.062 0.167 1 0.402 0.302 
PU 0.208 0.29 0.297 1 0.399  PU 0.032 0.075 0.402 1 0.337 
PT 0.034 0.076 0.411 0.399 1  PT 0.239 0.293 0.302 0.337 1 
Model 3        
Factor MF AP SC PU PT        
MF 1 0.164 0.103 0.252 0.098        
AP 0.164 1 0.223 0.263 .121        
SC 0.103 .223 1 0.293 .389        
PU 0.252 .263 .293 1 0.333        
PT 0.098 .121 .389 .333 1        
 
 
Convergent validity.  A range from ±.30 to ±.40 is “considered to meet the 
minimal level for the interpretation of structure,” and “loadings of above ±.50 or greater 
are considered practically significant” (Hair, 2006, p. 128).  Factor loadings for each of 
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the five extracted factors in each model, displayed in Table 12, were greater than 0.50, 
thus resulted in adequate factor loadings greater than expected threshold for all models.  
Overall, the indicator variables converged with their respective factors, and thus, 
convergent validity has been achieved.  
Reliability: inter-item consistency.  Examination of Table 15, the Cronbach’s 
Alpha value of each model and standardized items all indicated values above .70.  
Overall, the individual items within each dimension achieved a good level of internal 
consistency, and thus inter-item consistency was achieved.  
 
Table 15 
MFI Reliability Statistics Comparison Between Models 
 
Model 1  Model 2 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
 
.736 .745 118  .734 .741 16 
Model 3     
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Cronbach’s 
Alpha Based on 
Standardized 
Items 
N of 
Items 
    
    
.743 .748 17     
 
 
Full Sample CFA Model Comparison 
A similar process to the EFA model selection process was conducted.  Table 16 
presents three models compared with each of the datasets, without adjustments, to 
compare and assess the best model fit.  Model 2 depicts a lower chi-square as compared 
to models 1 and 3, with all three data sets, training, validation, and test-set resulting in 
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544.583, 543.169, and 559.330, respectively.  Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) were also lower in model 2 for all three datasets.  
There was no distinct difference between models identifying stability across all datasets.   
 
Table 16 
MFI Model Comparisons with Training, Validation, and Test Data 
 
Training Set 
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  761.112 853.112 1106.692 
2nd CFA Model  544.583 628.583 860.113 
3rd CFA Model  613.676 701.676 944.231 
    
Validation Set    
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  736.897 828.897 1129.863 
2nd CFA Model  543.169 627.934 859.965 
3rd CFA Model  586.786 674.786 918.667 
    
Test Set    
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  768.488 860.488 1116.799 
2nd CFA Model  559.330 643.33 877.353 
3rd CFA Model  610.573 698.573 943.74 
 
Table 17 presents three models compared with each of the datasets that include 
modification adjustments to compare and assess the best model fit after adjustments.  
Model 2 continues to depict a lower chi-square with each of the models and all three data 
sets, training, validation, and test-set resulting in 396.571, 396.995, and 424.531, 
respectively.  ACI and BIC were also lower in model 2 for all three datasets as compared 
to models 1 and 3.   
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Table 17 
MFI Modifications Model Comparisons with Training, Validation and Test Data 
 
Training Set 
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  610.587 706.587 971.192 
2nd CFA Model  396.571 484.571 727.126 
3rd CFA Model  465.512 557.512 811.092 
    
Validation Set (1st run Modification index adjusted) 
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  585.849 681.849 947.901 
2nd CFA Model  396.995 484.995 728.876 
3rd CFA Model  439.227 531.227 786.193 
    
Test Set (1st run Modification index adjusted)  
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  626.478 722.478 989.933 
2nd CFA Model  424.531 512.531 757.699 
3rd CFA Model  475.161 567.161 823.473 
 
Table 18 provides a comparison with the full dataset with the first run of 
modification indices with each of the three models, comparison with second run of 
modification indices of models one and two, and the final selection of the second model, 
third run.  Chi-square, AIC, and BIC are 390.003, 472.003, and 744.298, respectively. 
 
Table 18   
MFI Full Dataset Model Comparisons 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Run 
 
Full Set (Modification index 1st run) 
1st CFA Model  1566.205 1662.205 1980.990 
2nd CFA Model  1021.028 1109.028 1401.247 
3rd CFA Model  1156.050 1248.05 1553.552 
    
Full Set (Modification index 2nd run) 
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model  1383.211 1483.211 1815.279 
2nd CFA Model  505.548 599.548 911.692 
3rd CFA Model    
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Full Set (Modification index 3rd run)  
 chi-square AIC  BIC 
1st CFA Model     
2nd CFA Model  390.003 472.003 744.298 
3rd CFA Model     
 
Model 2 with third run modification was selected for the SEM.  Figure 31 
presents the first order confirmatory factor structure of the Manual Flight Inventory 
(MFI) measure, the five latent constructs include Manual Flight (MF), Pilot 
Understanding (PU), Pilot Training (PT), Safety Culture (SC), and Aviation Passion 
(AP), along with their respective indicator variables and measurement error terms, 
covariances, and the CLF.   
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Figure 31.  First order confirmatory factor structure.  The Manual Flight Inventory (MFI) 
final model, with Manual Flight, Aviation Passion, Safety Culture, Pilot Understanding 
and Pilot training factors. Included in the model is the common latent factor weighted to 
zero.  
 
Manual flight.  The factor Manual Flight (MF) retained three variables:  
Q_6_MF_1 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to 
disengage both the autopilot and autothrust prior to beginning the arrival 
phase? 
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Q_11_ MF_2 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to 
disengage both the autopilot and the autothrust on final approach prior 
to 1000 feet? 
Q_26_ MF_5 In day VFR weather conditions, how likely are you to fly without 
any automation engaged (no autopilot, no autothrust and no flight director) 
during the course of the flight? 
Pilot Understanding.  The factor Pilot Understanding retained three variables.  
Q_17_ PU_2 How likely is it that you could pass a systems oral on your current 
aircraft without any studying or preparation first? 
Q_12_ PU_4 If your aircraft lost one or more of its hydraulic systems, and the 
Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) or something similar 
(if installed) and in-flight reference manuals or written procedures were not 
available, how likely are you to know what to do? 
Q_9_ PU_5 If an emergency were to occur, beyond knowing what to do by 
following a directed procedure, how likely are you to know why most 
emergency procedures are written? 
Pilot Training.  The factor Pilot Training retained two variables. 
Q_13_ PT_2 How likely is it that during your initial checkout on your current 
aircraft the systems training (ground school) was based on rote 
memorization versus in-depth understanding? 
Q_19_PT_3 How likely is it that during your initial checkout on your current 
aircraft the procedures training in the simulator was based on rote 
memorization versus in-depth understanding? 
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Safety Culture.  The factor Safety Culture retained three variables.  Note that one 
of the three variables is identified as SC_PT, in that this variable loaded onto the SC 
factor during exploratory factor analysis.    
Q_24_SC_1 How likely is it that employee suggestions are taken into 
consideration by your employer? 
Q_31_SC_2 How likely are you to critique and report any aspect of your 
employer’s training program if you perceive it as substandard? 
Q_30_ SC_PT_6 How likely was it that your pilot training (simulator) debriefing 
sessions included self-assessment and reflection, in conjunction with your 
instructor’s comments? 
Aviation Passion.  The factor Aviation Passion retained three variables. 
Q_15_AP_1 How likely is it that you will attend an aviation conference or an 
aviation social event within the next 12 months? 
Q_10_ AP_3 How likely are you to read aviation books or magazines for 
enjoyment? 
Q_16_ AP_4 How likely are you to go to the airport or join a social media site to 
connect in order to socialize with other aviators? 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 19 presents descriptive statistics for the variables that were retained in the 
final model with 5,561 participants.  Data displayed includes Mean, Median, Mode, 
Standard Deviation, Standard Error of Skewness, Kurtosis, and Standard Error of 
Kurtosis. 
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Table 19 
MFI Descriptive Statistics Final Model 
 
Variables N Mean Median Mode Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Std. Error 
of 
Skewness 
Kurtosis Std. 
Error of 
Kurtosis 
Q6_MF_1 5661 3.33 3.00 3 1.804 0.441 0.033 -0.920 0.065 
Q9_PU_5 5661 5.31 5.00 6 1.180 -0.993 0.033 1.168 0.065 
Q10_AP_3 5561 4.88 5.00 5 1. 582 -0.610 0.033 -0.367 0.065 
Q11_MF_2 5661 4.92 5.00 7 1.955 -0.645 0.033 -0.880 0.065 
Q12_PU_4 5661 4.99 5.00 5 1.295 -0.721 0.033 0.269 0.065 
Q13_PT_2 5661 4.52 5.00 5 1.548 -0.358 0.033 -0.807 0.065 
Q15_AP_1 5661 3.78 4.00 3 2.007 0.145 0.033 -1.240 0.065 
Q16_AP_4 5661 4.53 5.00 5 1.845 -0.419 0.033 -0.916 0.065 
Q17_PU_2 5661 4.54 5.00 5 1.473 -0.497 0.033 -0.379 0.065 
Q19_PT_3 5661 4.33 5.00 5 1.492 -0.282 0.033 -0.848 0.065 
Q24_SC_1 5561 3.97 4.00 5 1.589 -0.237 0.033 -0.845 0.065 
Q26_MF_5 5661 3.20 3.00 1 1.919 -0.481 0.033 -1.037 0.065 
Q30_PT_6 5661 5.22 5.00 6 1.450 -1.002 0.033 0.575 0.065 
Q31_SC_3 5661 4.59 5.00 5 1.604 -0.533 0.033 -0.437 0.065 
 
Final Model Assessment 
Table 20 identifies the model fit measure of the second model, with modification 
indices, third run, and the full dataset identifying an excellent fit meeting the following 
standards: 
 
Table 20 
MFI Full Dataset Model Fit Measures Final Model 
 
Measures Acceptable Thresholds Observed Model Fit 
PCLOSE 1=Perfect Fit 1.00 
CFI >.95 Excellent; >.90 Traditional; > .80 Permissible* 0.982 
GFI >.95 Excellent; >.90 Traditional; > .80 Permissible* 0.990 
AGFI >.80* 0.984 
SRMR <.05 Good Fit; .05-.08 Adequate Fit, >.10 Poor fit* 0.024 
RMSEA <.05 Good Fit; .05-.10 Moderate, >.10 Poor fit* 0.030 
*Hu and Bentler (1999) 
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Final model reliability and validity.  Validation of the final model was a three-
step validation process of the extracted factors to include testing for discriminant validity, 
convergent validity, and reliability.  A construct validity test meets an acceptable level at 
> .70 as a standard threshold.  Table 21 identifies that MF, AP, PU, and PT all exceed the 
.70 threshold, whereas SC_PT rounded up from .651 was also deemed acceptable.  Table 
22 revealed that the average standardized regression estimates in each of the five factors 
of MFI are greater than .50, and the average squared multiple correlation in each of the 
factors are greater than the .30, as an indication of large effect sizes.   
 
Table 21 
MFI Reliability and Validity Final Model 
 
3rd Run 
 Construct 
Reliability 
AVE 
(Convergent 
Validity) 
MSV 
(Discriminant 
Validity 
Manual Flight  0.732 0.477 0.069 
Aviation Passion 0.705 0.446 0.089 
Safety Culture PT 0.651 0.390 0.224 
Pilot Understanding 0.712 0.453 0.141 
Pilot Training 0.779 0.638 0.224 
 
 
Table 22 
MFI Convergent Validity Final Model 
 
 Average 
Standardized  
Regression 
Estimates 
Average Squared  
Multiple 
Correlation 
(r2) 
Manual Flight  0.658 0.470 
Pilot Understanding 0.610 0.384 
Safety Culture_ 0.631 0.410 
Aviation Passion 0.688 0.483 
Pilot Training  0.673 0.479 
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Common Method Bias  
Two tests were conducted for common method bias.  Harman’s single factor test 
was utilized on the EFA model and common latent factor at the CFA model.  
Harman’s single factor test.  Harman’s single factor test was utilized on Model 
2 from the EFA comparison to test for common method bias.  All variables were loaded 
onto a single factor and assessed at a 50% level.  In that variance of the first factor is 
21%, as identified in Table 23, results indicate there was no common bias at the EFA 
level (Podsakoff et al., 2003). 
 
Table 23 
MFI Harman’s Single Factor Assessment 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Factor 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 3.316 20.725 20.725 2.48 15.502 15.502 
2 2.267 14.171 34.896    
3 1.993 12,459 47.354    
4 1.331 8.321 55.675    
5 1.094 6.836 62.511    
 
 
Common latent factor.  To test and control for common method bias, a Common 
Latent Factor (CLF) was utilized in AMOS.  A latent factor was added to the CFA model 
and connected to each item in the model and constrained to zero.  The standardized 
regression weights resulting from the model with the CLF were subtracted from the 
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regression weights of the original CFA model.  Table 24 presents results from the zero 
constrained test that identified bias, and the equal constrained test determined the bias 
was equally distributed.   
 
Table 24 
MFI Common Latent Factor Test 
 
CLF test: Equal Constraints Test 
Full Sample (n-5561)  X2 DF Delta Sig 
 304.089 73  
X2(DF=16_= 
201.459 
0.000 
Zero Constrained Model  505.548 89   
     
CLF test: Equal Constraints test 
Full Sample (n-5561)  X2 DF Delta Sig 
 304.089 73  
X2(DF=16_= 
201.459 
 
0.000 
Equal Constraint Model 569.733 88   
 
 
Table 25 presents the difference between the two models, one with a CLF and one 
without, where common method bias was identified with variables over a .20 delta.  
 
Table 25 
MFI Estimates Identifying Common Method Bias 
 
Standardized Regression Weights 
SEM items   Factors 
Std Reg 
Weights 
with no 
CLF 
Std Reg 
Weights 
with CLF 
Delta 
(Difference) 
Q11_MF_2 <--- MF 0.646 0.270 0.376 
Q29_MF_3 <--- MF 0.436 0.174 0.262 
Q6_MF_1 <--- MF 0.716 0.315 0.401 
Q26_MF_5 <--- MF 0.720 0.335 0.385 
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Q16_AP_4 <--- AP 0.742 0.189 0.553 
Q15_AP_1 <--- AP 0.689 0.316 0.373 
Q10_AP_3 <--- AP 0.567 0.338 0.229 
Q18_AP_2 <--- AP 0.514 0.130 0.384 
Q31_SC_3 <--- SC_PT 0.690 0.111 0.579 
Q30_PT_6 <--- SC_PT 0.470 0.127 0.343 
Q24_SC_1 <--- SC_PT 0.688 0.178 0.510 
Q12_PU_4 <--- PU 0.587 0.465 0.122 
Q9_PU_5 <--- PU 0.730 0.311 0.419 
Q17_PU_2 <--- PU 0.697 0.502 0.195 
RecQ19_PT3 <--- PT 0.815 0.173 0.642 
RecQ13_PT2 <--- PT 0.782 0.217 0.565 
 
 
Assumptions 
Prior to performing the SEM, three assumptions were tested to assess for 
normality, linearity, and independence of errors. 
Normality.  Normality is a primary assumption of regression (Kline, 2011).  
Figures 32 through 36 graphically depict normality of the five factors. 
 
Pilot training.  Figure 32 identifies the pilot training graphics.  The histogram 
appears to be bimodal.  The bell shape appears flat, with the two high points at less than 3 
and great than 4, on a 7-point Likert scale, with a tail skewed slightly to the right.  The Q-
Q plot identifies most data points hugging the line, with some deviations.  The deviations 
were determined to not be outliers, by observing the box plot.  
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Figure 32.  MFI pilot training diagrams of normality to include a histogram, Q-Q plot, 
and box plot.  
 
Pilot understanding.  Figure 33 displays Pilot Understanding.  The tail to the left 
indicates the curve is negatively skewed, with more selections at Likert selection of 1.  
There are a few data points not hugging the Q-Q plot line, and the box plot indicates there 
are outliers on the bottom 25%.  
 
 
Figure 33.  MFI pilot understanding diagrams of normality to include a histogram, Q-Q 
plot, and box plot.  
 
Safety culture.  Figure 34 depicts safety culture with a somewhat normal curve, 
but with a tail that is negatively skewed.  Many data points are hugging the Q-Q plot line 
with a few deviations.  The box plot indicates a few outliers; however, they are close to 
the whisker.  
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Figure 34.  MFI safety culture diagrams of normality to include a histogram, Q-Q plot, 
and box plot.  
 
Aviation passion.  Figure 35 presents Aviation Passion, with a tail to the left, 
therefore negatively skewed.  While there are some deviations from the Q-Q line, most 
fall on the line.  The Box plot identifies no outliers. 
 
 
Figure 35.  MFI aviation passion diagrams of normality to include a histogram, Q-Q plot, 
and box plot.  
 
Manual flight.  Figure 36 identifies a positive skewness.  While many data point 
hug the Q-Q line, there are large deviations.  However, the box plot indicates there are no 
outliers. 
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Figure 36.  MFI manual flight diagrams of normality to include a histogram, Q-Q plot, 
and box plot.  
 
Skewness.  A Skewness and Kurtosis ratio test was conducted by dividing the 
Skewness value by the standard error to create a standardized value.  By standardizing 
these values, the threshold for standardized scores could be applied, which is 0.05 = +/- 
1.96 or 2.0 and at three standard deviations at 0.10 = +/- 2.56 or 3, with the goal for the 
score to be within the threshold.  Table 26 identifies the Skewness and Kurtosis of the 
five factors, indicating they are outside the standard thresholds with the following 
Kurtosis Ratios of Pilot Training -0.568, Pilot Understanding .779, Safety Culture -0.317, 
Aviation Passion, -0.603, and Manual Flight -0.81.  Data transformation was 
accomplished on Pilot Understanding.   
 
Table 26 
MFI Five Factors: Skewness and Kurtosis 
 
Factor Skewness Kurtosis t Skewness Ratio 
Pilot Training 0.285 -0.568 0.033 8.63 
Pilot Understanding  -0.497 .779 0.033 -15.06 
Safety Culture -0.319 -0.317 0.033 -9.67 
Aviation Passion  -0.179 -0.603 0.033 -5.42 
Manual Flight  0.193 -0.81 0.033 5.85 
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov was checked to test for normality 
and standard distribution.  Table 27 displays the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic, whereas 
values close to zero are ideal.  While significant, the following statistics indicate they 
were very close to zero with Pilot Training at .088, Pilot Understanding .046, Safety 
Culture .039, Aviation Passion .027, and Manual Flight .043, therefore all roughly 
approximating normality.  
 
Table 27 
MFI Test of Normality 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova   
 
Factor Statistic df Sig. 
Pilot Training 0.088 5661 0.000 
Pilot Understanding 0.046 5661 0.000 
Safety Culture 0.039 5661 0.000 
Aviation Passion 0.027 5661 0.000 
Manual Flight 0.043 5661 0.000 
 
Data transformation.  Data Transformation is a mathematical technique to 
improve normality.  Prior to data transformation, each of the factors and their scores were 
standardized in order to capture which data points were greater than 2 or 3.  
Standardizing the scores created the ability to plot the points in order to identify outliers.  
Two types of outliers include potential outliers which are deemed okay and influential 
outliers that could negatively impact the results.  Therefore, four methods were utilized to 
transform the data: log 10, square root, inversed, and squared, and the option with most 
enhancement was selected.  Manual Flight, Aviation Passion, and Pilot training had 
standardized scores below 3.  Safety Culture had only one score at 3.13 and the rest 
below 3.  Pilot Understanding had 29 standardized scores above 3.  Therefore, the 
decision to transform data for Pilot Understanding was made, and ten cases with the 
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highest value were selected and are depicted in Table 28.  The data transformation 
presented in Table 29 presents the option with Squared transformation to create the most 
enhancement by lowering the Skewness from -.497 to .074 and changing the Skewness 
Kurtosis ratio from -15.06 to 2.24 which is under 3 standard deviations.   
 
Table 28 
MFI Case Summaries 
 
 Pilot abs_ZPU 
1 6497374040 3.9 
2 6525541141 3.9 
3 6497522084 3.86 
4 6524433649 3.84 
5 6521496525 3.77 
6 6803805303 3.68 
7 6782470502 3.68 
8 6778133147 3.62 
9 6782188575 3.55 
10 6742657693 3.49 
Total  N 10 10 
a Limited to first 10 cases. 
 
Table 29 
MFI Data Transformation Comparison 
 
Pilot Understanding Skewness Kurtosis Ratio Std Error 
Original  -.497 0.219 -15.06 0.033 
Log 10 0.303 0.114 9.18  
Square root 0.104 0.042 3.15  
Squared  0.074 -0.293 2.24  
Inversed 1.209 2.135 36.64  
 
 
The transformation of Pilot Understanding lowered the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic from .046 to .013, bringing it close to zero, yet still significant at the 0.05 level.  
However, based on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov table with the large sample size of 5,661, 
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the statistics presented in Table 30 approximate normality for univariate normality 
because they are all close to zero.  
 
Table 30 
MFI Univariate Normality After Data Transformation 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
Factor Statistic Df Sig. 
Pilot Training 0.088 5661 0.000 
Pilot Understanding (squared) 0.013 5661 0.028 
Safety Culture 0.039 5661 0.000 
Aviation Passion 0.027 5661 0.000 
Manual Flight 0.043 5661 0.000 
a Lilliefors Significance Correction 
 
 
Linearity.  To have a meaningful regression analysis, the expectation is that the 
factors from EFA to CFA should have a meaningful linear relationship.  Linearity 
estimates if there is a linear relationship between variables.  As presented in Table 31, the 
Pearson Correlation was examined to identify the linear relationship.  The correlation 
should be -1 as a negative relationship or +1 as a positive correlation, avoiding 0, which 
indicates no correlation.  Anything between .10 and .29 is considered a small association, 
.30 and > .49 is considered a medium size relationship, and >.5 is considered a large 
relationship (Cohen J., Cohen P., West, & Aiken, 2003).  All factors have a positive 
linear relationship with all factors, and all are significant.  However, with a large sample, 
any detected effect will provide a significant relationship.  Pilot Training identified a 
medium relationship with Pilot Understanding, a low relationship to Aviation Passion and 
Manual Flight, but a very high relationship to Safety Culture.  Pilot Understanding 
further identified a medium relationship to Safety Culture, Aviation Passion, and Manual 
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Flight.  Safety Culture presented a medium relationship with Aviation Passion, but a low 
relationship to Manual Flight, whereas Aviation Passion had a medium relationship to 
Manual Flight.  All relationships are positive and therefore pass linearity.  
 
Table 31 
MFI Five Factor Linearity 
 
  Pilot 
Training 
Pilot 
Understanding 
Safety 
Culture 
Aviation 
Passion 
Manual 
Flight 
Pilot Training 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .435
** .591** .156** .086** 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0 0 0 0 
N 5661 5661 5661 5661 5661 
Pilot 
Understanding 
Pearson 
Correlation .435
** 1 .481** .372** .325** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0  0 0 0 
N 5661 5661 5661 5661 5661 
Safety 
Culture 
Pearson 
Correlation .591
** .481** 1 .384** .199** 
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0  0 0 
 N 5661 5661 5661 5661 5661 
Aviation 
Passion  
Pearson 
Correlation .156
** .372** .384** 1 .265** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0  0 
N 5661 5661 5661 5661 5661 
Manual Flight 
Pearson 
Correlation .086
** .325** .199** .265** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0  
N 5661 5661 5661 5661 5661 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Independence of errors.  Independence of errors determines whether residuals 
are correlated to the previous residuals or not.  Mahalanobis distance was utilized to 
detect outliers.  As presented in Table 32, the chi-square probability chart (MedCal, 
2018), the threshold of 18.47 was determined utilizing a significance of .001 and four 
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independent variables, meaning nothing on Mahalanobis d-squared table should be 
greater than 18.47.  Table 33 identifies the potential cases that could be influential.   
 
Table 32 
MFI Chi-square Distribution Chart 
 
Probability level (alpha) 
df 0,5 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.001 
1 0.455 2.706 3.841 5.412 6.635 10.827 
2 1.386 4.605 5.991 7.824 9.210 13.815 
3 2.366 6.251 7.815 9.837 11.345 16.268 
4 3.357 7.779 9.488 11.668 13.277 18.465 
5 4.351 9.236 11.070 13.388 15.086 20.517 
Note: Adapted from MedCal, 2018. 
 
Table 33 
MFI Mahalanobis d-squared 
 
Observation  
number 
Mahalanobis  
d-squared 
 
p1 p2 
88 39.013 .000 .001 
3250 27.140 .000 .038 
265 26.369 .000 .010 
2233 26.282. .000 .001 
3993 23.728 .000 .014 
1236 23,298 .000 .007 
3308 22.881 .000 .005 
1561 22.356 .000 .005 
2645 22.202 .000 .002 
4855 21.360 .001 .007 
982 21.309 .001 .003 
219 20.622 .001 .010 
1647 20.416 .001 .008 
1164 20.353 .001 .004 
972 20.128 .001 .004 
1 19.668 .001 .010 
2 19.668 .001 .004 
116 19263 .002 .011 
779 19.224 .002 .006 
4298 18.696 .002 .028 
1604 18.543 .002 .029 
37 18.454 .002 .024 
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Table 34 presents multivariate normality of 4.442, whereas this value should be 
three (Hair et al., 2010).  However, Kline (2013) proposed an equation termed the 
Mardia’s Coefficient, utilizing the formula p (p+2) where p equals the number of the 
indicator variables in the model, and if the original Mardia’s Coefficient is less than 
the adjusted Mardia’s Coefficient, then the data can be deemed multivariate normal 
(p.11).  The initial Mardia’s Coefficient was 4.441 which is less than the adjusted 
Mardia’s Coefficient [14(14+2)] = 220.0, and thus multivariate normality was assumed.  
 
Table 34 
MFI Five Factor Normality Assessment 
 
Variable Min Max Skew c.r. Kurtosis c.r. 
SC 0.959 6.137 -0.329 -9.791 -0.318 -4.885 
AP 0.848 6.207 -0.179 -5.49 -0.604 -9.275 
PT 0.858 6.245 0.285 8.747 -0.569 -8.732 
PU 0.893 5.074 -0.497 -15.273 0.278 4.271 
MF 0.724 5.428 0.198 5.932 -0.811 -12.451 
Multivariate  0.988  4.442 
 
 
Residuals are the difference from the observed and the predicted values.  
Subtracting the predicted value from the observed value equals the predicted errors.  The 
standardized residuals should be close to zero.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov value is close 
to zero at .034, identified in Table 35.  
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Table 35 
MFI Test of Normality 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnova 
 Statistic Df Sig. 
Standardized 
Residual (MF full 
path MLR) 
.034 5561 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction  
 
 
Test of Normality utilizing Skewness was evaluated by dividing Skewness of .191 
by .033 resulting in 5.79, which is above a threshold of three, as depicted in Table 36. 
 
Table 36 
MFI Test of Normality Skewness 
 
   Statistic Std. Error 
Standardized 
Residual (PT 
full path MLR) 
Mean  .00000000 .01328617 
95% Confidence 
interval for Mean 
Lower Bound -.0260460  
Upper Bound .0260460  
 5% Trimmed Mean  -.0109645  
 Median  -.0662653  
 Variance  .999  
 Std. Deviation   .99964658  
 Minimum  -3.51759  
 Maximum  4.66279  
 Range  8.180.38  
 Interquartile Range  1.44627  
 Skewness  .191 .033 
 Kurtosis  -.166 .065 
 
 
Figure 37 displays four graphics of normality.  The Q-Q plot identifies most of 
the errors are hugging the line, meaning there is independence of residuals.  The 
histogram appears symmetrical with a slight positive skewness, but overall the residuals 
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appear to behave with a normal distribution.  The box plot shows two outliers, and the 
scatterplot identifies no patterns, meaning there are no positive or negative cones left or 
right, and no hill is depicted.  
 
 
Figure 37.  MFI standardized residual diagrams of normality to include Q-Q plot, 
histogram, box plot, and scatterplot.  
 
There were only 21 cases on the Mahalanobis d-squared over the threshold of 
18.46 with a sample size of 5661.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov value was extremely close 
to zero at .034.  Multivariate normality of 4.442 was close to the 3, but adjusted with 
Marida’s coefficient became normal, and the diagrams of normality represent near 
normality.  Therefore, the independence of errors test can be deemed adequate.  
Hypothesis Testing Manual Flight 
Manual Flight assessment in AMOS.  Multivariate analysis of manual flight as 
the dependent variable is depicted in the path model summary Figure 38.  
 
Figure 38.  MFI path model for MF as the dependent variable.  
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The standardized regression weights in Figure 38 are PU= .28, PT = -.10, AP = 
.15, and SC =.06.  Table 37 presents the same Estimates indicating significance at <.001 
level.  Most influential in this path analysis was Pilot Understanding (PU) with a C.R. of 
18.8 and standardized regression weight of .28.  Aviation Passion (AP) was the second 
most influential with a 10.92 C.R. value and a standardized regression weight of .152.  
Pilot Training (PT) had a negative influence of a -6.1 C.R. value and a standardized 
regression weight of -.10.  Safety Culture (SC) presented a small effect with a 3.7 C.R. 
value and a standardized regression weight of .06.  All results indicated an influence.  
 
Table 37 
MFI Manual Flight Regression Weight Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group 1 – Default model)  
   Estimate S.E C. R. P. Label 
MF <--- PU .435 .023 18.807 *** par_1 
MF <--- PT .094 .015 -6.081 *** Par_2 
MF <--- AP .144 .013 10.924 *** Par_3 
MF <--- SC .071 .019 3.700 *** Par_4 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group 1 – Default model) 
   Estimate     
MF <--- PU .281     
MF <--- PT -.096     
MF <--- AP .152     
MF <--- SC .062     
 
 
Manual Flight conclusion.  AMOS analysis with Manual Flight as the dependent 
variable confirm that all relationships with the predictor variables Pilot Understanding, 
Pilot Training, Aviation Passion, and Safety Culture, as predictors, were significant at the 
.001 level.  The following hypotheses, H1A, H3A, and H4A are supported.  While H2A 
indicates an influence, this influence identified a negative relationship between training 
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and a pilot’s willingness to manually fly, therefore was not supported.   
H1A: Pilots’ aircraft understanding positively influences willingness to 
manually fly, controlling for pilot training, aviation passion, and safety culture.   
H2A: Training positively influences willingness to manually fly, controlling for 
pilot understanding, aviation passion, and safety culture.  
H3A: Aviation passion positively influences pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
controlling for pilot training, safety culture, and understanding. 
H4A:   Safety culture positively influences pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
controlling for pilot training, aviation passion, and understanding.  
Hypotheses Testing Pilot Training  
Pilot Training assessment in AMOS.  Multivariate analysis of Pilot Training as 
the dependent variable is depicted in the path model summary Figure 39.  
 
 
Figure 39.  MFI path model for PT as the dependent variable. 
 
Table 38 presents Estimates that mimic the path diagram, indicating significance 
at <.001 level, which are standardized regression weights for each factor.  The standard 
errors (S.E), are all close to zero and below the .10 level.  The critical ratio (C.R.) 
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identifies the standardized scores which are evaluated with a threshold of anything >3 
indicating importance.  With Pilot Training (PT) as dependent variable, Safety Culture 
(SC) has the largest influence on PT with a 44 C.R value and a standardized regression 
weight of .53.  Pilot Understanding (PU) had the second largest influence with a 20 C.R. 
value and a standardized regression weight of .25.  Aviation Passion (AP) and Manual 
flight (MF) both have a negative relationship with Pilot Training (PT) with C.R. values of 
-.11 and -.06 respectively.  The standardized regression weights of Aviation Passion and 
Manual Flight are -.122 and -.067, respectively.  Between the four factors, Safety Culture 
presents the greatest predictor of Pilot Training, followed by Manual Flight.  All factors 
have significant relationships. 
 
Table 38 
MFI Pilot Training Regression Weight Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group 1 – Default model)  
   Estimate S.E C. R. P. Label 
PT <--- MF -.069 .011 -6.081 *** par_1 
PT <--- PU .391 .020 19.775 *** Par_2 
PT <--- AP -.119 .011 -10.513 *** Par_3 
PT <--- SC .627 .014 43.843 *** Par_4 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group 1 – Default model) 
   Estimate     
PT <--- MF -.067     
PT <--- PU .246     
PT <--- AP -.122     
PT <--- SC .533     
 
Pilot Training conclusion.  AMOS analysis for Pilot Training confirmed that all 
relationships were significant at the .001 level.  The following hypotheses H5A and H7A 
were supported.  While the following hypotheses H6A and H8A indicate a positive 
influence, this influence created a negative relationship, meaning that Aviation Passion 
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and Manual Flight negatively influenced Pilot Training.  Therefore, H6A and H8A 
hypotheses were not supported. 
H5A:      Safety culture positively influences pilot training, controlling for manual 
flight, aviation passion, and understanding.  
H6A: Aviation passion positively influences pilot training, controlling for 
manual flight, safety culture, and pilot understanding.  
H7A Pilot understanding positively influences pilot training, controlling for 
aviation passion, manual flight, and safety culture.  
H8A Manual flight positively influences pilot training, controlling for aviation 
passion, understanding, and safety culture.  
Hypotheses Testing Pilot Understanding 
Pilot Understanding assessment in AMOS.  Multivariate analysis of Pilot 
Understanding as the dependent variable is depicted in the path model summary Figure 
40.  
 
 
Figure 40.  MFI path model for PU as the dependent variable. 
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Pilot Training displays the greatest effect with a C.R. value of 20, and a 
standardized regression weight of .27.  Manual Flight and Safety Culture both had 
standardized regression weights of .21, with Manual Flight’s C.R. value at 19 and Safety 
Culture’s C.R. value at 15.  Aviation Passion had a C.R. value of 17 with a standardized 
regression weight of .20.  All were very similar and significant.  Table 39 presents the 
C.R. for Pilot Training at 19.78, Manual Flight at 18.81, Aviation Passion at 16.48, and 
Safety Culture at 14.62.  All are extremely close and significant.   
 
Table 39 
MFI Pilot Understanding Regression Weight Estimates 
 
Regression Weights: (Group 1 – Default model)  
   Estimate S.E C. R. P. Label 
PU <--- MF .135 .007 18.807 *** par_1 
PU <--- PT .165 .008 19.775 *** Par_2 
PU <--- AP .120 .007 16.478 *** Par_3 
PU <--- SC .155 .011 14.617 *** Par_4 
Standardized Regression Weights: (Group 1 – Default model) 
   Estimate     
PU <--- MF .209     
PU <--- PT .265     
PU <--- AP .195     
PU <--- SC .209     
 
 
Pilot Understanding conclusion.  AMOS analysis for Pilot Understanding 
confirms that all relationships were significant at the .001 level.  The following 
hypotheses H9A through H12A are all supported.  All factors were similar as to the 
influence of Pilot Understanding, with Pilot Training showing the greatest influence. 
H9A:      Safety culture positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
manual flight, aviation passion, and pilot training.  
193 
 
H10A: Aviation passion positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
manual flight, safety culture, and pilot training. 
H11A Pilot training positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
aviation passion, manual flight, and safety culture.  
H12A Manual flight positively influences understanding, controlling for aviation 
passion, pilot training, and safety culture.  
Hypotheses Testing Mediation Hypothesis 
Mediation hypothesis.  Figure 41 displays the mediation path model where the 
total effect of Pilot Training (independent variable) on Manual Flight (dependent 
variable) is mediated by Safety Culture (mediator variable).  Testing for a mediation 
hypothesis is a four-step process that must meet all assumptions of relationships (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986).  Step 1, the independent variable of Pilot Training must be correlated 
with the dependent variable Manual Flight, identifying the effect could be mediated.  
Step 2, the independent variable Pilot Training is correlated with the mediator, Safety 
Culture, where Safety Culture is being treated as a dependent variable.  Step 3, Safety 
Culture must be correlated with Manual flight.  Step 4 establishes that Safety Culture 
mediates the Pilot Training and Manual Flight relationship, where the effect of Pilot 
Training on Manual Flight controlling for Safety Culture should be zero.  
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Figure 41.  MFI mediation path model with safety culture dependent variable.  Pilot 
training and manual flight.  
 
Step 1.  Establish a relationship from Pilot Training to Manual Flight.  Figure 40 
presents the direct path model and results of a positive relationship of .09.  Table 59 
presents a C.R. of 6.507, which is significant, meeting the first step assumption. 
 
 
Figure 42.  MFI path analysis and regression weights with pilot training and manual 
flight. 
 
Table 40 
MFI Regression Weights PT to MF 
 
   Estimate S.E.  C.R.  P Label  
MF <--- PT .084 .013 6.507 ***  
 
 
Step 2.  Establish a relationship from the independent variable to the mediating 
variable.  Figure 43 and Table 41 present the path model with significant and positive 
relationship of .59, and a C.R. value of 55.13, meeting the second step assumption.  
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Figure 43.  MFI path analysis with pilot training and safety culture.  
 
Table 41 
MFI Regression Weights PT to SC 
 
   Estimate S.E.  C.R.  P Label  
SC <--- PT .503 .009 55.135 *** Par 1 
 
Step 3.  Establish a relationship from the mediation variable to the dependent 
variable.  Figure 44 and Table 42 present the path model with significant and positive 
relationship of .20, and a C.R. value of 15.247 respectively, meeting the third step 
assumption.  
 
 
Figure 44.  MFI path analysis and regression weights with safety culture and manual 
flight.  
 
Table 42 
MFI Regression Weights SC to MF 
 
   Estimate S.E.  C.R.  P Label  
MF <--- SC .228 .015 15.247 ***  
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Step 4.  Figure 45 displays the mediation model results.  Pilot Training to Manual 
Flight is -.05, which indicates a partial mediation because PT to MF was not zero.  Table 
43 results indicate that Safety Culture is negatively impacting the positive effect that Pilot 
Training had on Manual Flight with a C.R. -2.975, just less than three, but is considered 3 
and therefore significant. 
 
 
Figure 45.  MFI mediation model results with safety culture as the mediating variable 
between pilot training and manual flight.  
 
Table 43 
MFI Regression Weights for Complete Mediation Model 
 
   Estimate S.E.  C.R.  P Label  
SC <--- PT .503 .009 55.135 *** par 3 
MF <--- SC .260 .018 14.066 *** Par 1 
MF <--- PT -.047 .016 -2.975 .003 par 2 
 
The indirect effect of PT to SC and MF is .13 and is significant at .001 as 
identified in Table 44. 
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Table 44 
MFI Indirect Effect of MF Mediation Model 
 
Indirect Effects - Lower Boundes (BC) (Group number 1- Default model) 
  PT SC 
SC 0.000 0.000 
MF 0.113 0.000 
Indirect Effects - Upper Boundes (BC) (Group number 1- Default model) 
 PT SC 
SC 0.000 0.000 
MF 0.113 0.000 
Indirect Effects - Upper Boundes (BC) (Group number 1- Default model) 
  PT SC 
SC … … 
MF 0.001  
 
Mediating conclusion.  Per Baron and Kenny (1986), all four steps and 
assumptions were complete, and analysis identified there was a mediating effect.  Albeit 
a negative effect, this indicates that Safety Culture is removing a positive relationship that 
Pilot Training directly had on Manual Flight in a univariate relationship.  While 
significant, hypothesis H13A is non-supported due to the negative influence that safety 
culture has on a pilot’s willingness to manually fly: 
H13A: Safety culture positively influences pilot training, which influences a pilot’s 
willingness to manually fly.  
Automation Questions 
A series of questions, not part of the SEM, were asked to assess the participant’s 
opinions and preference on automation usage, safety, regulatory compliance, complexity, 
situational awareness, and company policy.  Questions were also asked to assess type and 
elements of the company’s training and checking program and how the pilot best learns.  
Non-SEM questions are presented in Appendix G, and associated comments are 
presented in Appendix H. 
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Summary 
Given the data analyzed, after pilot testing the survey and the model selection 
process, the final model positively and significantly identified predictors of manual flight 
to be pilot understanding, pilot training, aviation passion, and safety culture.  The results 
of the survey analysis, pilot test, EFA and CFA model comparisons, non-SEM questions 
regarding automation usage, safety, regulatory compliance, complexity, situational 
awareness, company policy, training, and learning will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSTIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Discussion 
The discussion will review the results of hypotheses testing for the manual flight, 
pilot training, and safety culture hypotheses, in addition to the mediation hypothesis.  The 
battery of supporting questions, referred to as non-SEM questions, will be discussed in 
relation to how the results relate to the factors and the resultant impact on the manual 
flight analysis.  
Hypotheses testing.  Results of the analysis with Manual Flight as the dependent 
variables confirmed that all relationships with the predictor variables, Pilot 
Understanding, Pilot Training, Aviation Passion, and Safety Culture were significant.  
Ten of the 13 hypotheses were accepted due to the significant and positive relationships.  
Three of the hypotheses were not accepted despite being significant due to a negative 
relationship.  The first twelve hypotheses were direct response hypotheses, and the final 
hypothesis was a mediation hypothesis accounting for the influence of Safety Culture on 
Pilot Training.  Hypotheses were further identified by the dependent variables of Manual 
Flight—hypotheses 1-4, Pilot Training—hypotheses 5-8, and Pilot Understanding—
hypotheses 9-12.   
Manual flight.  The Manual Flight hypotheses H1A, H3A, and H4A were supported 
due to significance.  H2A was statistically significant; however, because pilot training 
identified a negative relationship to the pilot’s decision to manually fly, it was not 
supported. 
H1A: Pilots’ aircraft understanding positively influences willingness to 
manually fly, controlling for pilot training, aviation passion, and safety culture.   
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H2A: Training positively influences willingness to manually fly, controlling for 
pilot understanding, aviation passion, and safety culture.  
H3A: Aviation passion positively influences pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
controlling for pilot training, safety culture, and understanding. 
H4A:   Safety culture positively influences pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
controlling for pilot training, aviation passion, and understanding.  
The research question of what impacts a pilot’s decision to manually fly was 
identified to be multiple factors.  Pilots’ aircraft understanding positively influenced 
pilots’ willingness to manually fly and presented the greatest relationship with manual 
flight.  Aviation passion also positively influenced pilots’ willingness to manually fly, 
identifying that if the pilot was passionate about aviation, they were more likely to 
engage in manual flight.  Training also influenced willingness to manually fly, however, 
presented a negative relationship.  Therefore, the more training the pilot experienced, 
they were less apt to manually fly their aircraft.  Safety culture also showed a significant 
relationship upon manual flight.  
Pilot training.  The Pilot Training hypotheses H5A and H7A were supported due to 
significance.  However, while H6A and H8A showed significant relationships, they were 
not supported due to a negative relationship that Aviation Passion and Manual Flight had 
with Pilot Training.  
H5A:      Safety culture positively influences pilot training, controlling for manual 
flight, aviation passion, and understanding.  
H6A: Aviation passion positively influences pilot training, controlling for 
manual flight, safety culture, and pilot understanding.  
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H7A: Pilot understanding positively influences pilot training, controlling for 
aviation passion, manual flight, and safety culture.  
H8A: Manual flight positively influences pilot training, controlling for aviation 
passion, understanding, and safety culture.  
Safety culture had a large influence on pilot training, indicating that a positive 
safety culture would positively influence pilot training, and the reverse would be true—a 
negative safety culture would negatively influence pilot training.  Pilot understanding 
also positively influences pilot training with the second highest relationship.  Pilots’ level 
of understanding influences their training, which could be indicative of self-training 
programs.  Aviation passion positively influenced pilot training, but with a negative 
relationship.  This could identify that the more passionate a pilot is, the more they love to 
fly, they may resist training processes which appear to be inhibiting manual flight.  
Manual flight also presents a negative relationship to pilot training.  This could be 
reflecting similar results with aviation passion in that the pilot’s desire to manually fly is 
negatively influencing training, due to manual flight not being made available during 
pilot training.  
Pilot understanding.  The Pilot Understanding hypotheses were accepted due to 
significance. 
H9A: Safety culture positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
manual flight, aviation passion, and pilot training.  
H10A: Aviation passion positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
manual flight, safety culture, and pilot training. 
H11A: Pilot training positively influences pilot understanding, controlling for 
aviation passion, manual flight, and safety culture.  
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H12A: Manual flight positively influences understanding, controlling for aviation 
passion, pilot training, and safety culture.  
Results identified that all Pilot Understanding hypotheses were accepted and 
significant.  Pilot training positively influenced pilot understanding and was the most 
significant.  Safety culture and manual flight both positively influenced understanding 
with a similar relationship with each factor.  Aviation passion also positively influenced 
pilot understanding.  These relationships identified that all factors significantly 
influenced a pilot’s level of understanding the aircraft. 
Mediating hypothesis.  A mediating hypothesis was designed to identify the 
influence that safety culture had on the relationship between pilot training and manual 
flight.   
H13A:  Safety culture positively influences pilot training, which influences a pilot’s 
willingness to manually fly.  
The first step in the process was to analyze pilot training with pilots’ willingness 
to manually fly.  This relationship identified a small but positive relationship, whereas the 
multivariate analysis identified a negative relationship.  This indicates that in isolation, 
pilot training had a positive influence upon manual flight; however, when the other 
variables were accounted for, the relationship turned negative.  Safety culture was one of 
those variables that was analyzed in this process.  The relationship between pilot training 
and safety culture was assessed and found significant, yet slightly higher than the 
univariate relationship.  The mediation path model identified that safety culture 
influenced pilot training, which influences a pilot’s willingness to manually fly, 
identifying safety culture has a significant influence over manual flight.  However, the 
relationship between pilot training and manual flight was negative, indicating that safety 
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culture is removing the positive effect that pilot training had on manual flight in a 
univariate relationship.  While significant, this hypothesis was not supported due to a 
negative relationship.  This negative relationship with pilot training and manual flight 
was identified with the multivariate analysis; however, the mediation analysis further 
indicates that safety culture is a significant and contributing factor to that negative 
relationship. 
Pilot opinion questions.  Industry reports supported by academic literature 
indicate that pilots may not understand aircraft systems, lack flight skills due to 
automation dependence, and have ineffective monitoring skills that may be attributing to 
this lack of manual flying.  The FAA recommended that pilots should manually fly 
(FAA, 2013a), yet despite this recommendation, the Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) reported pilots continue to lack hand-flying skills and lack monitoring ability 
(OIG, 2016).  However, pilots had yet to be queried as to the reason behind their 
performance.  Performance identified in this research is the level of automation utilized 
during flight.  The FAA and worldwide civil aviation authorities operate under approved 
training programs and assessment methods.  However, results of this research and the 
literature review indicate among other reasons, that these programs may not be effective 
for learning and assessing performance.  Policy further dictates standard operating 
procedures; however, results identified that 69% of the participants reported their 
organization had unwritten policies regarding automation usage.  While open-ended 
comments were not included on the survey, many participants sent comments that helped 
to further understand the results and are presented in Appendix H.  Some of these 
comments indicate that written policies encourage manual flight, yet the policies oppose 
the unwritten policies of what is accepted on the flight line, identifying a culture issue. 
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Manual flight.  As identified in Appendix G, question 32, there is a confusion as 
to what constitutes manual flight, whereas 15% of the participants believe that manual 
flight is when only the autopilot is disconnected, 49% believe both the autopilot and 
autothrust must be disconnected, and 36% believe that manual flight means that the 
autopilot, autothrust, and the flight director must be disengaged.  This confusion is not 
unfounded, as there is a taxonomy difference between the OIG and the FAA.   
Automation preference.  Pilots reported their preference to fly with the autopilot 
and autothrust connected by 74% and 78%, respectively, as presented in Appendix G, 
questions 33 and 34, respectively.  The presentation of the ensuing responses to the 
opinion-based questions assist in understanding this preference.  
Automation opinion.  This series of questions was written as dichotomous 
questions despite each answer being contingent upon other variables—mental fatigue, 
physical fatigue, overall flying experience, experience of fellow crewmembers, 
experience of the active arrival or location, cognitive ability, inter crewmember tension or 
conflict, life stress, pilot age, weather, location of flight, time of flight, time of 
crewmember’s break, quality of crew rest, passenger issues, recency of training, length of 
flight, circadian rhythm, or any combination of these variables, or others.  Adding the 
option, “it depends” would have resulted with all participants selecting the option it 
depends, because it does.  Safety, overload, confusion, risk, complexity, and situation 
awareness are not absolutes, and all move along a spectrum of “more” or “less” 
dependent upon other factors.  With this in mind, the following responses provide an 
overall perception of what pilots think about automation without any conditional factors 
included.  These experiential responses are reflective of the individual’s type of flying, 
and therefore will portray an authentic belief based upon that experience.  A domestic 
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short-haul pilot that flies into the same airport multiple times daily will not have the 
experience to make an accurate response to a more detailed question, such as to the 
necessity of automation after a long-haul flight, with an augmented crew, flying into a 
foreign country, after being on duty for 15 hours, but could only answer based upon an 
assumption.  Allowing pilots to answer with the mindset of their daily experience will 
provide the most authentic responses.  
Automation is safer than manual flight.  Appendix G, question 35, depicts that 
75% of the population believe that automated flight is safer than manual flight.  
Automation is safer when the automation works, the pilot understands how to use it, and 
there are no extenuating circumstances.  Participant’s comments, as presented in 
Appendix H, indicate automation may be safer due to the lack of manual flight ability, 
and they do not necessarily agree that fully automated flight is in the best interest of 
overall safety, despite being safer.  
Manual flight overloads the pilot flying.  Appendix G, question 36, identifies that 
49% of the participants believe that manual flight overloads the pilot monitoring, where 
51% believe it does not.  The differences in these responses would be contingent upon a 
number of variables such as operations in a foreign country or airport, complexity of the 
arrival, ATC involvement, and airport conditions.  Therefore, the split difference was 
varied per the pilot’s operating environment.  Comments in Appendix H identify the 
complexity of manual flight, and the decision to manually fly could be based upon 
overload and complexity of the air traffic system more so that the aircraft. 
Manual flight reduces situation awareness.  Appendix G question 37, depicts that 
51% of the participants believe that manual flight reduces situation awareness, meaning 
that 49% believe they can remain situationally aware while manually flying the aircraft.  
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The response to this question is one that is also situational.  During high workload, higher 
levels of automation usage has been identified to improve situation awareness, yet when 
mental workload is increased due to lack of understanding of complex aircraft systems, 
operations, or interpreting the automation, higher levels of automation will reduce 
situation awareness.  Concern for situation awareness when something fails on the 
aircraft is identified in the comments in Appendix H. 
Manual flight and the risk of violations.  Research has identified that flight skill 
retention in automated aircraft was determined to remain relatively intact without 
consistent performance, yet degradation of cognitive ability necessary for manual flight 
was apparent.  Therefore, responses where 61% believe that manual flight exposes the 
pilot to more risk, as depicted in Appendix G, question 38, can be explained by these 
results.  Without manual flight skill retention, due to lack of practice, there will be an 
increased potential for error with an ensuing violation. 
Fly by wire and automation complexity.  The focus of automation research has 
revolved around flight deck displays of a glass cockpit and integrated system designs 
with limited discussion on flight control operations and understanding the complexity of 
the fly-by-wire system.  Pilots’ lack of understanding, poor attention, limited knowledge, 
mode awareness issues, and problems managing an automation surprise have been 
identified to be resultant from automation complexity.  It is also believed that automation 
creates more confusion for the pilot due to complexity.  However, of the pilots queried, 
most of which are operating these complex, highly automated fly-by-wire aircraft, state a 
different opinion than the aircraft complexity theory.  As depicted in Appendix G 
questions 39, 40, and 41, these participants believe that the fly-by-wire aircraft were 
meant to be manually flown and were not too complex for manual flight by 71% and 
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95%, respectively, and 91% did not believe fly-by-wire aircraft were confusing.  Naidoo 
and Vermuelen (2014) best explain this difference of perception of complexity with the 
contention that it is not necessarily the complexity of the aircraft, but the problem is 
inadequate training. 
Company policy.  Corporate culture plays a key role in pilots’ performance 
beyond espoused values, corporate rules, and written procedures, in that the unwritten 
rules are what often guide behavior and influence performance.  Corporate culture 
therefore extends to performance in how the airline culture behaves and transcends to 
employee performance standards.  As reported, worldwide there are a variety of policies 
regarding automation usage, both written and unwritten, which are depicted in Appendix 
H.  Results identified that unwritten policies are more prevalent than the written policy 
regarding mandates to utilize automation.  
Written policies.  Unless corporate policy or civil aviation authority regulations 
mandate automation usage, the pilot has a choice.  Thus, a question as to why pilots are 
choosing not to disengage the automation, despite FAA recommendations, are answered 
with these results.  Appendix G, question 43, identified that 56% of the participants state 
that the company has written policies mandating automation usage.  However, all carriers 
operating automated aircraft for hire have policies regarding automation.  In that only 7% 
of the population did not fly an automated aircraft, this response rate could be due to 
confusion as to the term automation policies, similar to the confusion of the term manual 
flight, and is contingent upon understanding the question.  English as a second language 
was identified as a limitation in this research and could be attributed with this response.  
Comments on automation usage appear to be varied indicating autopilot, autothrust, and 
flight director policies are company specific, as identified in Appendix H.  
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Unwritten policies.  Whereas 56% of the participants stated their company had 
written policies mandating automation usage, 69% stated their company has unwritten 
policies mandating automation usage as identified in Appendix G, question 42.  The 
FAA’s recommendation for manual flight, disconnecting both autopilot and autothrust, 
and the companies’ perceived compliance via written policy versus how they actually 
advise the pilots to operate through unwritten policies are identified in Appendix H.  The 
response to the discernment between unwritten policies and practice could be found in 
the definition of corporate culture being a pattern of behavior stemming from, in part, 
espoused values, beliefs, and underlying assumptions, in addition to policies and 
procedures, which all include elements of a safety culture (Schein, 2010).  
Performance.  Performance in this research is referenced as to the level of 
automation the pilot chooses to utilize.  In response to how pilots operate related to 
automation usage and their preference for the other pilot, Appendix G, questions 44 and 
45, identify that 71% of the pilots monitoring prefer the pilot flying utilize automation, 
and 58% state that the pilots they fly with rarely, if ever, fly without the autopilot or 
autothrust engaged.  An example of pilots not wanting their fellow pilot to manually fly 
and associated concern are presented with comments in Appendix H, indicating the 
operating environment to be the overloading factor.   
Training.  A preponderance of research and accident investigations attributed 
automation-related pilot errors, in part, to inadequate training, with sub-optimal training 
as one of the two most significant flight hazards.  Training questions encompassed 
necessity for supplemental training aids, type of ground school and assessment measures, 
participant’s recency, companies training cycle, debriefing time, self-assessment during 
the brief and the use of a video, AQP certification, how the pilot studied to pass the oral 
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examination, manual flight during operating experience (OE), and crew compliment 
during training.  Results, as presented in Appendix H, reflect comments regarding 
training.  
Supplemental training.  The question as to whether pilots are being provided the 
tools in their respective companies regarding training is answered in Appendix G, 
questions 46 and 47, and identified 80% of the pilots queried utilized additional 
information to learn the aircraft, and 50% of those pilots stated that additional 
information was necessary in order to pass training.  These results indicate that operators 
are not providing adequate resources to navigate their training program.    
Type of ground school.  Regulatory agencies have enabled airlines to cancel 
traditional ground-schools, where pilots are no longer mandated to come together in a 
classroom environment with an instructor and fellow classmates to learn aircraft 
operating systems.  Under AQP, airline flight operations management have been 
authorized to allow pilots to teach themselves aircraft systems and computer operations 
via at-home training programs.  This training process relies upon an assumption that 
pilots will acquire correct systems understanding, and when an inflight emergency arises, 
the pilot will have accurate knowledge to deal with it.  Appendix G, question 48, 
identifies those with a classroom and instructor represented 24%, whereas completely 
self-taught were 13%, and a combination of self-taught and classroom represented 63%.  
Multiple comments, presented in Appendix H, identified that the combination of both 
could be reflective of self-taught followed by a review. 
Type of systems evaluation.  Training assessment has been an ongoing challenge, 
yet, until recently, little research existed on effective simulator training evaluation 
measures.  However, effective evaluation is the only way to determine training program 
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effectiveness.  Pilot performance, as identified by accidents, incidents, and ASRS may be 
better indicators of training effectiveness than current AQP data collection processes 
during simulator training events and electronic reviews.  Accepted training assessment 
processes do not necessarily substantiate that learning has taken place in the form of 
understanding and retention, with the capability to transfer that knowledge to the aircraft.  
Appendix G, question 49, depicts that 39% of participants took a written or electronic 
systems test, 8% took a systems oral, and 53% stated they took a combination of both.  
Comments as to learning and knowledge from these assessment methods are presented in 
Appendix H. 
Recency and recurrent training cycle.  A recency event is a simulator training 
event where a pilot performs three takeoffs and landings within 90-days, to maintain 
currency per Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.439 (GPO, 2015).  Recurrent 
simulator training is a regulated event where pilots will receive an approved number of 
simulator days for training and evaluation, conducted on either a sixth month, nine 
month, or annual cycle (GPO, 2015).  There is no requirement for knowledge assessment 
during pilot recency or recurrent training events beyond rote memorization of limitations 
or memory items, and no requirements for repetition or practice of manual flight skills 
(FAA, 2017a; GPO, 2015).  Appendix G, questions 50 and 51, identified that the majority 
of participants were actively flying, and 65% rarely or ever required a recency, 20% 
needed a recency twice per year, 10% once a year, and 5% visited the simulator three 
times per year to maintain proficiency.  In addition, 57% of the pilots attended a 6-month 
cycle, 17% every 9 months, and 23% annually. 
Average debriefing time.  The power of the flight crew debrief has been the focus 
of much research and is instrumental in how pilots learn from human error (Ellis et al., 
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2014).  Learning depends upon how the debrief was conducted per the outcome of the 
event.  If the checkride was a success, the debrief should only focus upon errors made 
throughout the event to maximize learning, yet after a failed experience, the focus must 
also include what the pilot did correctly (Ellis et al., 2014).  Ellis et al. (2014) further 
argued the necessity to accurately assess the experience before learning would occur, and 
reported that pilots would become more accountable for their behavior if they became 
responsible for their success and failures during the learning process.  Appendix G, 
question 52, identifies that 13% of the pilots spent less than 15 minutes in a debrief, 49% 
spent 15 to 30 minutes, and 33 % spent 31 to 60 minutes, whereas 4% spent over 60 
minutes.  As identified in Appendix H, one participant reported they were forced to select 
less than 15 minutes but did not receive any debrief. 
Debrief self-assessment.  Automated aircraft provide extensive latitude for safety, 
meaning there is a great deal of room for error as automation is a safety net that 
minimizes consequences of pilot performance, thus pilots have the opportunity to 
perform and respond to mismanaged arrivals, poor decision-making, and lack of SA 
without resulting in a consequential event, whereas continual success may create 
erroneous mental models of adequate performance (Dismukes, 2010).  While self-
assessment is an integral part of effective learning, pilots must possess the resources to 
accurately measure performance in order to adjust their self-assessments (Sitzmann, Ely, 
Brown, & Bauer, 2010).  Appendix G, question 53, identified that 87% of the pilots were 
able to self-assess and reflect upon their training experience during their debriefing 
session. 
Oral preparation.  How a pilot learns the aircraft between understanding versus 
memorizing facts will be reflective of operational performance.  Automaticity and 
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adaptive expertise improve performance during novel situations, whereas rote 
memorization results in limited understanding and memorized procedures that may not 
transfer to the aircraft beyond events practiced and anticipated events in the simulator.  
Adaptive expertise is where understanding and contextual-based knowledge creates 
adaptive strategies for unexpected events.  Automaticity refers to when a pilot’s 
knowledge is at the level where he or she does not have to think about what to do, 
therefore the response is automatic.  Rote memorization does not guarantee the pilot 
understands the automatic response, whereas knowledge-based automaticity and adaptive 
expertise implies a deeper level of understanding.  When asked how the pilots prepare to 
pass a systems validation, 43% stated they learned by memorizing facts, where 57% 
learned the aircraft to understand systems and processes.  These results identify that close 
to half the pilot population may have limited understanding due to memorized procedures 
that may not transfer to the aircraft beyond events practiced and anticipated in the 
simulator, as presented in Appendix G, question 54.  
Manual flight operating experience.  Appendix G, question 55, identified that 
68% of the pilots were allowed to disengage the autopilot and autothrottle during 
operating experience (OE).  Therefore 32% were not allowed to disengage the 
automation, despite a check airman on the aircraft.  Appendix H presents a training 
professional’s opinion on the importance of providing the ability to manually fly.  
Without the ability to disengage the automation with an instructor onboard, the chance 
the pilots will have confidence to do this on their own is unlikely. 
AQP certification.  AQP is a train to proficiency program that mandates inclusion 
of CRM, LOFT, and line operational evaluation (LOE) scenarios.  AQP simulator 
training must be (a) aircraft specific; (b) include indoctrination, qualification, and 
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continuing qualification (CQ) programs; (c) training and evaluation for instructors and 
examiners; (d) replicate normal flight operation; (e) include a normal crew compliment; 
(f) collect proficiency data, and; (g) utilize a full flight simulator (FAA, 2017a).  
Appendix G, question 56, identifies that 48% of the participants were AQP certified, 16% 
were not, and 36% were unsure.  The high response of those who are unsure identifies a 
culture issue relating to an informed culture, and an associated limited knowledge of 
training requirements. 
Video.  When students observe their performance utilizing a video, and self-
assessment and reflection are done with an instructor and peers, maximum performance 
gains will be realized (Mavin & Roth, 2014b).  The utilization of a video is not a 
requirement for AQP but could be an effective tool for collecting proficiency data and 
assisting with the debrief as this process is a highly efficient and cost-effective tool that 
could improve training effectiveness.  When queried as to the use of this tool, Appendix 
G, question 57, 85% of the population stated they were not videotaped during training. 
Crew complement.  A crew compliment is required under AQP.  Justification to 
reduce the number of required simulator sessions was due to pilots being trained and 
assessed as a crew, where half the training and assessment was being conducted as the 
pilot monitoring and the other half as the pilot flying.  Therefore, training must occur in 
the pilot’s respective seat.  A first officer’s pilot monitoring training must be conducted 
in the first officer seat, as there are additional responsibilities that must be learned and 
practiced.  Appendix G, question 58, identifies that 50% of the training is not being 
conducted as a crew, yet only 15% of the pilots reported their training was not AQP 
certified. 
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SEM questions.  Appendix F displays the SEM questions.  For this discussion, 
these questions were categorized with the factor they belong—Manual Flight (MF), Pilot 
Understanding (PU), Pilot Training (PT), Safety Culture (SC), and Aviation Passion 
(AP). 
Manual flight questions.  The manual flight SEM questions identified the 
likelihood of automation usage in different phases of flight.  Overall, 27-30% of the 
population are not likely to disengage the autopilot and autothrust at any given time, and 
more than 50% will not disengage prior to the final approach phase, and more than half 
would not disengage the flight director.  These results identify that pilots are utilizing 
automation more so than manual flight, and comments in Appendix H reflect that this 
decision could be primarily due to company policy, written and unwritten, versus 
personal choice.  The FAA has recognized the relationship between manual flight and 
pilot proficiency because the agency recommended that pilots should manually fly their 
aircraft (FAA, 2013a).  Yet, despite these recommendations, the OIG reported pilots 
continue to lack hand-flying skills (OIG, 2016).  Therefore, company policies could be 
creating the degraded skills identified by the OIG due to associated lack of practice.  
Some participants noted their aircraft did not have an autopilot or autothrust, another pilot 
expressed confusion as to how the autothrust operated, and there appears to be conflicting 
opinions on aircraft manufacturer mandates as revealed by the comments in Appendix H.  
Pilot understanding questions.  A seven-point Likert scale was utilized for the 
SEM opinion and operational based questions, which enabled pilots to answer 
knowledge-based questions on a level from extremely unlikely to extremely likely versus 
an absolute.  The assumption was, if the pilot absolutely knew the systems question they 
would select extremely likely (7).  However, anything below extremely likely would 
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indicate doubt of absolute knowledge, indicating they might not have the necessary level 
of understanding.  Predicated on the assumption that extremely likely identified 
knowledge, the participants responses identified that 21% were certain they understood 
the flight management system, 36% understood the flight mode annunciator, but only 7% 
were sure they could pass an oral without studying, 9% could handle an emergency 
without direction, and 12% understood why the procedure was written.  These results 
indicate that pilots may lack understanding of the equipment they fly and operational 
practices.  Knowledge deficiency, in some capacity, has attributed to over 40% of the 
accidents and 30% of major incidents reviewed, and LOSA narratives identified that 
flight path errors were due to a knowledge deficit and automation usage (FAA, 2013d).  
However, due to social desirability theory, the only way to accurately assess the level of 
understanding would be to administer an actual test.  There is also a possibility that the 
pilots could be unconsciously incompetent, where they don’t know what they don’t 
know.  Comments regarding pilot understanding are presented in Appendix H. 
Pilot training questions.  A key factor that could be influencing learning is the 
high percentage of pilots utilizing rote memorization versus understanding, in that 61% 
utilized rote memorization in ground school and 57% in simulator training.  Of the pilots 
surveyed, 73% reported they received feedback, and 79% were allowed self-assessment.  
Only 55% of pilots queried were encouraged by a check airmen to manually fly during 
OE.  Lack of repetition identified that 39% of the pilots questioned did not repeat event 
sets.  Training that lacks repetition and feedback in complex aircraft may directly 
influence understanding (knowledge), performance (manual flying), and pilot confidence 
in automated aircraft.  Cognitive performance requires practice and repetition for the pilot 
to remain proficient (Casner et al., 2014).  Combining the results of high rote 
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memorization, lack of repetition, and no encouragement to manually fly during training 
with results from the non-SEM questions identifies that training worldwide may be 
lacking.   
Safety culture questions.  The FAA defines safety culture as, “the shared values, 
actions, and behaviors that demonstrate a commitment to safety over competing goals 
and demands,” and comprises five sub cultures—reporting, just, flexible, informed, and 
learning (FAA, 2013b, p. 9).  Safety culture is the essence of an organizations culture, 
and identified by behavior that stems, in part, from beliefs and underlying assumptions, 
and is an influential factor in manual flight and pilot training.  Overall 54% of the 
population was unsure or did not believe their suggestions would be taken into 
consideration, 34% were unsure or unlikely to critique their training program, 41% 
lacked a belief or were unsure if the leadership in charge of developing training programs 
had the expertise of learning, 54% were unsure or believed it was best to keep quiet, and 
46% were unsure or did not believe their company would exceed regulatory compliance.  
These results identify that organizations worldwide may lack a positive safety culture.  
Multiple comments identified a punitive culture, which opposes a safety culture, that will 
not sustain or support an SMS, as presented in Appendix H. 
Aviation passion questions.  Aviation passion in this study refers to an 
individual’s involvement in aviation activity beyond work experience, such as 
recreational flight, aviation club participation, reading aviation magazines and books, 
flying home simulators, or purchasing aviation themed products.  Overall the population 
appeared to have a strong level of passion, in that 35% were likely to attend an aviation 
event, 68% were likely to purchase an aviation themed product, 72% were likely to read 
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aviation themed books, 62% were likely to socialize with other aviators outside work, 
and 81% of them were proud to be pilots.   
Limitations.  In addition to the anticipated limitations previously identified in the 
limitation section, primarily the lack of a sampling frame and the data collection method, 
there were unanticipated limitations that became apparent reviewing the results.  As 
identified, 17% of the pilots had been trained more than ten years earlier and experienced 
a different type of initial pilot training than the current process.  Those that experienced 
an oral for an assessment were more than likely in this group and would not reflect the 
current methodology of an electronic exam.  An expatriate category could also have been 
included, in that a within culture difference exists between a pilot of one culture 
operating in the environment of another culture, as was identified in comments in 
Appendix H.  English as a second language, while an anticipated limitation, was 
identified to be an actual limitation to an assumed conceptual understanding some of the 
questions.  In that the data gathered was a broad sample reflecting a worldwide 
population and was not specific to a geographic area or a particular operator, a further 
limitation is that any attempt to attribute the results to a specific geographic region 
without controlling for confounding variables is not recommended. 
 
Conclusions 
The overarching research question is—does pilot training, aircraft understanding, 
aviation passion, and safety culture, impact the decision as to the level of automation 
usage?  Moreover, in what aspects did these factors impact each other, and could 
demographics such as age, gender, geographic location, flight hours, type of aircraft, 
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general aviation flight, or how a pilot was trained impact pilots’ performance associated 
with the level of automation utilized? 
In response to the FAA’s (2013) request that pilots manually fly, the resultant 
OIG’s (2016) identification that pilots continued to lack hand flying skills and monitoring 
ability, and the current industries’ concern for flight skill loss due to automation reliance 
and complacency (Abbott, 2015; Curtis et al., 2010; FAA, 1996; Franks, Hay, & Mavin, 
2014; Geiselman, Johnson, & Buck, 2013; Haslbeck et al., 2012; Moll, 2012), questions 
were posed to active FAA certified check airman and training professionals in order to 
better understand manual flight and performance concerns.  During the preliminary stage 
of this research, SMEs were queried to help ascertain what was occurring on the flight 
line in regard to manual flight.  An FAA designee on the Airbus A330, at an international 
airline with the positional power to assess pilot performance and provide his opinion, 
supported industry concerns when he stated his opinion that pilots were not manually 
flying because of, “Lack of confidence”, “Lack of proficiency”, and “Fear”  (Personal 
communication, Captain Miller, February 05, 2015).  An example of manual flight 
performance is further represented by the action of a U.S. international airline captain 
after he experienced a systems failure during departure which prevented the engagement 
of the autopilot and autothrust.  He flew into RVSM airspace, where reduced vertical 
separation mandates an operational autopilot, continued to destination, and then declared 
an emergency in VFR (visual) conditions when ATC would not provide a block altitude 
for arrival: 
To have my skills degrade to a point where a level 0 VMC landing in Atlanta 
required declaring an emergency is a personal wake-up call.  I hate to think that 
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someday manual flight operations will be an assumed emergency, but that day 
may be approaching.  (Personal communication, Captain Steve, May 18, 2015) 
The results of this research identified that pilot training, aircraft understanding, 
aviation passion, and safety culture all influenced a pilots’ decision to manually fly.  
However, the most significant influence on the decision to manually fly was the pilots’ 
level of understanding.  Pilot training identified as the most significant influential factor 
on pilot understanding and safety culture presented the greatest influence over pilot 
training.   
When the initial cadre of experienced instructors at a U.S. airline (many had 
Airbus experience) were learning the Airbus A350 systems (a highly automated aircraft) 
via a computer-based training program and 100% failed one or more system modules, the 
efficacy of a CBT training program that required pilots to listen to audio online, support 
the results of current training programs that may be deficit and are influencing pilots’ 
level of understanding (Personal communication, FAA designee, October 27, 2016).  
Furthermore, the captain who declared the emergency due to the loss of the auto flight 
system lacked knowledge that he was prohibited from operating in RVSM airspace 
(Personal communication, Captain D., June 9, 2015).  He was also not provided that 
information from ground operations, indicative of either a lack of understanding by all or 
lack of information sharing, both of which are required with an informed culture.  Safety 
culture is the foundation of an SMS, and this research has identified that safety culture 
worldwide is impacting how pilots operate their aircraft.  
Safety culture has the greatest impact on pilot training, therefore, is the underlying 
factor with the greatest influence as to how pilots learn and operate their aircraft.  The 
captain who declared the emergency in the above example is also the head of human 
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factors and analyzes ASAP reports and further stated, “We as a group are presently not 
prepared to fly in complex airspace with Level 0 automation.  Nor, might I add, are we 
suitably prepared to fly in complex airspace with Level 4 automation (so says ASAP)” 
(Personal communication, Captain D., May 08, 2015).  Furthermore, this airline’s 
internal response to the identification of this global flight performance issue was not to 
improve training but to encourage pilots to declare an emergency if they lost their 
automation under the construct of workload management (Personal communication, 
Captain D., July 15, 2016).   
Results further identified that pilot training has a negative impact on pilots’ 
willingness to manually fly when all factors are considered, whereas in isolation, pilot 
training had a small but positive impact.  However, when safety culture was added as a 
mediator between training and manual flight, this removed any positive impact that pilot 
training may have had on the pilot’s decision to manually fly and turned that relationship 
negative.  Where safety culture and pilot training present a negative impact on a pilot’s 
decision to manually fly, aviation passion was the second highest predictor of manual 
flight and was both significant and positive. 
While all factors influence the decision to manually fly, associated policies, 
written or unwritten, and practices that dictate line operations (safety culture) and how 
organizations train pilots (pilot training), are events that are at the hands of operators and 
controlled by the aviation regulatory agencies.  Therefore, evaluating practices that could 
be improved upon was accomplished in this research.  A literature review was utilized in 
conjunction with the researcher’s flight and training experience to develop questions that 
could assess current training practices to identify whether or not operators were 
administering best practices for learning, understanding, possessed a safety culture, and 
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were following regulatory mandates and associated flight recommendations.  The results 
of the pilot opinion questions provided a better understanding as to safety culture, current 
training methodologies, and learning with associated understanding.  Pilot understanding 
is a direct result of learning, and further impacts the decision to manually fly.  How 
organizations train pilots that contradict best practices of learning include:  
(1) Learning by rote memorization— Per the results, 43% of the pilots queried 
utilize rote memorization practices. 
(2) Inadequate brief times— Per the results, 62% of the pilots queried received a 
30-minutes or less debrief. 
(3) Lack of video during debrief— Per the results, 85% of the pilots queried were 
not recorded on a video.  
(4) Inadequate training materials— Per the results, 80% of the pilots queried 
utilized supplemental material (not provide by the company) with 50% stating 
this self-gathered material was necessary.  
Approved training programs that may be inadequate, non-compliant, or 
recommendations not followed by operators that could be influencing training and 
understanding include:  
(1) Inadequate assessment measures.  Per the results, 39% of the pilots queried 
received only an electronic or written assessment.  
(2) Lack of crew compliment.  Per the results, 50% of the pilots queried did not 
have the correct crew compliment during training.   
(3) Lack of a standard taxonomy for manual flight.  Per the results, the pilots 
disagreed as to the meaning of manual flight with 15% of the pilots queried 
believing it was only the autopilot disconnected, 49% of the pilots queried 
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believed both the autopilot and autothrust must be disengaged, and 36% of the 
pilots queried believed that in addition to autopilot and autothrust being 
disconnected, that the manual flight also meant no use of the fight director.   
(4) Lack of flight line teaching without both the autopilot and autothrust.  Per the 
results in the non-SEM questions, 32% of the instructors did not request the 
pilot to disengage the automation during training, and the SEM results 
identified 45% of the instructors did not encourage the pilots to disengage the 
automation.  
Safety culture is the essence of the corporation’s culture and includes behaviors, 
values, beliefs, and how the organization does business relative to safety and associated 
processes, to include communication, reporting, flexibility, information sharing, and 
improvement strategies.  Safety culture has greatest influence over the ultimate impact on 
pilots’ decision to manually fly the aircraft.  Results indicate that all areas of safety 
culture could be improved upon, to include: 
(1) Reporting Culture: How likely are you to critique and report any aspect of 
your employer’s training program if you perceive it as substandard?  Per the 
results, 34% of the pilots queried were unsure or would not critique the 
training program.  
(2) Informed Culture: How likely is it that your employer’s leadership team in 
pilot training, involved in program development, has knowledge of how 
humans learn and is aware of technology to improve learning?  Per the results, 
41% of the pilots queried were unsure or believed that management involved 
in training did not have expertise.  
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(3) Learning Culture: How likely is it that employee suggestions are taken into 
consideration by your employer?  Per the results, 54% of the pilots queried 
were unsure or believed they would not be taken into consideration.  
(4) Just Culture: How likely are you to agree with the following statement—the 
best way to have a successful career as a pilot is to keep quiet and not make 
waves?  Per the results, 54% of the pilots queried were unsure or believed it 
was best to keep quiet.  
(5) Flexible Culture: How likely is it that your employer will exceed minimum 
regulatory compliance? Per the results, 46% of the pilots queried were unsure 
or believed their employer would not exceed regulatory compliance.  
The greatest issues with pilot training were the lack of repetition, where 39% of 
the pilots queried did not repeat event sets in direct opposition to learning.  Rote 
memorization was another highlight issue where pilots utilized rote memorization in the 
systems training and simulator training at a rate of 69% and 57%, respectively, in direct 
opposition to understanding.  Feedback was positive in that 74% of the pilots assessed 
received feedback. 
Aviation passion was assessed, and while the results identified a group that was 
overall passionate, viewing from a dispassionate perspective, 38% do not socialize with 
other aviators, 28% do not read aviation books or other aviation reading material, and 
32% do not purchase aviation themed products.  While 65% do not attend aviation 
events, 37% of the pilots were flying over 700 hours annually which could indicate a time 
issue for such events, and expense could be a factor as well.  Yet, 19% do not feel proud 
to be a pilot.  
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Recommendations 
The recommendations fall within three areas: future research, operational 
practice, and regulatory reform.  Operational suggestions are expanded into two 
categories—pilot training and resultant understanding, and safety culture, the most 
significant factors impacting how pilots operate their aircraft.  Recommendations for 
future research also include the potential of repeating this study, but with specific 
operators and countries while controlling for confounding variables.  
Future research.  The purpose of this research was to examine the relationships 
among training methodologies, pilots’ aircraft understanding, safety culture, aviation 
passion, and manual flight, to address industry concerns of automation dependence, 
confusion, lack of mode awareness, and flight skill loss.  The strongest predictors of 
automation usage were identified to be safety culture, pilot training, and understanding 
and therefore could be utilized for empirical research.  Recommendations include:  
1. A number of moderation hypotheses could be further evaluated with the data 
collected from this research to determine how moderators may influence the 
results.  Moderators being supplemental training materials, type of ground 
school, type of systems assessment, the company’s recurrent training 
schedule, average debriefing time, how the pilot studied to pass an oral, AQP, 
crew compliment during training with carriers that were AQP, training 
experience (previous instructor or check airman), and type of primary flight 
training.  Understanding how all factors influence or moderate the results 
could provide more insight to an industry problem.  Organizations interested 
in utilizing the MFI inventory could also modify the inventory in the 
following areas: (a) replace the pilot understanding factor questions with a 
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systems review to accurately assess the level of understanding; (b) replace the 
safety culture factor with results from safety culture surveys specific to the 
organization, and (c) FOQA data could identify automation usage.   
2. Experiments could be conducted to: (a) assess the efficacy of an electronic 
exam as compared to an oral exam to assess the pilot’s level of understanding 
(FAA, 2017a); (b) perform an in-house analysis with testing between groups 
to identify the most efficient and effective means of learning with simulators 
on motion versus non-motion (Petitt, 2014); (c) assess a three-hour simulator 
sessions versus four (Mavin & Roth, 2014b); (d) assess the efficacy of video 
debriefs (Mavin & Roth, 2014b); and (e) determine the benefit of a virtual 
classroom versus self-taught process to improve the level of understanding 
(Walcott, & Phillips, 2013).  
3. Further research should be conducted with a longitudinal study of aviation 
passion to determine if passion changes over time.  However, results of this 
study could identify an association with age, type of flying, gender, or hours 
flown annually or total, or safety culture with negative or positive passion.    
Operational practice.  Improvement should include addressing pilot training and 
safety culture, as both are directly impacting operational practices and would be 
contingent upon results as to the research suggested.  
Recommendations to improve training.  Pilot training could be improved by 
employing SMEs who understand how people learn to develop training programs and 
redesign the training process based upon learning principles, as results identified that 
41% of the crews queried believed those designing programs did not have experience to 
do so.  Applying SMS to the training programs to incorporate risk mitigation and 
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proactive safety measures could also ensure pilots are trained to the level of 
understanding to operate the aircraft in a safe and efficient manner.  Dependent upon the 
results of associated research, the following improvements to training practices could be 
realized: (a) Restructure current training practices to include principles as to how pilots 
learn through repetition, feedback, and understanding; (b) Consider a virtual classroom 
with subject matter experts to ensure understanding versus rote memorization; (c) Follow 
FAA and ICAO mandates to ensure crew compliment for all AQP operators; (d) Reduce 
the training scenarios to three hours.  The four-hour session was a carryover prior to AQP 
train as a crew and will allow for additional sessions to increase repetition; and (e) ensure 
instructors are trained how to assess and evaluate to include the elements of how to 
provide feedback to improve understanding and associated learning.  
Recommendations to improve safety culture.  Organizations worldwide are 
participating in SMS and U.S. airlines are mandated to have an SMS program.  However, 
without a safety culture as the foundation, SMS will be ineffective.  Safety culture has 
been identified to significantly influence training and performance, and therefore has a 
direct relationship to the safe operation.  Recommendations to improve safety culture 
based upon the results identified include: (a) Assess the culture of the organization and 
based upon results, consider employing an outside organization to assist in a cultural 
shift, (b) Remove management who oppose a safety culture.  As Collins (2001) 
purports—who first, then what.  A shift in culture does not have to be a lengthy process if 
affirmative action prevails by removing the players that participate in a negative culture.  
Leaving such players in place and attempting to change the culture will fall flat, as the 
employees will not believe in the change. 
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Regulatory compliance.  Results identify that organizations do not have a safety 
culture to support SMS mandates, therefore, SMS will not be effective and will continue 
to influence operational safety.  In that this research identified safety culture as an issue 
impacting training, understanding, and how pilots manually fly, and results identified a 
lack of a positive safety culture, safety culture issues that should be addressed include: (a) 
An informed culture should dictate a worldwide taxonomy for manual flight, and 
operators should inform and educate employees as to the type of required training and 
required operating practices.  The only way employees can accurately assess and critique 
their training programs is by having knowledge of what is required, and 36% have no 
knowledge of training requirements, and; (b) In that a negative safety culture with 
worldwide operators has been identified, modifications to the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR21) should be considered.  A 
punitive approach toward offenders who violate a just and reporting culture required by 
SMS would send the message to operators worldwide that retaliation is not accepted 
when an employee reports an unsafe act.  Until organizations feel the financial impact 
and negative publicity of their actions counterproductive to safety, safety culture will 
continue to be a problem, SMS will fail, and the negative influence on pilot training and 
operational practices will continue.   
The Office of the Inspector General identified that pilots’ lacked flight skills and 
exhibited problems monitoring their instruments, and incidents and safety reports have 
further identified confusion, lack of understanding, and mode awareness issues 
contributing to accidents and incidents worldwide.  The researcher hypothesized that 
pilots were not to blame, but a larger system with underlying variables could be 
attributing factors.  The Manual Flight Inventory (MFI) survey was developed to better 
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understand the relationships of safety culture, pilot training, understanding, and aviation 
passion on automation usage to assist an industry that may be better equipped to both 
comprehend and solve the problem, in addition to providing a theoretical contribution, 
adding to the body of knowledge.  The questions have been answered by statistical 
analysis, now it is up to the operators and regulators to utilize this information to improve 
safety.   
Despite training practices, culture, or events beyond the pilot’s control, at the end 
of the day pilots hold the responsibility of professionalism.  While this research identified 
areas of concern at the hand of management who are ultimately influencing aviation 
safety, a comment made by Captain Nathan Koch in his recollection of a presentation 
sums up the pilot’s responsibility:  
A message I received from listening to Dr. Tony Kern speak, and is emphasized 
in his books, is one that I live by—Don’t worry about what your company might 
be pushing or the fact that you can get away with less than 100% effort much of 
the time.  You owe it to yourself to always do your best, because today could be 
the day that you need to fly to the limit of your ability.  (Captain Nathan Koch, 
Qanatas, 2018) 
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to operational success 
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result in an operational 
hazard.  Confidence in 
a pilot’s performance 
with manual flight 
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will determine 
automation usage.  
Confidence 
development is 
discussed.  
Unconsciously 
incompetent is 
addressed.   
Performance associated 
with confidence has 
been identified; 
however, due to current 
training methodologies, 
pilots may be left short 
in confidence in their 
performance, therefore 
fearful to disconnect the 
automation.  Pilots 
should be provided the 
ability to demonstrate to 
themselves they can 
perform.  Lack of 
systems and aircraft 
understanding may also 
be hidden due to a 
perception of confidence 
they understand.  
However, a person 
doesn’t know what they 
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Understandin
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Lack of aircraft 
understanding 
continues to be an 
industry issue.  
Distractions of 
NextGen and the 
associated learning 
curve may further 
increase confusion.  
Two types of confusion 
are identified, and 
errors based on lack of 
understanding the 
experience are 
increasing, as multiple 
characteristics of 
confusion addressed.  
Inadequate training led 
to 19 accidents.  
System complexity, 
interface design, and 
substandard training 
lead to lack of 
understanding.  Lack of 
understanding leads to 
poor SA.  
Despite research that 
identifies lack of 
understanding to be 
directly connected to 
performance and 
improved situation 
awareness, and 
confusion is directly 
connected to airline 
accidents, training 
methodologies have not 
addressed improved 
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Training  Research and accident 
investigations 
attributed automation-
related pilot errors, in 
part, have been due to 
inadequate training.  
Sub-optimal training as 
one of the two most 
significant flight 
hazards.  Reducing 
overload and 
restructuring 
information could 
improve learning and 
performance.  
Performance requires 
repetition.  
A preponderance of 
information to improve 
training has been 
presented.  However, 
there is no regulatory 
requirement for airlines 
or aircraft operators to 
heed these lessons.  
Investigation into safety 
culture and SMS that 
could be applied to the 
training department for 
proactive risk mitigation 
to avoid pilot error.   
Adamski & 
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FAA (2017a); 
Helmreich et al. 
(1999); Knowles 
et al. (2011); 
Vidulich et al. 
(2010); Wise 
(2011).  
AQP 
 
AQP, a train to 
proficiency program 
that mandates inclusion 
of CRM, LOFT, and 
line operational 
evaluation (LOE) 
scenarios enables 
airlines to reduce 
operating costs and 
train to proficiency.  
Under AQP, pilots are 
allowed to train 
themselves at home, 
and associated 
problems are identified.  
AQP is required to 
have assessment 
measures for both the 
instructors and pilots to 
determine success. 
 
AQP success and 
assessment should be 
directly associated to 
industry accidents, 
incidents, and ASRS 
reports.  Whereas 
performance is a result 
of current training, the 
culture of the operator 
and SMS with proactive 
risk mitigation could be 
reviewed and AQP 
revisited to redesign 
current aircraft systems 
and training 
methodologies.   
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learning, to 
include pilot 
debrief, 
cognition, 
feedback, 
self-
assessment, 
and training 
assessment.  
Discussion on how 
learning occurs, to 
include cognition, 
aptitude, repetition, 
feedback, and 
confidence.  Adult 
learning theories, 
cognitive load theory, 
and associated training 
program 
methodologies.  
Effective learning 
strategies to include the 
importance of the 
debrief, self-
assessment, and the 
connection between 
training and 
assessment.  AQP 
guidelines to include 
assessment strategies.  
There exists a great deal 
of research as to how 
people learn.  However, 
learning concepts have 
not been utilized to 
develop pilot training 
programs, and training 
management and 
program developers are 
not required to have a 
learning theory 
background.  While 
assessment measures 
have been a struggle to 
assess AQP success, 
there is no evaluation on 
pilots’ level of 
understanding versus 
rote memorization of 
facts.  ASRS reports are 
indicative of training 
issues, yet proactive risk 
mitigation strategies to 
improve training 
appears to elude 
regulations.  
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Safety Culture  Discussion on safety 
culture and five sub 
cultures—reporting, 
just, flexible, informed, 
and learning.  
Corporate culture 
therefore extends to 
performance in that 
how the airline culture 
behaves and transcends 
to employee 
performance standards.  
Discussion on the 
history of CRM, AQP, 
threat and error 
management (TEM), 
and LOSA, in relation 
to SMS and proactive 
risk mitigation.  
The FAA mandated 
airlines develop an SMS 
as of 2018.  However, 
despite the mandate, 
airline training 
departments may not be 
applying proactive risk 
mitigation strategies 
associated with SMS.       
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Aviation 
Passion 
Discussion includes 
types of passion to 
include harmonious 
and obsessive passion 
and association with 
work engagement and 
job performance.  
Research is missing to 
assess the impact of 
aviation passion on pilot 
performance, or whether 
passion is connected to 
manual flight 
tendencies.  
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Automation Comments 
 
Flying fully automated with no previous years of lots of manual flying can be a big 
threat. 
 
 Automation is safer that manual flight 
 
I take it to heart being part of the generation of flying with no autopilot, here in Asia 
its an exponential on-growing trend of over relying on automation, as if flying 
manual is dangerous, but of course to the industry is easy and cost beneficial to 
teach how to press buttons than to develop aviating skills. A real shame. 
 
 
I can relate to every question. Automation dependency poses a major problem 
nowadays. How many of us can fly a straight and level unaccelerated flight without 
AP, AT , and FDs?? In my company very few fly without FDs, since it's a trigger on 
OFDM when you turn them off. However some procedures require them to be 
turned off/ recycled, such as no precision or circling. Also very few pilots ( there are 
over 4000 pilots in my company) do visual approaches, only because they are not 
sure how to execute them properly. Company's mantra has scared them and thus 
they lost their confidence. If you have any questions I'll be glad to help you anyway 
I can. Looking forward to seeing the final paper! 
 
 
I just completed the survey and find it very interesting. I would say automation 
dependency is becoming prevalent, and there will be a generation of pilots who do 
not know the pitch thrust relationship for their aircraft. One specific example comes 
to mind, while flying as a captain on the E175 at [Blank], I first placed my hand in 
front of the N1 guages at cruise, then asked the FO what he thought it should be 
roughly. He answered honestly saying he had no idea, but then I told him to take a 
guess, he said maybe 65%. We were closer to 87%, and I was hoping he’d say 85-
90%, so I told him it was higher, then uncovered the gauges. It really drove the point 
home, and he acknowledged that he should have a better idea. I should add at 
[Blank] now there is very much a culture of leave everything on- even though the 
book allows for disconnecting everything to stay proficient.  
 
When I have hand flown, or offered to let the FO hand fly, on a VFR day in a low 
workload environment, they seem timid at first. Which brings me to another story, I 
flew with a different FO from my first story, and he was surprised that I wanted to 
let him turn everything off (AT, AP, FD). At first I gave him guidance on what to 
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do, but as he flew, he got more proficient and realized how his skills needed to be 
used so that he would not regress. During upgrade training, I made the suggestion 
that there should be more emphasis on the pitch + power/thrust relationship, as a 
few months prior a crew disengaged the AT in a descent, but did not bring thrust 
back up. They got the shaker over Santa Monica coming into LAX. I am glad they 
recovered, but I feel if they were prepared to set a N1 for the desired airspeed, it 
would have been a much better outcome.  
 
Given recent accidents like Asiana in SFO, or Emirates in DXB emphasizes the 
importance of not only monitoring, but making adjustments if the automation is not 
doing what it should, or what the pilots want. Interestingly the children of the 
magenta uses the phrase click, click (AP)...click, click (AT) to describe this. If the 
automation does not give the desired reaction, pilots can still manipulate the controls 
to do so which is our job at the end of the day. 
 
I hear and read that many Companies in the World require and mandate full 
automation during the whole flight...what I think of it is that it is counterproductive 
to safety! I agree that the autopilot flies better than a human, but it flies only what 
the human tells it to fly!  
Automation can be an improvement to safety. But at the end of the day, we still need 
pilots with a high level of flying skills and the ability to recognize when automation 
is being helpful, and when it becomes a distraction and a threat.  
After a 30 yr. career I have observed hand flying skills deteriorate quite a bit with 
my first officers. However, They do an excellent job with the automation.   
 
In [Blank] they were pro automated flights, which I think it´s great when you have 
your manual flying background experience: that experience that takes you to 
disconnect and fly manually, with confidence, when the airplane is not doing what 
you want. And works great in airports with high density traffic. But, on the other 
hand, you feel you gradually lose your manual flight skills. 
•  
 
As well.... the Boeing 777 autothrottle remains connected all the time. We are 
encouraged and do fly "manually" below 10000 feet, with the autopilot off. Some 
questions may give the impression that we do not do any "manual" flying because 
we always have the autothrottle connected. 
 
We are not allowed to disengage the autothrust at any time, no matter the 
circumstances. A few years ago we lost the autothrust inflight on the A330 and even 
though it was a non-event, we had to file a safety report with the company. Yup, 
that's how bad it gets here. The flight directors have to stay on at all times as well. 
It's unfortunate but they do not trust us at all at this carrier. If there's anything more 
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you would like to know please let me know. It might be a few days but I will get 
back to you. 
 
Manual Flight 
 
Done! Very good survey, i was glad to participate... i would fly more manually 
without the auto thrust if my company allowed it... shame! 
 
 
I had great confidence in my first officer’s performance and he opted to manually 
fly the full arrival into Seattle. With vectors, altitude and speed constraints, and 
requirement to slow to 180 knots where L/D [Lift over drag] requires speed brakes 
to descend on profile [B777].  I have never been so busy keeping up with him. If the 
plane had crashed I would have been two miles behind the accident. 
 
The aircraft I fly has AP and AT and it’s definitely a mood or fatigue feeling 
regarding the disengagement of them individually or all off, and since we get 
worked like ragged dogs the automation is used a lot....not ALL the time but a lot. 
I’ve found nearly everyone with the automation disengaged keeps the flight director 
on at all times as it still provides a relevant source of direction, turn source, etc. 
Another factor in disengagement of the automation depends on the environment 
flown into - not just weather specific but airspace/type of flying specific. I’m more 
likely going to hand fly into Jackson Hole in VMC than I would into LAX unless 
I’m behind a heavy for example. 
 
 
Important topic. We put a lot of emphasis on manual flight. Autopilot off means 
athrust off in my company. Manual flying is generally allowed, and in high regard, 
depending on the situation.   
 
However we also have a policy when to go fully automated, it goes like this: "Non-
ILS approaches are flown at the highest available level of automation until Rwy is in 
sight and identified." 
 
Result: in VMC conditions, with the runway in sight, independant of the type of 
approach, you can fly how you want (if allowed by airspace design, STAR design 
etc.): automatics on, automatics off, with or without FD if you choose automatics off 
(however AP off always means also ATHR off, these two are linked together). At 
the end, we are pilots, and we can steer an aircraft manually into the touchdown 
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zone within speed, bank, pitch and VS limits. The same applies to ILS approaches: 
you choose what you use (except in LowVis Ops, there clear rules apply). 
However, in all other approaches, without the runway in sight, we use highest avail 
level of automation: that means AP, ATHR and FD, but also highest FMA-modes of 
the autoflight system. The reason is: IMC non-precision-approaches are far more 
demanding than ILS-approaches or approaches in VMC, so we want full mental 
capacity, therefore highest available level of automation. 
 
I just took survey.  I am recently retired B767 Captain.After 30 yr career I have 
observed hand flying skills deteriorate quite a bit with my first officers. However, 
They do an excellent job with the automation.  Management doesn’t have the time 
and money to cram in anything but the bare requirements for training session. 
[Blank] is good example, plus all the YouTube videos of pilots trying to land 
airplanes during windy conditions. 
Good luck with your thesis. 
Situational Awareness  
 
If someone doesn't have manual flight routine that drags with it that there is no 
situational awareness...with serious system failure onboard the a/c there will be no 
automation and with a pilot with no manual flying routine there will be no 
situational awareness and a huge amount of stress!  
 
auto safer than manual: I believe, that using automation correctly does help with 
situational awareness (see later answers), especially in high density areas (think JFK 
or ORD). But there are times when manual flight is safer, e.g. quickness of 
response, technical issues.  
 
Automation Policy 
I worked at (blank) before, which has one of the strictest policies regarding manual 
flight. Raw data (flight directors off) was banned as of last year, and manual flight is 
banned in most busy airports, as the "airport briefings" the company publishes state 
"Mandatory use of AP". Manual flight is also banned from most smaller airports, 
again the "airport briefings" state "Mandatory use of AP due to possible VFR 
traffic". Which leaves very little room for hand-flying the aircraft legally. I would 
say less than 5% of (blank) pilots would regularly or even occasionally hand-fly the 
aircraft above 1000 ft. 
Our company policy is AP can be disconnected bellow 10000 ft, but FD and AT 
shall be ON except in case of non-normal or MELs. So it is “Highly unlikely” I will 
disconnect AP and AT for the arrival or the approach as it is a company policy, but I 
would like to do it! [Emphasis added] 
332 
 
 
 
I am passionate on the subject, I was a Mariner sailing on Cargo ships for 20 years 
the switched careers to a flying job, I will forward to other pilots i know and have 
completed the survey myself. W.r.t to the automation questions I did my initial 
training on the A320 with a smaller airline with a number of older trainers from 
purely civil as as defence back grounds who encouraged manual flight - however i 
am now a check pilot myself and company policies with my current employer do not 
permit manual flying above 1000 feet on routine line flights and permit on Auto 
pilot or Auto thrust disconnection not both at the same time. Most new pilots 
therefore and not habitual to include air speed in their scan 
 
 
I've completed your survey. It is an interesting topic to me because I have been 
flying at 2 different airlines where the former required as much automation as 
possible and the latter required te PROPER automation for the situation, where 
manual flight without AP/AT and FD is highly encouraged and flown like this I 
would say on every 5th leg. Wish you all the best! 
Our policy about flying with AP/AT is written in our OMA. It is recommended to 
use AP/AT as it lowers the workload, however we are allowed to fly manual for 
practice. It is not recommended in the TMA, but in the final stage I encourage it as 
much as practicable. 
My company prefers to use automation to the extreme, and they do the training to 
the extreme usage of SOP! NO manual FLIGHT! I was lucky to fly manually years 
ago when there was no EICAS/EFIS 
I have been flying at 2 different airlines where the former required as much 
automation as possible and the latter required the PROPER automation for the 
situation, where manual flight without AP/AT and FD is highly encouraged and 
flown like this I would say on every 5th leg. 
Our ops manual requires the highest level of automation at all times so we are not 
allowed to turn off the autothrust and/or flight directors at any time. We are 
however, allowed to hand fly the airplane below 10,000 ft. I personally try to do that 
as much as possible, but I have flown with numerous pilots who turn on the autopilot 
as soon as the gear is up and disconnect only around 400-500 ft on final.  
[Emphasis added]. 
I fly the 737 in a company where manual flying is accepted but I can see the 
tendency of forcing pilots to be less and less "pilots" of the airframe more than 
vectors of accomplishing the daily duty quite obvious. I hear some companies in 
Europe now force pilot to use LNAV/VNAV for visual approach as mandatory, or 
Asiatic companies even force the use of AP and AT down to minimum or the 
aircraft manual minimum, which I find compelling. 
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My current airline inherits a much more pragmatic Schandinavian culture, has more 
relaxed SOP’s and strongly encourages manual flight, including raw data hand-
flying 
Around 90% of my colleagues hand-fly the departure to around 10,000 feet and 
disconnect on base leg during the approach. About 20 to 30% of hand-flown 
departures and approaches are flown with Flight Directors off. 
The aircraft I fly (Airbus A320 Family) or the Company's automation policy 
prevents me from disconnecting everything on routine flights. AutoThrust remains 
the engaged in all phases of flight from thrust reduction altitude till the flare, when 
the thrust levers are retarded for all normal flights. The only exception being in case 
of a failure.  
My present company mandates the use of ALL automation from 10000ft-10000ft. 
Below that ONLY the Autopilot may be disengaged, but FDs & A/THR need to be 
engaged. My previous company which got me my initial experience on the A320, 
did however have flexibility in these areas & I was lucky enough to benefit from 
flying without AP/FD & A/THR on regular line flights occasionally to practice & 
keep my skills sharp. The present day scenario however has scores of pilots from 
varying backgrounds & experience and it is therefore no wonder the company 
mandates the use of automation. [Emphasis Added]. 
 
When asked about written company policies "requiring" automation, I answered 
"yes". To be more specific, our company has a written policy requiring the use of 
automation during RNAV departures, but encourages "hand-flying" when conditions 
permit, so there was no absolutely correct answer. My personal thought about the 
use of "partial" automation is as follows; during a hand flown approach, 
autothrottles should be disconnected when the autopilot is disconnected. The reason 
I feel this way is that any pitch change made by the pilot during the approach causes 
a change in airspeed. Autothrottles will respond in order to maintain the selected 
speed. As the throttles move, the pilot will then need to re-adjust his pitch, which 
will cause a corresponding change with the thrust setting, which will then require... 
You can see the cycle that begins to happen. If you have any questions, or if there is 
any way I may offer any help, please let me know. 
 
"highest available level" was consciously worded like this, meaning not to exclude 
any approach or airport option due to a technical issue. You can still fly non-
precision-approaches in IMC with ATHR defect, because you are still "highest 
available". 
 
From experience, this policy gives plenty of opportunity to practice manual skills, 
while making a clear statement under which circumstances highest support of 
automation must be used. 
 
334 
 
Just two sentences define all you need: 1. manual flight (with or without FD) equals 
manual thrust 2. Non-ILS approaches are flown at the highest available level of 
automation until Rwy is in sight and identified. 
 
I feel this policy [combined with the principle that manual flight (with or without 
FD) also means manual thrust] is the clearest, most sensible and most practical way 
of a sensible usage of automation while keeping crews skilled AND comfortable in 
manual flight. It should be adopted by more airlines in my opinion. 
 
I did your survey for you. Just to add some extra it might be worth noting that like 
you I fly the B777 and our company and I believe BOEING mandate the use of the 
autothrottle at all times. We can hand fly the jet at sensible times but not with out 
the auto throttle. I hope that helps in the way I may have have answered some of 
your questions. 
I did the Survey and I would like to add some things to it...I hear and read that many 
Companies in the World require and mandate full automation during the whole 
flight...what I think of it is that it is contraproductive to safety! I agree that the 
autopilot flies better than a human but it flies only what the human tells it to fly! I 
am very lucky that I still fly and work in the Company that doesn't forbid manual 
flying...should any problem occur to a pilot who flies only with automation, she/he 
in that crucial moment doesn't have necessary confidence to do and to finish the 
things routinely with her/his own hands! That's tha fact!!! I know since I have seen 
the things! Manual flying should be encouraged in certain percentage in 30 days or 
so! 
Automation Unwritten Policy 
Where discussing auto flight v. Manual flight your survey touches on corporate 
requirements/policy. My airline for example has conflicting policies on this.  It 
states in on part of our FCOM that we are to use automation as much as possible, 
later on in the same manual and in the SOP it states that pilots will maintain hand 
flying skills.  It does not give guidelines as to when or how this is to be 
accomplished.  
I recently finished a captain checkout on the B777 with 25-yrs previous flying 
Captain on the 74.  During training the instructors said to never disengage the 
autothrust. But the then (blank) put out a training video recommending that the 
pilots should disengage the autothrust and the importance of doing so, telling pilots 
to memorize power settings in order to fly etc. (In my opinion wrong… a pilot needs 
to know how to manage the aircraft.)  During line ops I was told that we never 
disengage the autothrust on this aircraft.  The company manuals and training state 
one thing for FAA approval, but the company doesn’t follow their own rules. That’s 
how they roll. I think the FAA knows and doesn’t care. The fox is guarding the 
henhouse sort of thing.   
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Pilot Flying Overloads the PF 
I recently started flying long haul with pilots that are about to retire and they just 
don't want any sort of trouble. In 9 months flying the 787 only last Monday I got to 
fly with a Captain that allowed me to disconnect both the AP and AT above 10.000. 
Many times I've been told "this aircraft is not designed to be hand flown". I would 
hand fly every approach in VMC with the AP and AT off, however I usually fly 
with this sort of Captains. 
I found some questions I couldn't really answer the way I should. For example, 
about automation my actual company discourages to disengage but for me is not a 
problem because on the contrary in the previous company when proper conditions 
the company could encourage to disconnect. But honestly the local pilots of my 
actual company are mostly really bad pilots so I understand. In my last simulator the 
captain was not even able to land twice flying a circling approach [Emphasis 
Added]... Cheers 
Training  
“Unfortunately, today's training environment is too centered (in my opinion) on 
automation and discourages us from thinking like aviators,” 
Automation really is changing how we do things and how we are taught to do things 
in new airplanes. Unfortunately, I feel that the school houses aren’t doing a very 
good job. Been getting a lot of, “The manufacturer wanted us to tell you this, but we 
can’t explain why or how.” Last two initials I went through, I barely felt like I 
understood anything about how the aircraft functions systems wise. 
A few of my responses may have been skewed by the fact that questions regarding 
initial training on my current aircraft (B747-400/-8) did not occur at my current 
company (my 3rd airline on the same aircraft type), but I came up with the best 
answers I could for your research. Good luck with your doctoral program. 
Type of Ground School  
I answered combination because I was self-taught using a flash drive and then went 
to classroom where they gave the foot stomper questions that would be on the test so 
we could pass. The second part wasn’t teaching more giving the answers. 
I had to learn on my own and nobody to ask questions. We don’t have real manuals 
anymore, but all are on a computer. Not sure if I really know what I know, but then 
it doesn’t seem anyone cares anyway.  
I had to google the cockpit of my plane because the company flash drive manual 
was in black n white and aircraft symbols mean different things depending on their 
color. Never have I seen training so bad in all my years of airline flying. Scary 
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where the kids will be who don’t have experience to fall back on to help understand 
systems and operations.   
Oral Examination 
Systems was a “memorize the book take a computer test and regurgitate 
information” and then the oral was on limitations, also memorized for that event. 
Nobody really asked me anything to see if I understood the aircraft or how it 
operated. 
In (Blank) there is no “oral” as part of a proficiency check. Depending on the 
operator, there may be a few questions prior to the ride, but usually it’s just discuss 
the profile and then get in the sim and go do it. 
The US system of oral examination and on understanding systems seems appealing, 
but perhaps Airbus don’t design their aircraft to be understood in quite such that 
manner. I don’t perhaps Airbus don’t design their aircraft to be understood in quite 
such that manner.  I don’t know, I’m a Boeing driver. I do feel very strongly that 
robust initial training which sets high standards, combined with robust but people 
based checking and training is the way to build a professional pilot. I remember my 
most challenging and educational training moment was in the States during initial 
training. An oral exam that lasted between 4-6 hours on the PA28. Not anyone.  
Company culture and welfare toward pilots are more important. Manual flight is a 
basic concept but automation is kind of trend! Especially long distance flight and 
automation is kind of trend! Especially long distance flight and auto flight are well 
connected all the time.  After all the that’s why we need simulator training twice a 
year.  
Debrief 
I had to select the option “less than 15 minutes”, but the truth is we never had a 
debrief during my entire initial training. Granted it was late at night and the 
instructor wanted to get home, but training was a firehose event and by the next day 
I forgot what we did the night before. I really depend on debriefs so I can take notes 
and review for the next day and when I get to the line. 
Automaticity 
In regard to systems knowledge, I think the pendulum has swung to rote and saying 
what the switch does but that’s not to say I need to know how many holes are drilled 
around the edge of the static port. The studying was pretty easy since we had a study 
guide and the instructors could only ask questions out of the systems bank. But the 
toughest part of all this is finding experienced people who can help because a third 
of (blank) pilots are new hire FO’s. We’ll figure it out one way or another! 
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Importance of Manual flight.  
I’m a Flight Instructor on the A320 and believe manual flight is a lost art. I get 
crews to practice as often as the weather allows. Either manual thrust or Auto pilot 
off F/D off and when comfortable all three. Ground courses are too short, SIM’s are 
tick the box regulatory exercises and don’t give the crew time to practice, practice 
practice. I believe over learning is the key, I’d like to say that’s my idea, but I can’t. 
 
Another sad thing is I sometime feel like I am the "alien" and no one else see the 
pattern. Maybe it show my age lol. Anyhow I will share it for sure. Keep up the 
good work 
 
•  I have been reading the survey, and at this moment I have just finished training in a 
local low cost airline in [Blank], to fly B738s. I am starting my flight training this 
coming Friday. So far, I´ve only been doing observation flights. So, I think I could 
best answer the survey next week when I have already started flying. What do you 
think? This is a big difference: flying for [Blank] on Airbus a320s, where they like 
the flights to be flown almost fully automated, to flying in Argentina B738s with a 
mentality of favoring manual flying. What a difference! I guess it has to do with a 
latin macho mentality of "I can perfectly fly this airplane manually", which I´ve 
seen from the flight inspector in my simulator check ride and I could sense in the 
atmosphere from my colleges. 
 
Manual Flight 
Most pilots at my company will elect to turn the autopilot off once within 1000-500' 
of the runway in visual conditions. I almost always have it off by the 1000' callout. 
Auto throttles are usually left on until 30' with most pilots. I've only ever seen 1 or 2 
pilots do a visual approach with no AP, no AT and no FD at my airline. It's 
extremely frowned upon at our company especially since the level of experience is 
starting to get lower and lower with the pilot shortage.  
Unfortunately, it's also a double edged sword isn't it? It keeps pilots within a safety 
margin in day to day dealings however whenever a failure occurs it's twice as 
dangerous as it could potentially be because many pilots have no experience flying 
an approach in a jet without any automation...!  
As per the company, any & all "Raw-Data" flying is supposed to be done during the 
simulator sessions. Airbus as a manufacturer in a way also prefers that it be flown 
using all the automation available...but that is not to detract from the fact that if 
something ain't right, you take over! One of the "Airbus Golden Rules"! 
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(Blank and blank), two airlines that have a clear policy against the regular 
practice of manual flight, have both come very close to crashes due to loss of control 
in flight (failing to understand what the automation was doing, or failing to 
manually recover the aircraft from an undesired state). 
We are restricted from disconnecting AT during all phases of Flight unless 
dictated by the QRH during non-normal situations. We are also required to engage 
auto Flight during RNAV sids that require accurate lateral navigation, especially in 
Europe. There was no restrictions on the 737 and 767 and for that matter the 777 
(autothrottles were recommended) The 787 sop’s require AT always and Auto pilot 
recommendations.  
Manual Flight and Aircraft Differences 
 
Manual Flight: for me, the least I have to do is disengage the autopilot. From there 
on I fly the aircraft manually (at least as far as this is possible on the Airbusses ;-) I 
might disengage the autothrust, as well, but the boundary between auto flight and 
manual flight lies with the use of the autopilot.  
 
Airbus aircraft can't land with auto-thrust on. At 20 feet (manual landing), the 
aircraft will order "Retard! Retard!" so the pilot will close the thrust levers, thereby 
disengaging the auto-thrust.  
Flying Airbus, rarely did we disconnect A/T during an approach, whereas Boeing 
encourages manual flight. So, I would have answered very differently had I still 
been flying Airbus.  
A couple things that are unique to the Eclipse 550 (Airplane I am currently flying) 
that are unusual and possibly unique to the airplane. The autothrottles automatically 
kick off when the landing gear is lowered. The software was designed that way 
because they wanted the pilot "in the loop" closer to the ground.  
Pilot Understanding 
A working knowledge of airplane systems is an important part of training, 
however, you will agree with me that “trouble shooting outside the scope of the 
problem at hand” is NOT recommended when an issue arises on board.  
Pilots are trained and expected to FOLLOW published procedures as contained in 
the QRH or on the ECL (Electronic Checklists) as displayed on EICAS. To know 
what to do if there was no EICAS or CHECKLIST would be a BIG problem in 
today’s airplanes 
This reliance [or overreliance] on automation seems to have made pilots 
complacent in their monitoring duties, in some cases, not understanding or 
comprehending what IS actually happening and the expected results. 
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Automation really is changing how we do things and how we are taught to do things 
in new airplanes. Unfortunately, I feel that the school houses aren't doing a very good 
job. Been getting a lot of, "The manufacturer wanted us to tell you this but we can't 
explain why or how." Last two initials I went through, I barely felt like I understood 
anything about how the aircraft functions systems wise. I believe there will be a 
generation of pilots that will understand nothing about how their aircraft truly work 
and I believe this will lead to a loss of life. The final report, as you've said, will blame 
the pilot. 
 
Safety is a great subject and a not negotiable element in aviation. I have a very 
interesting incident that happened to me in London on …. and the lack of 
understanding of safety by certain airlines is just mind boggling to say the least ! 
Should you want to know more you welcome to make contact with me. 
I frequently observe the absolutely worst scenario: use of automation by pilots 
who don't possess full understanding of the FMS/FMA/AT relationship. To 
exacerbate the problem, verbal FMA annunciations are not required by our manuals, 
so errors are plentiful. It saddens to see how young men and women who were flight 
instructors in their recent past become willing slaves to the flight director and forget 
all about primary instrumentation scan! It scares me when I think of those pilots 
being forced to execute a manual go-around in IMC and/or at night, immediately 
envisioning recent horrific accidents in my native Russia and other parts of the 
world that were caused by the somatogravic illusion, illusions in particular and by 
degradation of instrument scanning skills in general. 
The problem arises when folks don't understand the automation & what level of 
automation to use at which stage of flight. Boeings have been far more conventional 
in their approach to ergonomics & the "Man-Machine" interface...where the bond is 
a lot stronger! I feel that I'm still a rookie in this aircraft, having flying the Baby 
'Bus for a little over 10 years, as it still foxes me into saying, "Oh shit! What 
now???” 
The US and EU methods of training, the US system of oral examination and on 
understanding systems seems appealing, but perhaps Airbus don't design their 
aircraft to be understood in quite such that manner. I don't know, I'm a Boeing 
driver. I do feel very strongly that robust initial training which sets high standards, 
combined with robust but people based checking and training is the way to build a 
professional pilot. I'm always sceptical of what I term 'missionary pilots' who have a 
mentality that is just that bit too keen. I remember my most challenging and 
educational training moment was in the States during initial training. An oral exam 
that lasted between 4-6 hours on the pa28. 4 hour sim slots and a technical exam are 
not of the same robustness but there has to be an atmosphere and support which aids 
that system 
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The main problem in commercial Aviation is the lack of skill and training in manual 
flight and when to decide reversing to manual in case of not understanding 
automation or in case of emergency. with ATQP it is now possible to ask for manual 
training during Sim session . 
Pilot Training  
We seem to do type ratings in the minimum time to save costs and it’s effectively 
a box ticking exercise. We are the same re autothrottle or autothrust. Not to be ever 
taken out but we can dispatch with it u/s. We never practice it but we have to 
demonstrate our ability to fly a single engine ILS and go around every three years. 
I have  noticed a trend with new pilots. Their training is extremely basic and 
although they know the procedures well they can’t manually fly and do not 
understand the systems. I spend a lot of time teaching them how to land. They 
cannot even do it properly. Thanks to the reliability of the modern planes their lack 
of knowledge and skills is not obvious but will certainly come into consideration in 
degraded situations. Some of these young pilots are becoming captains and 
unfortunately will become the last fence in case of problem or unusual situation. I 
am not sure they have the resources to cope with that. I expect an increase in 
aviation accidents and incidents in the future due to this lack of skills. 
Required training for pilots seems to have been reduced in terms of flight time and 
with the introduction of the Multi Pilot License, (MPL), actual real world experience 
has also been cut down to simulator training time.  
 
Honestly, from what I've seen, the basics are often over looked. Once I was told that 
a plane is just a plane. I've carried that through training with several of my type 
ratings. Maintaining the basics of flying has made each type easier to handle. 
Understanding certain principals, pitch and power, descent planning, over all hand 
flying on good days, has made me exponentially better on bad days. I appreciate the 
levels of automation far more now that I use them in what I feel is a proper way. 
Some fundamentals are lost in training events, because it's assumed that you should 
have them at this level. It's not always the case and they are perishable. In extreme 
events, it could even have devastating results when pilots are assumed to be 
proficient at flying. After all, we do it day in and day out.  
Safety Culture 
 
Look into the corporate culture, run by non aviation personnel with better perks, 
which has bull dozed the airlines in the few couple of decades. Pilots r treated like 
bus drivers now. 
 
•  
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Cabin crew from far eastern countries (South Korea, China, Japan) will never 
contradict you or let you know if you are wrong, NEVER! (quite a big threat!) They 
tend to speak English not fluently and will never ask you to explain again what you 
just said and they did not understand. Their authority gradient is HUGE in their 
countries. 
 
I'm an old pilot from GA and the B727, DC9-80, MD80 ,B767 A320/330/340 with 
approximately. 25K hours on everything. What really worries me, is that you are 
encouraged NOT to fly manually, not to fly visual and that we are getting punished 
in China if doing so… I got punished with 1500 USD, for continuing under VMC 
conditions, (CAVOK), down to 500 feet AGL. Stabilized at 550 feet as required by 
Boing and Airbus, but punished as they do not allow us to fly VMC approaches as 
stated by FAA and EASA. And I took over and flew it manually. Big mistake. These 
guys will never, never be able to cope with an unusual situation, that requires 
manual flying. And most of these guys , do NOT, understand English beyond the 
very basics as required in an emergency situation. Maybe FAA and EASA should 
introduce English requirements to foreign pilots( Chinese) as the Chinese are doing 
towards US. 
Until very recently our airline used the training department (with very specific 
instructors) as a punitive medium, or cost control medium (I have been affected by 
both), so more detail into how the ACTUAL company culture affects the safe 
operation and or learning environment could be explored.  
I myself had been that "operator-pilot" when I used to fly in Russia where hand 
flying is strongly discouraged and the punitive culture of low uncertainty tolerance 
prevails. Joining (blank) was a transformative experience when I realized that 
manual flying is still a thing. 
Many pilots like to fly manually and manual flight is requested in all simulator 
training in China. The problem is the punishment culture for any deviation based in 
QAR data. So it's better to keep all automation engaged in order to reduce the risk of 
flight deviations. 
Regarding the company requirements of automation usage...my current company 
talks about using and not using it. Whereas when I worked for a company in China 
they wanted the automation on ASAP and off when landing. Different 
mindsets....also explains why some of the Asiatic countries can’t fly a visual 
approach to save their lives...literally. The other issue is that they are exposed to 
only a couple hundred hours of hand flying and then that’s it.  
A few of my colleagues at that time told me while they were CFIs in China some 
of the students would taxi out, set the parking brake, hop out and have a smoke and 
let the HOBBS meter spin never doing ANY of their solo flying. The management 
encouraged this as it kept the tach times low (!!!!!!!!). This was from multiple 
sources at different schools. Imagine seeing 2-3 planes in a run-up with props 
spinning and NOBODY in them. 
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Aviation Passion 
It amazed me how incredibly uninhibited most of my captains of previous 
generation had been when it would come to downgrading automation levels to basic 
raw data flying when either a situation dictated that or purely for enjoyment of 
flying. Eventually, I am proud to say, I have become that pilot, too. [Emphasis 
Added]. Granted those were less automated airplanes (E145 and CRJ-700) than 
A320 that I had operated overseas, with no A/T and integrated vertical navigation. 
 I do take great pride in being a pilot, but it does not define me.  
I still enjoy hand flying when I can regardless of having 26,000 + hours. 
I’ve found those that flew in Alaska in smaller airplanes, those that continue to 
fly small GA planes are more in tuned with the jet - the hand/eye coordination but 
this should come as no shocker. I’ve only met one jet pilot who owned a GA plane, 
a tail wheel nonetheless, and he was just a crappy pilot regarding landings. Go 
figure 
Automation is great: it makes us safer, and more aware, but I have so many 
thousands of hours on antiques, classic Lears, DC-9s, that I still appreciate old-
school flying. The industry, as a whole, is losing important skills. 
Overall assessment 
Fatigue and company pressure is also an extremely important part of the risk factor. 
I have also noticed a trend with new pilots. Their training is extremely basic and 
although they know the procedures well they cant manually fly and do not 
understand the systems. I spend a lot of time teaching them how to land. They can 
not even do it properly. Thanks to the reliability of the modern planes their lack of 
knowledge and skills is not obvious but will certainly come into consideration in 
degraded situations. Some of these young pilots are becoming captains and 
unfortunately will become the last fence in case of problem or unusual situation. I 
am not sure they have the resources to cope with that. I expect an increase in 
aviation accidents and incidents in the future due to this lack of skills. Thanks for 
your interest in that question. Looking forward to read about your survey and your 
thesis! Kind regards. 
 
 
Survey done. A very interesting topic - I could talk for hours about automation, the 
modern flight deck, training and engagement with the aircraft being flown. Having 
raced around with my hair on fire in Royal Air Force fast jets, flown pretty much all 
the Airbus types and now the B787-9 I hope I would not be bragging to say I've 
experienced a wide variety of flying. The biggest problem I see these days is a real 
reluctance to disengage the automatics (autopilot, autothrust and FD) due to 
company policy but primarily lack of confidence due, in my opinion, to lack of 
practice. When flying with the automatics most pilots are not fully 'engaged' with 
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what the a/c is doing but when you are hand flying it you are 'engaged' because you 
are physically 'putting the a/c where you want it'. I hear all to often these days my 
F/O say can he hand fly the aproach because he has his sim check coming up and 
wants to practice - isn't that the wrong way around??? LOL but a serious point. 
•  
• I like the questions that you asked. Hopefully it will lead to some changes in the 
training's, the procedure and the mentality. Sadly most pilots don't know how to fly 
anymore. When the WX or the traffic allowed, I often encourage my FO to 
disconnect the automation and fly the approach, almost no one do it, in the last 5 
years I think only 2 guys. People aren't comfortable. Is it because the Airbus doesn't 
feel right? Because the training we received, or the company policy, maybe a bit of 
all. One thing for sure, we got our wings clipped from the industry long time back 
and only those that do the extra mile to keep their skills at the risk sometime to be 
call in the office stay really proficient. 
•  
• I just finished the survey. There were some questions which didn’t give me the 
choice of saying that I am doing certain things because the company SOP requires 
it. For example we are not allowed to fly manually by many airlines. Also the fear 
culture in some Airlines. That means managements behavior towards pilots. Mostly 
pilots in major airlines do things or don’t do things because they don’t want to get in 
trouble with the management n called into the office. I have worked for six airlines n 
the reason of leaving was to go to an airline who respects their pilots. Most of them 
harass pilots through the flight data monitoring system. Some airlines have negative 
training through instructors who over load u with multiple failures n shouting n 
degrading in the PCs. Some make u feel absolutely inadequate through the 
company’s culture n SOPs. I can go on forever. But u r doing a good job. I will 
forward this survey to my very professional colleagues. 
•  
 
Thanks for the answer. I have been an instructor at both airlines I have worked at: 
[Blank] and [Blank].  
 
[Blank] I was a line check pilot and usually the last chance guy. [Blank] I was an 
instructor on the 744 in the sim and now on the 767 as a linecheck pilot. Both were 
appendix F training places. Being that both aren't places that pilots dreamed working 
at, I have seen a wide swath in initial qualifications as well as high turn over and a 
dilution of culturally ingrained techniques. Obviously one had schedules of high 
flight cycles and the other is extremely low cycles. I have found extremely 
surprising similar weaknesses in both types of flying. The three main weakness 
being: mode confusion, knowing when to use what level of automation, and 
recognizing red flags of task saturation in early stages.  
 
I see you flew the Classic as well. When we parked them, I was surprised how well 
people that had flown steam for 40 years tend to adapt. There were outliers, but the 
vast majority picked it up well. The odd thing I found was that on the 744, with our 
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FAR minimum training at 6 and 12 month sim visits was that the vast majority 
could fly the plane quite well when it was the silly OEI hand-flown ILS. You would 
still see pilots who flew the plane for a decade struggle with using the automation in 
normal, or slightly abnormal (leveling under 10k if a door pops) situation. 
 
 It was odd. The pilot stuff one does every six months was actually way better than 
expected. Probably a ramble, but I find this subject fascinating. I could go on for 
days. 
•  
• I filled out your survey...very interesting and I can't wait to see your results and 
conclusions. I must say, being a former Air Force (TacHel, Ab Initio Jet Instructor, 
Fighters) for 20 years and showing up in the Commercial world now for 8 yrs, I 
couldn't believe how little energies are spent for hands on flying...My 3 previous 
aircraft all had sticks, the first 2 had no automation at all, and you would only live 
for about 5 secs if you let go of the cyclic on the B212...the Hornet was pretty whiz 
bang with level3 automation. It was pretty funny and sometimes "not cool" when I 
would ask the Capt as a newbie FO if I could hand fly the APP or DEP all the 
way...it seems we have become systems managers, relying mostly on 2-3 AP to 
make us look good most of the time. When asked in the sim if there is something 
(sequences) I would like to see/do when our official script is complete, I always ask 
to fly a VFR circuit to a T&G, and time permitting a SE ILS APP manually to 200 
& 1/2...sometimes it's nice, sometimes not soo much...ha! 
•  
 
Hi. I just took your survey. I want to point out one thing that stood out to me in the 
survey. There were several questions that asked about my initial training on my 
aircraft. The answers I provided would be different if I were doing that training 
today. I initially trained on my aircraft 20 years ago and upgraded to Captain on it 
11 years ago. The training today is very different than it was back then. 
 
Anyway, I hope that helps. Thank you for tackling this issue. I think it is important 
and I'm glad you are doing it. Automation can be an improvement to safety. But at 
the end of the day, we still need pilots with a high level of flying skills and the 
ability to recognize when automation is being helpful, and when it becomes a 
distraction and a threat. Unfortunately, today's training environment is too centered 
(in my opinion) on automation and discourages us from thinking like aviators. 
 
• that’s a very nice initiative as something has definitely to be done. Companies are 
more focussed on their short term statistics and strongly discourage to disconnect 
the automation. This has a negative impact on our handling and safety as we get less 
and less practice. Hopefully the future results of your survey will be significant and 
you’ll be able to show them to the autorithies. I’ve already completed my part, all 
the best. 
•  
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In Canada, there is no “oral” as part of a proficiency check. Depending on the 
operator, there may be a few questions prior to the ride, but usually it’s just discuss 
the profile and then get in the sim and go do it. My operator’s policy is that the 
autopilot may be disengaged as the pilot wishes, however the auto thrust should 
remain engaged until 50’AGL at the latest. It was difficult for me to answer your Qs 
accurately given that. In Canada, 2 pilots can operate long legs (7-10hrs) without a 
third pilot. Usually it is a pilot agreement mandated requirement for augmented 
crews unless the flight is ultra long haul. There is an amendment of the regs in the 
works, but it is taking excruciatingly long to implement. Given the above it may be 
a challenge for non-US pilots to answer your Qs. Overall though, well done! Have 
you had a chance to review CPPC material? 
 
 
there are on our industry pilots and people who achieve to have a Licence... big 
issue is that we stop to achieve our minimum required performance. And most 
people hide behing automation and forget what is their obligations as pilots. 
Normally i ask pilots about max crosswind limitations with or without autopilot... 
curious stuff human max. Still above auto pilot... why ?! That s question. ... reply is 
very easy... i barely use auto pilot on any approach ... is moment to be in control and 
to make my training. ... that s why i found curious ... ILS are authorised to 200 ft 
without automation as you know ... if so is because we must be able to do ... this 
subject apart i understand the objective of your questions... but don t be afraid to 
chock.. you wanna know the reality .... i think !! All Lucky 
At last someone willing to take on the Human Factor beast lurking in the shadows, 
hiding behind a quick blame-the-pilot escape. I will gladly participate in this 
research. Good luck with the Phd and thank you for making a stand for us pilots. 
 
• Future Research 
•  
• One day, you should investigate the reporting culture in China. Their punishment 
culture. 
 
• I do not believe I saw one single question on your survey related to fatigue.  Fatigue 
is a very serious issue for any commercial airline crew.  A pilot's decision to hand-
fly an aircraft will be affected by the pilot's determination of his/her physical state 
and the state of his/her fellow Flight Deck crew member.  If the Flying Pilot (FP) is 
too tired, he'll more than likely allow the Autopilot (AP) to fly the aircraft.  If my 
departure time is before 7:00 AM, I normally do not hand-fly the aircraft because 
my day more than likely started at 5:00 AM or 4:00 AM in the morning.  We 
normally get on the hotel van an hour before departure time and I normally wakeup 
an hour before the hotel van time; therefore, a 7:00 AM departure is a 5:00 
AM wakeup call, a 6:00 AMdeparture is a 4:00 AM wakeup call, and a 5:00 
AM departure is a 3:00 AM wakeup call.  I've had a few 5:00 AM departures.  They 
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are dangerous to say the least.  Even if you go to bed at 8:00 PM, you more than 
likely will just lay in bed until 10:00 PM, which only allows you to get 5 hours or 
less of sleep.  This is the best time to allow the AP system to fly the aircraft.  Also, 
if you are on the last hour of your 12, 13 or 14 hour duty day, allowing the AP to fly 
the aircraft is more than likely the safest thing to do; especially if your landing 
after 11:00 PM. 
 
One more thing:  the regional airline industry is an entry level industry for new 
pilots that graduate from schools like ERAU.  Mainline carriers take the best 
regional Captains and military pilots so they don't have the same new hire safety 
issues that regional airlines have.  Safety is at its most risky point during a new 
hire's first year or first 500 hours.  During this time, it's good to have the new hire 
pilot use the AP as much as possible because it will teach him/her how to fly the 
aircraft through AP demonstration and recognize the different automation modes. 
 
I fly the Bombardier CRJ700 (70 Seats) for a regional airline.  The aircraft has a 
glass instrumented Flight Deck but no Auto-Thrust system.  We hand-fly the aircraft 
as much as possible below 10,000 feet and normally engage the AP before FL180 
but definitely before FL290 due to RVSM automation requirements.  We do this 
primarily because it's FUN!  We know that some day we'll move on to a "mainline" 
carrier and fly an aircraft that wasn't even designed to have the pilot fly it except for 
5 minutes during the takeoff and landing.  Mr. Henry is more than likely 
experiencing this now at his mainline carrier (he's a former regional pilot). 
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Tables 
Table I-1 
Pilot Test 5-model Validity Measures 
 CR AVE MSV MaxR(H) MF PU PT SC 
MF 0.691 0.322 0.233 0.732 0.567    
PU 0.757 0.388 0.354 0.775 0.483** 0.623   
PT 0.590 0.220 0.657 0.679 -0.266† -0.595*** 0.469  
SC 0.725 0.358 0.657 0.769 0.096 0.396** -0.810*** 0.598 
AP 0.776 0.421 0.071 0.811 0.023 0.064 -0.124 0.267* 
 
 
Table I-2 
Pilot test 5-model Model Fit Measures E 2 Model Fit Measures PreTest 5 Factor 
Measures Acceptable Thresholds Observed Model Fit 
CMIN/df <3.0* 1.643 
CFI >.95 Excellent ; >.90 Traditional; > .80 Permissible* 0.738 
SRMR <.05 Good Fit; .05-.08 Adequate Fit, >.10 Poor fit* 0.099 
RMSEA <.05 Good Fit; .05-.10 Moderate, >.10 Poor fit* 0.078 
PCLOSE 1=Perfect  0.000 
*Hu and Bentler (1999) 
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Table I-3 
Inter-item Correlation Matrix Table 
 
 
SC1 SC3 SC5 PT1 PT6 PU1 PU2 PU3 PU4 PU5 AP1 AP2 AP3 AP4 MF3 RevMF4 MF2
Pearson 
Correlation
1 .585** .407** .417** .329** 0.138 0.071 0.131 0.044 .201* 0.163 .207* -0.062 0.169 0.001 -0.082 0.157
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0.14 0.453 0.163 0.642 0.031 0.082 0.026 0.512 0.071 0.992 0.383 0.093
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
.585** 1 .418** .444** .433** .244** 0.133 0.105 0.104 .256** .233* 0.172 0.072 .233* -0.042 0.037 0.006
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0 0.009 0.156 0.264 0.269 0.006 0.012 0.067 0.442 0.012 0.653 0.692 0.947
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
.407** .418** 1 .301** .325** 0.071 -0.033 0.087 0.079 0.158 0.049 0.173 -0.093 0.162 -0.158 -0.095 0.035
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0.001 0 0.449 0.726 0.355 0.401 0.092 0.607 0.065 0.321 0.084 0.092 0.31 0.711
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
.417** .444** .301** 1 .288** .402** .187* .201* 0.177 .406** 0.101 0.161 0.002 0.106 0.079 0.02 0.103
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0.001 0.002 0 0.045 0.032 0.058 0 0.283 0.085 0.983 0.261 0.401 0.832 0.275
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
.329** .433** .325** .288** 1 0.104 -0.05 0.061 0.128 .247** 0.141 0.159 0.095 .242** 0.072 0.07 0.082
Sig. (2-tailed) 0 0 0 0.002 0.267 0.593 0.515 0.173 0.008 0.132 0.089 0.311 0.009 0.447 0.46 0.381
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.138 .244** 0.071 .402** 0.104 1 .306** .513** .371** .366** -0.079 0.008 -0.074 -0.037 0.131 0.027 .246**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.14 0.009 0.449 0 0.267 0.001 0 0 0 0.401 0.932 0.434 0.693 0.162 0.771 0.008
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.071 0.133 -0.033 .187* -0.05 .306** 1 .293** .457** .409** 0.012 -0.043 0.115 0.023 0.031 0.027 0.128
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.453 0.156 0.726 0.045 0.593 0.001 0.001 0 0 0.899 0.652 0.22 0.806 0.74 0.776 0.174
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.131 0.105 0.087 .201* 0.061 .513** .293** 1 .369** .320** -0.119 0.065 0.02 -0.001 0.166 0.058 0.031
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.163 0.264 0.355 0.032 0.515 0 0.001 0 0 0.204 0.49 0.831 0.991 0.076 0.537 0.741
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.044 0.104 0.079 0.177 0.128 .371** .457** .369** 1 .547** 0.081 -0.085 0.178 0.065 0.041 -0.064 .191*
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.642 0.269 0.401 0.058 0.173 0 0 0 0 0.392 0.367 0.057 0.49 0.666 0.499 0.041
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
.201* .256** 0.158 .406** .247** .366** .409** .320** .547** 1 0.15 -0.025 0.071 0.098 0.095 0.014 .272**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.031 0.006 0.092 0 0.008 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.789 0.449 0.298 0.315 0.885 0.003
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.163 .233* 0.049 0.101 0.141 -0.079 0.012 -0.119 0.081 0.15 1 .351** .541** .600** -0.092 -0.096 0.045
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.082 0.012 0.607 0.283 0.132 0.401 0.899 0.204 0.392 0.11 0 0 0 0.329 0.306 0.631
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
.207* 0.172 0.173 0.161 0.159 0.008 -0.043 0.065 -0.085 -0.025 .351** 1 .420** .432** -0.081 0.005 -0.048
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.026 0.067 0.065 0.085 0.089 0.932 0.652 0.49 0.367 0.789 0 0 0 0.387 0.958 0.608
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
-0.062 0.072 -0.093 0.002 0.095 -0.074 0.115 0.02 0.178 0.071 .541** .420** 1 .499** -0.017 -0.007 0.04
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.512 0.442 0.321 0.983 0.311 0.434 0.22 0.831 0.057 0.449 0 0 0 0.853 0.938 0.673
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.169 .233* 0.162 0.106 .242** -0.037 0.023 -0.001 0.065 0.098 .600** .432** .499** 1 -.217* -0.105 -0.036
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.071 0.012 0.084 0.261 0.009 0.693 0.806 0.991 0.49 0.298 0 0 0 0.02 0.266 0.702
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.001 -0.042 -0.158 0.079 0.072 0.131 0.031 0.166 0.041 0.095 -0.092 -0.081 -0.017 -.217* 1 .564** .401**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.992 0.653 0.092 0.401 0.447 0.162 0.74 0.076 0.666 0.315 0.329 0.387 0.853 0.02 0 0
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
-0.082 0.037 -0.095 0.02 0.07 0.027 0.027 0.058 -0.064 0.014 -0.096 0.005 -0.007 -0.105 .564** 1 .282**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.383 0.692 0.31 0.832 0.46 0.771 0.776 0.537 0.499 0.885 0.306 0.958 0.938 0.266 0 0.002
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
Pearson 
Correlation
0.157 0.006 0.035 0.103 0.082 .246** 0.128 0.031 .191* .272** 0.045 -0.048 0.04 -0.036 .401** .282** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.093 0.947 0.711 0.275 0.381 0.008 0.174 0.741 0.041 0.003 0.631 0.608 0.673 0.702 0 0.002
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 115
MF2
AP1
AP2
AP3
AP4
MF3
RevMF
4
PT6
PU1
PU2
PU3
PU4
PU5
Inter-item Correlations Matrix table
SC1
SC3
SC5
PT1
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Table I-4 
Inter-item Correlation Matrix Table 
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Figure J-1.  Pretest 5 factor model. 
 
